Motion to set aside default reply.pdf

Daniel Zuckerbrod, Petitioner Vs. City Of Southfield, Respondent · 24-004053-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

 

IN THE MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

Daniel Zuckerbrod, 

 

 

 

Petitioner, 

 

vs. 

 

City of Southfield, 

 

 

 

Respondent. 

 

Docket no. 24–004053 

____________________________________________________________________/ 

 

DEAN & FULKERSON, P.C. 

Thomas P. Christy (P55593) 

Attorneys for Petitioner 

100 West Big Beaver Road, Suite 650 

Troy, Michigan 48084 

248–362–1300/fax –1358 

tchristy@dflaw.com 

 

HALLAHAN & ASSOCIATES 

Laura M. Hallahan (P42101) 

Seth A. O’Loughlin (P80257) 

Kelsea M. Melcher (P85821) 

Attorneys for Respondent 

1750 South Telegraph Road, Suite 202 

Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302 

248–731–3089 

lhallahan@hallahanlaw.com 

____________________________________________________________________/ 

 

REPLY RE: MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 

The petitioner is aware that TTR 231 does not provide for replies on 

motions. However, given that the respondent makes a serious allegation, i.e. that 

the petitioner may be deliberately defying the tribunal (response at ¶ 3), the 

petitioner asks the tribunal to tolerate a short response to that claim: 

1. The petitioner has no incentive to delay when the petitioner is seeking 

relief. 

2. In the original case from which this one was spun off, when the 

petitioner’s current counsel took over, he withdrew the main dispute between the 

parties from consideration because he believed the facts did not support it, then

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attempted to settle the minor remaining issues. That is hardly bad faith or delay. 

Meanwhile, the respondent’s counsel has taken a “no negotiations” posture. That 

is her right and prerogative, but her office should not be accusing the petitioner of 

delaying tactics when he has been the one take the initiative on settlement.1 

3. Part of the delay arises from an error by the tribunal’s clerk. On April 4, 

2025, the tribunal’s original order of default stated that “petitioner failed to file 

proof evidencing service of the petition.” This was not correct: the petitioner 

included a proof of service at the end of the petition. Because the clerk apparently 

did not see the original proof of service at all, the original default notice did not 

identify any deficiencies in it. Therefore, on April 18, 2025, the petitioner timely 

and simply re-filed the original proof of service as a separate document with no 

other changes. 

Then, on May 27, 2025, about six weeks later, the tribunal held that the 

petitioner’s original service attempt was inadequate. The rules are not clear 

whether a severed petition is truly a new petition requiring “six address” service 

under TTR 227(6): first, under TTR 225(2), adding a subsequent year is done by 

motion, which, under TTR 227(11), clearly does not require six address service; 

second, severance is not mentioned anywhere in the rules; third, given that the 

severed petition formed part of the original petition, which was already given six 

address service, and is not a new document, such service is not required. Indeed, 

the other time when the petitioner’s counsel was involved with a severed petition 

 

1 The petitioner is not providing the relevant e-mail correspondence here because 

of MRE 408, but could do so if the tribunal were to order production.

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(docket no. 22–000561), the tribunal did not require service of the severed 

petition. That said, the petitioner did not contest the tribunal’s present 

interpretation and timely complied with most of the order. That is hardly bad 

faith delay. 

Admittedly, the petitioner’s counsel forgot to file a motion in addition to the 

proof of service. He remedied that also. To dismiss the case when the petitioner’s 

counsel otherwise showed a pattern of compliance would be overkill. If the 

tribunal wishes to punish petitioner’s counsel, a sanction would be more 

appropriate. 

 

Dated: July 25, 2025 

Respectfully submitted, 

 

DEAN & FULKERSON, P.C. 

 

By: /s/ Thomas P. Christy (P55593) 

Attorneys for Petitioner 

100 West Big Beaver Road, Suite 650 

Troy, Michigan 48084 

248–362–1300/fax –1358 

tchristy@dflaw.com 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

Thomas P. Christy states that on July 25, 2025, he served a copy of this 

document upon Laura Hallahan by e-mail at lhallahan@hallahanlaw.com as 

permitted by TTR 221(11). I declare that the above statements are true to the 

best of my information, knowledge, and belief. 

 

Dated: July 25, 2025 

/s/ Thomas P. Christy

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