24-003392_Uncapping.pdf
Nathan T Burns, Petitioner V City Of Detroit, Respondent · 24-003392-TT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS LANSING MARLON I. BROWN, DPA DIRECTOR MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 Nathan T Burns, MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL Petitioner, SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION MTT Docket No. 24-003392 v Case Type: Uncapping City of Detroit, Presiding Judge Respondent. Marcus L. Abood ORDER OF DISMISSAL Location of Hearing: Telephonic Hearing Held on: April 30, 2025 Appearances on Behalf of Petitioner: Nathan Burns Appearances on Behalf of Respondent: Stephanie Hodges PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 16, 2024, the March BOR issued the decision indicating that the subject property’s Taxable Value (TV) was uncapped for tax year 2024 under MCL 211.27a. Petitioner filed a petition with the Tribunal on May 29, 2024. On September 10, 2024, the Tribunal issued an order placing Petitioner in default for failing to pay the filing fee with the petition. On September 23, 2024, Petitioner paid the filing fee for the petition. On September 30, 2024, the Tribunal issued an order setting aside Petitioner’s default. On October 9, 2024, Respondent filed an answer. The amount of the TV in dispute, as set forth in the pleadings, for all tax years at issue is within the jurisdictional limits of the Small Claims Division.1 Further, the property’s TV for subsequent tax years is included in this proceeding.2 ISSUES AND APPLICABLE LAW The issue in this matter is whether Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject property’s TV was improperly uncapped under MCL 211.27a. 1 See MCL 205.762(1). 2 See MCL 205.737(5)(b).
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MTT Docket No. 24-003392 Page 2 of 7 Under the General Property Tax Act, property taxes are based on the property’s TV for the tax year(s) at issue. MCL 211.27a provides that a property’s TV is the lesser of the property’s SEV or capped TV, and a property’s capped TV is, absent a transfer of ownership, determined mathematically by taking into consideration the prior tax year’s TV, statutory losses, the lesser of the rate of inflation or 5%, and statutory additions, including omitted property (i.e., property not previously assessed).3 MCL 211.27a(6) defines “transfer of ownership,” in relevant part, as follows: As used in this act, "transfer of ownership" means the conveyance of title to or a present interest in property, including the beneficial use of the property, the value of which is substantially equal to the value of the fee interest. Transfer of ownership of property includes, but is not limited to, the following: (a) A conveyance by deed. Pursuant to R 792.10133, after hearing, the Tribunal must issue a final decision in writing. Additionally, “[a] written final decision shall include separate sections entitled “findings of fact” and “conclusions of law.’” Findings of fact “shall include a concise statement of the underlying supporting facts” that are “based exclusively on the evidence.”4 Consequently, the Tribunal has not addressed every piece of evidence or every inference that might lead to a conflicting conclusion and has rejected evidence contrary to its findings. Furthermore, “[e]ach conclusion of law shall be supported by authority or reasoned opinion.”5 Accordingly, the Tribunal will outline the summary of evidence, findings of facts, and conclusions of law, before ultimately rendering judgment. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE A. Petitioner’s Evidence Petitioner’s contentions of TV: Parcel Number: 21079044-5 Year TV 2024 $8,687 3 See MCL 211.34d. 4 See also MCR 2.517(a). 5 Id.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003392 Page 3 of 7 The exhibits offered by Petitioner may be viewed at line-item entry 1 of the docket maintained in this case.6 The following exhibits were submitted into evidence: 1. Evidence, filed on May 29, 2024 a. March Board of Review Decision. No exhibits were excluded from evidence. Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Petitioner contends that the subject dwelling is gutted out. There is no bathroom or kitchen. The property has experienced vandalism. Petitioner is trying to make repairs but is a truck driver and is often on the road. Petitioner argues that Respondent’s photographs of the subject property are incomplete. On rebuttal, Petitioner owned the subject property as a non-profit with his former girlfriend for 10 years. The transfer from Petitioner’s girlfriend does not constitute a transfer resulting in uncapping. B. Respondent’s Evidence The property’s TV, as confirmed by the BOR, for the tax year(s) at issue: Parcel Number: 21079044-5 Year TV 2024 $39,600 No exhibits were submitted into evidence. Based on the pleadings and sworn testimony, Respondent contends that the subject’s change in ownership caused the uncapping in the subsequent year. Specifically, Petitioner purchased the subject from his former girlfriend on September 13, 2023, for $100. FINDINGS OF FACT The following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. The subject property is located at 21619 Moross Street, in the city of Detroit and within Wayne County. 2. The subject property is classified as residential. 3. Respondent uncapped the subject property’s TV based on the transfer of the subject property to Petitioner. 6 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003392 Page 4 of 7 4. Petitioner did not file a property transfer affidavit with Respondent, as required by MCL 211.27a(10). 5. Petitioner asserts that the subject property’s TV should not have been uncapped because there was not a transfer of ownership. 6. Petitioner purchased the subject property from his former girlfriend on September 13, 2023, for $100. 7. Petitioner did not submit any documentary evidence for an alleged non-profit organization. 8. Petitioner did not submit any ownership documents for the subject property. 9. Respondent did not submit any documentary evidence. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The following authority and reasoned opinion supports the Tribunal’s determination: Petitioner “has the burden of proof in establishing the [TCV] of the property.”7 “This burden encompasses two separate concepts: (1) the burden of persuasion, which does not shift during the course of the hearing, and (2) the burden of going forward with the evidence, which may shift to the opposing party.”8 Although the Tribunal has a duty to make an independent determination of value,9 the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that this duty “arises only when the petitioner has met its burden of going forward with evidence.”10 Therefore, “if a petitioner fails to come forward with competent evidence to challenge the assessed values of the property, then the tribunal's duty to make an independent determination of true cash value is not triggered.”11 Indeed, the Tribunal’s factual findings must be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.12 Thus, while the Tribunal may not “automatically accept a respondent’s assessment,”13 it may, upon motion or its own initiative, enter an involuntary dismissal if the petitioner fails to meet the burden of going forward.14 7 MCL 205.737(3). 8 Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354–55; 483 NW2d 416, 420 (1992). 9 See Alhi Dev Co v Orion Twp, 110 Mich App 764, 767; 314 NW2d 479, 481 (1981). 10 Dicastal N Am, Inc v City of Greenville, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2024 (Docket No. 365333) citing Great Lakes Div of Nat'l Steel Corp, 227 Mich App 379, 408- 410; 576 NW2d 667, 680-681 (1998). 11 Id. The Court further stated that it “will not assess the credibility of witnesses, and the determination of the weight to be given the evidence is within the Tax Tribunal’s discretion.” Id. (citations omitted). See also Country Meadows, GP v Macomb Twp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 1, 1997 (Docket No. 182305), wherein the Court held: “Plaintiffs cite Jones & Laughlin . . . . for the proposition that even when the plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof, the tribunal must still make an independent determination of the true cash value of the property in question. However, unlike the plaintiff in Jones & Laughlin, in the present case plaintiffs did not meet their burden of going forward with evidence. Under the circumstances, the tribunal could not make an independent determination of the true cash value of the property because it had no evidence on which to base such a determination except that provided by defendant. A contrary holding would be tantamount to requiring the tribunal to hire its own appraiser.” Id. (citations omitted). 12 See Antisdale v City of Galesburg, 420 Mich 265, 277; 362 NW2d 632 (1984); 13 Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 355-356. 14 See MCR 2.504(B)(2). See also Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354-355 and Great Lakes v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App at 408-410.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003392 Page 5 of 7 “The ‘substantial evidence test’ has been defined as evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. While it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence it may be substantially less than a preponderance of the evidence.”15 “Competent evidence” has been defined as “that which the very nature of the thing to be proven requires . . . . ”16 The “thing to be proven” in this case is the TCV of the property at issue. TCV is defined as “the usual selling price at the place where the property to which the term is applied is at the time of assessment, being the price that could be obtained for the property at private sale, and not at auction sale except as otherwise provided in this section, or at forced sale.”17 TCV is traditionally determined using one of three widely accepted appraisal methods: cost, income, and market.18 “Variations of these approaches and entirely new methods may be useful if found to be accurate and reasonably related to the fair-market value of the subject property.”19 Petitioner did not provide any evidence, let alone sufficient competent and material evidence to meet the burden of going forward in this case. Therefore, the burden of going forward did not shift to Respondent, and the Tribunal’s duty to make an independent determination of value was not triggered. As such, involuntary dismissal of the case is warranted. IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. JUDGMENT IT IS ORDERED that the 2024 tax year is DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with maintaining the assessment rolls for the 2024 tax year shall correct or cause the assessment rolls to be corrected to reflect the property’s true cash and taxable values within 20 days of entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment, subject to the processes of equalization.20 To the extent that the final level of assessment for a given year has not yet been determined and published, the assessment rolls shall be corrected once the final level is published or becomes known. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with collecting or refunding the affected taxes shall collect taxes and any applicable interest or issue a refund within 28 days of entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment. If a refund is warranted, it shall include a proportionate share of any property tax administration fees paid and penalty and interest paid on delinquent taxes. The refund shall also separately indicate the amount of the taxes, fees, penalties, and interest being refunded. A sum determined by 15 Russo v Dep't of Licensing & Regul, 119 Mich App 624, 631; 326 NW2d 583, 587 (1982). See also Dow Chem Co v Dep't of Treasury, 185 Mich App 458; 462 NW2d 765 (1990). 16 Goff v Bil–Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507, 514 n 5; 563 NW2d 214 (1997), overruled on other grounds in Mudel v Great Atl & Pac Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2000), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). See also Moore v Prestige Painting, 277 Mich App 437; 745 NW2d 816 (2007). 17 MCL 211.27(1). 18 Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n v City of Holland, 437 Mich 473, 485; 473 NW2d 636 (1991). 19 Id. 20 See MCL 205.755.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003392 Page 6 of 7 the Tribunal to have been unlawfully paid shall bear interest from the date of payment to the date of judgment, and the judgment shall bear interest to the date of its payment. A sum determined by the Tribunal to have been underpaid shall not bear interest for any time period prior to 28 days after the issuance of this Final Opinion and Judgment. Pursuant to MCL 205.737, interest shall accrue (i) after December 31, 2013, through June 30, 2016, at the rate of 4.25%, (ii) after June 30, 2016, through December 31, 2016, at the rate of 4.40%, (iii) after December 31, 2016, through June 30, 2017, at the rate of 4.50%, (iv) after June 30, 2017, through December 31, 2017, at the rate of 4.70%, (v) after December 31, 2017, through June 30, 2018, at the rate of 5.15%, (vi) after June 30, 2018, through December 31, 2018, at the rate of 5.41%, (vii) after December 31, 2018, through June 30, 2019, at the rate of 5.9%, (viii) after June 30, 2019, through December 31, 2019, at the rate of 6.39%, (ix) after December 31, 2019, through June 30, 2020, at the rate of 6.40%, (x) after June 30 2020, through December 31, 2020, at the rate of 5.63%, (xi) after December 31, 2020, through June 30, 2022, at the rate of 4.25%, (xii) after June 30, 2022, through December 31, 2022, at the rate of 4.27%, (xiii) after December 31, 2022, through June 30, 2023, at the rate of 5.65%, (xiv) after June 30, 2023, through December 31, 2023, at the rate of 8.25%, (xv) after December 31, 2023, through June 30, 2024, at the rate of 9.30%, (xvi) after June 30, 2024, through December 31, 2024, at the rate of 9.50%, and (xvii) after December 31, 2024, through June 30, 2025, at the rate of 9.47%, and (xviii) after June 30, 2025, through December 31, 2025, at the rate of 8.66%. This Final Opinion and Judgment resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes this case. APPEAL RIGHTS If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. A motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Tribunal with the required filing fee within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty or disabled veterans exemption and, if so, there is no filing fee. You are required to serve a copy of the motion on the opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the motion. Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003392 Page 7 of 7 Alternatively, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the record on appeal. There is no certification fee. By Entered: June 4, 2025 PROOF OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized representatives. By: Tribunal Clerk