MTT_26-002294_Motion_for_Reconsideration_SIGNED_CERTIFIED.pdf

Mathias El Tribe Trust Petitioner V City Of Southfield Respondent · 26-002294-TT

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MATHIAS EL TRIBE TRUST 

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TRUSTEE 

4305 Sun Devils Avenue 

Bakersfield, California 93313 

Office: (628) 288-7423 I Email: mmccaster@mathiaseltribe.org 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL - SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

MATHIAS EL TRIBE TRUST, 

Petitioner, 

MIT Docket No. 26-002294 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF FEE­

WAIVER DENIAL AND DEFAULT; REQUEST 

TO HOLD MONETARY CURE IN ABEYANCE 

v. 

CITY OF SOUTHFIELD, 

Respondent. 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF FEE-WAIVER DENIAL AND DEFAULT 

AND REQUEST TO HOLD MONETARY CURE IN ABEYANCE 

Petitioner Mathias El Tribe Trust moves under TTR 261 for reconsideration of the October 1, 

2026 Order Denying Petitioner's Fee Waiver Request and Order Holding Petitioner in Default. 

Petitioner contemporaneously submits the Tribunal-directed amended petition and a renewed fee­

waiver request addressing the financial condition of the named Petitioner itself. The amended petition 

corrects the representative-information issue identified in the order; this motion addresses the fee­

waiver and default determinations. 

I. THE MOTION IS TIMELY, AND THE NON-MONETARY CURE HAS BEEN

COMPLETED. 

TTR 261 permits reconsideration of an order on a motion filed within 21 days after entry. The 

present motion is filed within that period. No response or oral argument is permitted unless ordered by 

the Tribunal. TTR 261(1)-(2). 

The October 1 order separately required an amended petition identifying Mathias El Tribe Trust 

as Petitioner and completing Section 2 with the information of the Authorized Representative who 

signed the petition. The accompanying amended petition does exactly that: it keeps Mathias El Tribe 

Trust as the named Petitioner and identifies Chief Mathias El as the Authorized Representat:iye acting 

on behalf of Petitioner. The representative-information portion of the default should therefore be 

deemed cured. 

Page 1

II. THE OCTOBER 1 FEE-WAIVER RULING SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED OR

CLARIFIED UNDER THE TEXT OF TTR 213. 

The prior waiver request proceeded under TTR 213(2) because it identified means-tested Tribal 

TANF received by the Authorized Representative. The October 1 order treated subrule (2) as asking 

whether the party receiving the waiver is itself receiving the identified public assistance. Petitioner 

does not repeat the prior request on that ground. 

The renewed request presents a different question under TTR 213(4): whether the named 

Petitioner is unable because of indigence to pay the required fee. TTR 213(4) speaks in terms of a 

"party" and "they," but then defines indigence through a household-income measure designed around 

a natural-person household. Mathias El Tribe Trust is not a natural person and has no household to 

report. It does, however, have an actual financial condition: it has no operating income, no available 

cash, no liquid funds, and no operating account from which the $200 petition fee or the $25 motion fee 

can be paid. The Trust holds property for the stated trust, tribal, governmental, charitable, and 

beneficiary purposes, but that property is not a liquid source available to pay litigation fees. 

The order stated broadly that, because the party is "a trust, not an individual," it does not qualify 

for a fee waiver under the Tribunal's rules. Petitioner respectfully asks the Tribunal to reconsider or 

clarify that statement. The only waiver basis actually presented before the order was entered was TTR 

213(2). The separate TTR 213(4) question was not developed on the Trust's own financial facts. 

Treating the household-income wording as a categorical exclusion of every non-natural party would 

add a limitation that TTR 213(4) does not expressly state. At minimum, the issue warrants a reasoned 

determination on the renewed request rather than an automatic default based on the form of the 

Petitioner. 

The textual contrast within Michigan procedure reinforces the need for clarification. Michigan 

Court Rule 2.002(A){l), which governs fee waivers in ordinary Michigan courts, expressly limits 

waiver eligibility to individuals and excludes public or private organizations unless a statute provides 

otherwise. TTR 213 contains no comparable individual-only sentence. Petitioner does not contend that 

MCR 2.002 governs this Tribunal request; the comparison is offered only to show that Michigan uses 

express language when it intends an individual-only limitation. 

This is a good-faith request for application, clarification, or, if necessary, extension of the existing 

rule to the circumstances actually presented. See TTR 215(2)(b) (a signature certifies that the filing is 

warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing 

law). 

Page2

III. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW LIMITS THE USE OF STATE PROCEDURE WHEN

PROCEDURE BECOMES A CONDITION THAT IMPAIRS TRIBAL INTERESTS OR 

FORUM ACCESS. 

Petitioner does not contend that every neutral state filing requirement is displaced merely because 

tribal interests are implicated. Federal Indian law draws a more precise line: ordinary state-court 

processes may apply, but a State may not use access conditions or procedural classifications to exact a 

surrender of protected tribal interests, to convert forum jurisdiction into substantive regulatory or 

taxing authority, or to accomplish indirectly a consequence that federal law does not authorize. 

A principal Supreme Court access-to-forum authority is Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort 

Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 887-93 (1986) (Wold II). North 

Dakota conditioned tribal access to state court on waiver of tribal sovereign immunity and acceptance 

of state civil law. In Wold H's statutory setting, the Supreme Court held North Dakota's jurisdictional 

disclaimer scheme preempted by Public Law 280, and explained that this conclusion was reinforced 

by the scheme's undue burden on federal and tribal interests in Indian self-government and autonomy, 

as well as the federal interest in ensuring access to the courts. The Court also recognized the limiting 

principle that a tribal plaintiff remains subject to the normal processes of the forum in which it files. 

Id. at 891-92. Petitioner cites Wold II for that distinction, not for the proposition that Public Law 280 

itself governs this proceeding: ordinary process is one thing; a condition that alters or burdens 

protected tribal interests as the price of access is another. 

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388-91 (1976), supplies the related jurisdictional rule. A 

grant of state civil adjudicatory jurisdiction did not itself confer general civil regulatory or taxing 

authority over reservation Indians. Forum jurisdiction and substantive taxing power are therefore 

separate inquiries. Michigan may designate this Tribunal as the exclusive state forum for review of a 

property-tax assessment, see MCL 205. 731, without that forum designation itself answering whether 

the challenged assessment, classification, fee consequence, lien consequence, or other burden is 

substantively authorized. 

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 

505, 509-10 (1991), reinforces the distinction between using a forum and surrendering tribal 

protections: a tribe did not waive sovereign immunity merely by filing an action challenging a 

proposed state tax assessment. Participation in a state-created review process therefore should not be 

treated as blanket consent to unrelated substantive consequences. 

The Indian tax cases likewise require consequence-specific authority. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe 

of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985), requires clear congressional consent before a State taxes 

protected Indian interests. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian 

Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 268-70 (1992), sustained the particular tax Congress authorized but rejected a 

different tax that Congress had not authorized. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 

U.S. 463, 480-83 (1976), similarly distinguished prohibited state taxes and a vendor-license fee from a 

minimal collection burden tied to a tax validly imposed on non-Indians. These cases do not establish 

that every court filing fee is invalid. They establish the governing method: identify the exact burden, 

identify the exact source of state authority, and determine whether federal law permits that 

consequence. 

Page 3

Petitioner does not ask the Tribunal, on this motion, to assume any federal predicate that remains 

disputed in the underlying assessment appeal. The narrower point is that administrative labels and 

procedural defaults cannot themselves decide those antecedent status questions. Where a controlling 

federal statute, treaty, restriction, or rule of federal Indian law applies to a particular consequence, the 

Supremacy Clause requires the federal rule to control to the extent of actual conflict. 

IV. APPLIED HERE, THE FEE-AND-DEFAULT MECHANISM SHOULD NOT

FORECLOSE REVIEW WHILE THE RENEWED WAIVER QUESTION IS PENDING. 

Michigan has assigned the Tax Tribunal exclusive and original jurisdiction over direct review of 

final property-tax decisions within MCL 205. 731. Petitioner is therefore using the state forum 

Michigan itself requires for this assessment challenge. The problem presented by the October 1 order 

is not merely the existence of a filing fee. It is the combination of (a) an exclusive state forum, (b) a 

fee-waiver rule whose indigence definition is written in natural-person household terms, ( c) a non­

natural Petitioner that has no household and no liquid funds, and ( d) a default consequence if that 

Petitioner cannot satisfy a monetary condition that it contends the rule should waive or adapt to its 

actual financial condition. 

If the Tribunal ultimately determines, after considering the renewed request, that the fee is an 

ordinary, validly applicable process and that no waiver is available, Petitioner preserves its objections 

but recognizes that Wold II does not by itself invalidate every normal filing requirement. What should 

not occur is use of the drafting mismatch itself - "trust, not an individual" - as a categorical reason to 

deny any meaningful inability-to-pay showing, while simultaneously treating nonpayment as a basis to 

block the only state forum available to test the underlying assessment. That is the point at which an 

ordinary procedure risks becoming the kind of access condition Wold II requires courts to examine 

under federal Indian law. 

The appropriate interim course is therefore modest and preserves every side of the dispute: deem 

the representative-information defect cured; promptly decide the renewed fee-waiver request on the 

Petitioner's own circumstances; and hold the monetary cure and any further default consequence in 

abeyance until that determination is made. If the renewed waiver is denied, TTR 213(5) supplies a 

familiar mechanism for preserving the filing date by allowing payment after denial within the period 

fixed by the Tribunal. Petitioner asks that any such period run from the ruling on the renewed request 

so that seeking reconsideration does not itself destroy the underlying appeal. 

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully asks the Tribunal to enter an order: 

1. reconsidering or clarifying the October 1 fee-waiver ruling so that the prior TTR 213(2)

determination is not treated as a categorical holding that a trust can never seek relief under TTR

213(4); 

2. accepting the amended petition and deeming the representative-information portion of the October 1

default cured;

3. holding the $200 monetary cure requirement, the $25 motion fee, and any further default, dismissal,

or set-aside-default requirement in abeyance while the renewed fee-waiver request and this motion

are decided; 

Page4

4. clarifying that neither the fee ruling, the preprinted form categories, nor Petitioner's participation in

this proceeding adjudicates or concedes the substantive legal character of the Trust, the tribal and

beneficiary interests it administers, the subject property, or the underlying federal and tribal 

objections preserved in the appeal; and 

5. if the renewed waiver is denied, allowing the payment period fixed under TTR 213(5) to run from

the order deciding the renewed request, without loss of the original filing date and without waiver

of preserved objections. 

Dated: October 1, 2026 

Respectfully submitted, 

MATHIAS EL TRIBE TRUST 

By: 

 

CHIEF MATHIAS EL 

Chief, Trustee, and Authorized Representative 

Acting solely in representative capacity on behalf of Mathias El Tribe Trust 

Office of the Chief Justice and Trustee 

Page 5

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I certify that on Oc .4, obe:<: \ f 

• 2026, I served a copy of the foregoing Motion for 

Reconsideration of Fee-Waiver Denial and Default and Request to Hold Monetary Cure in Abeyance, 

together with the accompanying Renewed Fee Waiver Request and Amended Petition, on the City of 

Southfield using the service address or agreed electronic-service address shown in the case record. 

Method of Service: [ ] U.S. Mail [ ] Certified Mail Wgreed Electronic Service [ ] Other: 

Service Address / Email: 


 

Signature/ Stamp: _____ c_)ff_,cc_of_th,_•,. h_.u:_.fJ,_"''_· (_"n_d1

_ .... "'_"'_' -------

CHIEF MATHIAS EL 

Authorized Representative of Mathias El Tribe Trust 

Page 6 

[ ] Agreed

X

City of Southfield, Attn: City Clerk, P.O. Box 2055, Southfield, MI 48037-2055

Certified Mail No.: 9414 8362 0855 1308 0763 67

Certified Mail No.: 9414 8362 0855 1308 0763 67

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