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24-003981.pdf

Aaron Shields, Petitioner V Township Of Chesterfield, Respondent · 24-003981-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Aaron Shields, 

 

 

 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

Petitioner, 

 

 

 

 

 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

 

 

v 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case Type: Special Assessment 

 

Chesterfield Township, 

 

 

 

 

Presiding Judge 

 

Respondent. 

 

 

 

 

Jason C. Grinnell 

 

FINAL OPINION AND JUDGMENT 

 

Location of Hearing: 

 

 

Telephonic 

Hearing Held on: 

 

 

 

December 2, 2025 

Appearances on Behalf of Petitioner: 

Aaron Shields and Nicole Shields 

Appearances on Behalf of Respondent: Joel Nickels, appraiser 

 

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT 

 

The special assessment at issue shall be as follows: 

 

Parcel Number: 15-09-27-279-002 

Type of Special Assessment

Total Amount to be Levied

Paving of Salt River Drive 

$7,657.15, payable in installments of 

$765.72 per year for 10 years

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 

Petitioner protested the special assessment at the hearing held to confirm the special 

assessment roll. A hearing was held and the special assessment was confirmed on 

September 24, 2024. 

 

Petitioner filed a petition with the Tribunal on October 23, 2024, and Respondent filed its 

answer on November 7, 2024. 

 

ISSUES AND APPLICABLE LAW 

 

The issue in this matter is: 

 

Whether the benefit from the special assessment is proportional to the cost of the 

improvement.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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The Michigan Supreme Court has held: 

 

A special assessment is a levy upon property within a specified district. 

Although it resembles a tax, a special assessment is not a tax. In contrast 

to a tax, a special assessment is imposed to defray the costs of specific 

local improvements, rather than to raise revenue for general governmental 

purposes . . . . In other words, a special assessment can be seen as 

remunerative; it is a specific levy designed to recover the costs of 

improvements that confer local and peculiar benefits upon property within 

a defined area.1 

 

Special assessments “are permissible only when the improvements result in an 

increase in the value of the land specially assessed,”2 and to be valid “‘there must be 

some proportionality between the amount of the special assessment and the benefits 

derived therefrom.’”3 The Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he essential question is not 

whether there was any change in market value, but rather whether the market value of 

the assessed property was increased as a result of the improvement.”4 Further, 

Common sense dictates that in order to determine whether the market 

value of an assessed property has been increased as a result of an 

improvement, the relevant comparison is not between the market value of 

the assessed property after the improvement and the market value of the 

assessed property before the improvement, but rather it is between the 

market value of the assessed property with the improvement and the 

market value of the assessed property without the improvement.5 

 

It is well settled, however, that municipal decisions regarding special assessments are 

presumed valid and should generally be upheld.6 

 

When reviewing the validity of special assessments, it is not the task of 

courts to determine whether there is ‘a rigid dollar-for-dollar balance 

between the amount of the special assessment and the amount of the 

benefit . . . .’ Rather, a special assessment will be declared invalid only 

when the party challenging the assessment demonstrates that ‘there is a 

substantial or unreasonable disproportionality between the amount 

assessed and the value which accrues to the land as a result of the 

improvements.’7 

 

 

1Kadzban v Grandville, 442 Mich 495, 500; 502 NW2d 299 (1993) (citations omitted). 

2 Id. at 501. 

3 Id. at 501-502. 

4 Ahearn v Bloomfield Charter Twp, 235 Mich App 486, 496; 597 NW2d 858, 863 (1999). 

5 Id. 

6 Id. at 502 

7 Id.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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“[T]he question whether and how much the value of land has increased as the result of 

certain improvements is factual, to be determined on the basis of evidence presented by 

the parties. As such, it is to be resolved by the trier of fact . . . .”8 

 

Pursuant to R 792.10133, after hearing, the Tribunal must issue a final decision in 

writing. Additionally, “[a] written final decision shall include separate sections entitled 

“findings of fact” and “conclusions of law.’” Findings of fact “shall include a concise 

statement of the underlying supporting facts” that are “based exclusively on the 

evidence.”9 Consequently, the Tribunal has not addressed every piece of evidence or 

every inference that might lead to a conflicting conclusion and has rejected evidence 

contrary to its findings. Furthermore, “[e]ach conclusion of law shall be supported by 

authority or reasoned opinion.”10 Accordingly, the Tribunal will outline the summary of 

evidence, findings of facts, and conclusions of law, before ultimately rendering 

judgment. 

 

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 

 

A. Petitioner’s Evidence 

 

Petitioner contends that the special assessment is invalid and should be reduced as 

follows: 

 

Type of Special Assessment

Petitioner’s Contention

Paving of Salt River Drive

$0

 

The exhibits offered by Petitioner may be viewed on lines 8 and 9 of the docket 

maintained in this case.11 

 

No exhibits were excluded from evidence. 

 

Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Petitioner contends 

that the special assessment does not confer a special benefit to their property. 

 

At hearing, Aaron and Nicole Shields (collectively the “Shields”), provided sworn 

testimony concerning the special assessment. The Shields contend that the special 

assessment for paving does not confer a special benefit or increase in value to their 

property. The Shields testified that their research revealed a market increase to their 

property of 5.6%, while other properties in the special assessment district increased by 

only .26%. Further, the Shields contend only the private portion of Salt River Drive was 

paved while the public portion, which the Shields contend is in worse shape, was not. 

 

8 Id. at 502-503. 

9 See also MCR 2.517(a). 

10 Id. 

11 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be 

accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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In rebuttal, the Shields submit that the only way to get to their property is to traverse 

Jefferson Road, a public road, that is in poor repair. Accordingly, the Shields contend 

that because the public portion of the road was not repaved, they received no real 

benefit to their property. 

 

Upon inquiry by the Tribunal, the Shields testified that they are not disputing the special 

assessment district was properly formed and acknowledged over 50% over the special 

assessment district’s homeowners voted in favor of the paving. 

 

B. Respondent’s Evidence 

 

Respondent contends that the special assessment is lawful and should be upheld as 

follows: 

 

Type of Special Assessment

Total Special Assessment Levied

Paving of Salt River Drive

$7,657.15

 

The exhibits offered by Respondent may be viewed on lines 5 and 10 of the docket 

maintained in this case.12 

 

No exhibits were excluded from evidence. 

 

Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Respondent contends 

that the special assessment was properly formed and proportional to the benefit 

received. 

 

At hearing, Respondent’s appraiser, Joel Nickels, testified that the special assessment 

was calculated using a front foot basis. Mr. Nickels agreed that Salt River Drive 

consists of both public and private frontages. Mr. Nickels submits that the paving 

confers a benefit by protecting the value of the properties in the special assessment 

district. Mr. Nickels further testified that over 71% of the properties located in the 

special assessment district voted in favor of the paving. 

 

Mr. Nickels testified that the paving project was completed in summer of 2024. 

Although the Shields contend other properties in the special assessment district and 

same economic condition factor (ECF) neighborhood saw minimal increases in their 

2025 assessment, Mr. Nickels noted the subject property is a ranch and has a different 

ECF than two-story or other non-ranch type homes. 

 

In rebuttal, Mr. Nickels commended Petitioner but pointed out that Petitioner has the 

burden of proof to overcome the validity of the special assessment, which Mr. Nickels 

contends was not done in this case, and therefore the special assessment should be 

upheld. 

 

 

12 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be 

accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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FINDINGS OF FACT 

 

The following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence, based upon the 

pleadings, exhibits, and testimony: 

 

1. The subject property is located at 48884 Salt River Drive, Chesterfield, Michigan 

in Macomb County. 

2. The special assessment at issue in this appeal was imposed under MCL 41.722. 

3. The improvements proposed by the special assessment consist of paving Salt 

River Drive. 

4. The portion of Salt River Drive subject to the special assessment is a private 

road. 

5. The total amount of the original special assessment was $286,381.11 and was 

later reduced to $208,925.33 or $72.07 per front foot. 

6. The subject property consists of 106.25 front feet, resulting in a total special 

assessment cost of $7,657.15 or $765.72 per year, payable over a 10-year 

period (plus interest). 

7. The special assessment was calculated using a per front foot basis. The total 

frontage was approximately 2,900 front feet. 

8. Twenty-six of the 37 (70%) property owners signed in favor of the special 

assessment. 

9. The special assessment district was property formed. 

10. Hearings concerning the special assessment were held on May 28, 2024, and 

September 24, 2024. 

11. Petitioner protested the special assessment at the September 24, 2024 hearing. 

12. The subject property’s assessment increased from $373,000 in 2024 to $393,800 

in 2025, an increase of $20,800, or approximately 5.6%. 

13. Petitioner did not submit any valuation evidence to support his claim that the 

benefit of the special assessment is not proportional to the cost of the 

improvements. 

 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

 

The following authority and reasoned opinion supports the Tribunal’s determination: 

 

A special assessment is a levy upon property within a specified district. MCL 247.391 

allows for the establishment of Special Assessment Districts (SAD) for the purpose of 

providing maintenance for private roads if 51% of the property owners support a 

petition. It is not uncommon for abutting property to be specially assessed the costs of 

paving a road like in the instance here where Petitioner has been assessed, along with 

other parcels of land in the subdivision, to cover the costs of paving. Chesterfield 

Township has no jurisdiction over private roads, instead, it is up to the individual 

property owners of the land adjacent to the road by collecting funds to pay for the 

private maintenance of the road.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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This special assessment appeal involves the paving of Salt River Drive, a private road, 

at the request of approximately 70% of the property owners whose property abuts Salt 

River Drive. 

 

In special assessment cases, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over two issues, (1) whether 

the special assessment was properly formed, and (2) whether the benefit from the 

special assessment is proportional to the cost of the improvement. In this case, 

Petitioner appeals the special assessment levied against his property for the paving of a 

private portion of Salt River Drive. Petitioner does not contest whether the special 

assessment was properly formed, rather, Petitioner contends the benefit received from 

the paving project is not proportional to the benefit received. 

 

The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he essential question is not whether 

there was any change in market value, but rather whether the market value of the 

assessed property was increased as a result of the improvement.” Further, common 

sense dictates that in order to determine whether the market value of an assessed 

property has been increased as a result of an improvement, the relevant comparison is 

not between the market value of the assessed property after the improvement and the 

market value of the assessed property before the improvement, but rather it is between 

the market value of the assessed property with the improvement and the market value 

of the assessed property without the improvement.13 

As for the validity of the special assessment, our Michigan Supreme Court has held that 

“[t]he creation of a special assessment district through the legislative powers of a 

municipality enjoys a presumption of validity.”14 Thus, Petitioner has the burden of proof 

to establish that the special assessment is not valid. “[T]o effectively challenge special 

assessments, plaintiffs, at a minimum, must present credible evidence to rebut the 

presumption that the assessments are valid.15 Without such evidence, a tax tribunal 

has no basis to strike down special assessments.”16 

 

In this case, Petitioner submitted a table as evidence concerning the subject property 

and five other properties which are also part of the SAD on Salt River Drive, comparing 

the 2024 assessed value (AV) with the 2025 AV.17 Petitioner’s evidence shows an 

increase in the AV of the properties from tax year 2024 to 2025 to be between .26% and 

5.6%. Comparing the subject property’s 2024 AV of $186,500 with the 2025 AV of 

$196,900 results in a 5.6% or $20,800 increase in the true cash value. Overall, 

Petitioner’s evidence indicates that property values subject to the special assessment 

district were increasing from 2024 to 2025. However, Petitioner contends, “[t]he 

patterns across these parcels indicate that the repaving project did not produce any 

exceptional increase in market value.”18 

 

 

13 Ahearn v Bloomfield Charter Twp, 235 Mich App 486, 496; 597 NW2d 858, 863 (1999). 

14 Dixon Road Group v City of Novi, 426 Mich 390; 395 NW2d 211 (1986). 

15 Kadzban at 505. 

16 Kabzban at 508. 

17 See Tax Docker Lookup, line #9, Petitioner’s evidence, page 11. 

18 Id.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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However, the Tribunal finds that Petitioner’s table showing the change in AV from tax 

year 2024 to 2025 is not compelling, because property values can fluctuate for a 

multitude of other reasons other than road improvements. Moreover, Petitioner and his 

wife testified that in their opinion, the subject property did not benefit from the special 

assessment. Although Petitioner contends the repaving did not produce any 

“exceptional increase” in market value, that is not the relevant legal standard for the 

Tribunal to consider. Moreover, the Tribunal finds that mere statements without 

supporting evidence is not convincing. It is well-established that “[i]t is not sufficient for 

a party to simply announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this 

Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for 

him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.19 

 

As the Courts have held in multiple decisions, a Petitioner must present market 

evidence to prevail. When reviewing the validity of special assessments, it is not the 

task of courts to determine whether there is ‘a rigid dollar-for-dollar balance between the 

amount of the special assessment and the amount of the benefit ....’ Rather, a special 

assessment will be declared invalid only when the party challenging the assessment 

demonstrates that ‘there is a substantial or unreasonable disproportionality between the 

amount assessed and the value which accrues to the land as a result of the 

improvements.20 

 

Here, Petitioner, like the petitioners in Kadzban, failed to present proofs “which would 

directly controvert the reasonableness of the costs proportioned to petitioners.”21 In this 

case, Petitioner did not submit evidence concerning whether the benefit of the paving 

was proportional to the cost. Because Petitioner did not provide any evidence of value 

with and without the improvement, the Tribunal finds that Petitioner has failed to meet 

his burden of proof in rebutting the presumption that the special assessment is valid. 

 

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds the special assessment is affirmed. 

 

JUDGMENT 

 

IT IS ORDERED that the special assessment shall be as set forth in the Summary of 

Judgment section of this Final Opinion and Judgment. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall cause its records to be corrected to 

reflect the special assessment as finally shown in the Summary of Judgment section of 

this Final Opinion and Judgment within 20 days of the entry of this Final Opinion and 

Judgment. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with collecting or refunding the 

affected special assessment shall collect the assessment and any applicable interest or 

issue a refund within 28 days of entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment. 

 

19 Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232; 577 N.W.2d 100 (1998). 

20 Kadzban, at 302-303. 

21 Kadzban at 505.

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MTT Docket No. 24-003981 

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This Final Opinion and Judgment resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes 

this case. 

APPEAL RIGHTS 

If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for 

reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of 

Appeals. 

 

A motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Tribunal with the required filing fee 

within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision 

closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing 

system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such 

motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless 

the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a 

principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the 

decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty or disabled veterans exemption and, 

if so, there is no filing fee. You are required to serve a copy of the motion on the 

opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to 

electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the 

motion. Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral 

arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal. 

 

Alternatively, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the 

claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If 

the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal 

by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the 

record on appeal. There is no certification fee. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By _______________________________________ 

 

Entered: January 30, 2026 

jcg 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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