24-003950.pdf

Scott Madison, Petitioner V City Of Whitehall, Respondent · 24-003950-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Scott Madison, 

 

 

 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

Petitioner, 

 

 

 

 

 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

v 

Case Type: Disabled Veterans 

Exemption 

 

City of Whitehall, 

 

 

 

 

 

Presiding Judge 

 

Respondent. 

 

 

 

 

Jason C. Grinnell 

 

FINAL OPINION AND JUDGMENT 

 

Location of Hearing: 

 

 

Telephonic 

Hearing Held on: 

 

 

 

September 9, 2025 

Appearances on Behalf of Petitioner: 

Petitioner requested hearing on file 

Appearances on Behalf of Respondent: Kelli Navarro 

 

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT 

 

Parcel No. 61-22-600-001-0043-00 is not granted a Disabled Veterans Exemption 

(DVE) under MCL 211.7b for the 2024 tax year from July 2, 2024, through December 

31, 2024. 

 

Parcel No. 61-22-600-001-0043-00 is not granted a DVE under MCL 211.7b for the 

2025 tax year.1 

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 

Petitioner filed an affidavit for DVE with the supervisor or other assessing officer which 

Respondent denied on August 14, 2024. 

 

Petitioner filed a petition with the Tribunal on August 29, 2024, and Respondent filed an 

answer on December 12, 2024. 

 

On July 16, 2025, Petitioner filed a request to have the case heard on file due to 

extenuating circumstances. The Tribunal granted Petitioner’s request on August 7, 

2025. 

 

 

1 Tax year 2025 is automatically included because this hearing took place after April 1, 2025. See MCL 

205.737(5)(a). If Petitioner returns and satisfies the requirements set forth in MCL 211.7b, Respondent 

would be required to pro-rate any property taxes as outlined in MCL 211.7b(3).

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

Page 2 of 7 

 

ISSUES AND APPLICABLE LAW 

 

The issue in this matter is whether the subject property qualifies for a property tax 

exemption under MCL 211.7b. The petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that they are entitled to an exemption.2 

 

MCL 211.7b(1) states: 

 

Real property used and owned as a homestead by either of the following 

individuals is exempt from the collection of taxes under this act: (a) A 

disabled veteran. (b) A surviving spouse of a disabled veteran who, 

immediately before death, was eligible for the exemption under this 

section. An exemption under this subdivision continues as long as the 

surviving spouse does not remarry, and the exemption applies to any 

property used and owned as a homestead by the surviving spouse, 

including homestead property acquired after the decedent’s death.3 

 

MCL 211.7b(2) states:: 

 

To obtain the exemption, an individual described in subsection (1)(a) or (b), 

or the individual’s legal designee, must file an application, in a form and 

manner prescribed by the state tax commission, showing the facts required 

by this section and a description of the real property with the assessing 

officer for the local assessing unit after January 1 and before December 31 

of the calendar year for which the exemption is claimed. The application 

when filed is open to inspection. The taxes subject to collection under this 

act shall be canceled for any year in which an individual described in 

subsection (1)(a) or (b) who is eligible for the exemption under this section 

has acquired title to real property exempt under this section. Upon granting 

the exemption under this section, each local taxing unit shall bear the loss 

of its portion of the taxes upon which the exemption has been granted. An 

exemption granted under this section as to taxes levied on or after January 

1, 2025 remains in effect, without subsequent reapplication, until it is 

rescinded by the individual who was granted the exemption or is denied by 

the assessor, as provided in section 7c.4 

 

MCL 211.7b(4)(a) defines a disabled veteran as a veteran who resides in Michigan and 

satisfies one of the following requirements: 

 

(i) Has been determined by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs to be 

permanently and totally disabled as a result of military service and entitled to 

veterans’ benefits at the 100% rate. 

 

2 See ProMed Healthcare v Kalamazoo, 249 Mich App 490; 644 NW2d 47 (2002). 

3 Id. 

4 Id.

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

Page 3 of 7 

 

(ii) Has a certificate from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs certifying 

that the veteran is receiving or has received pecuniary assistance due to 

disability for specially adapted housing. 

(iii) Has been rated by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs as 

individually unemployable.5 

 

“Veteran” is defined as “an individual who served in the United States Armed Forces, 

including the reserve components, and was discharged or released under honorable 

conditions.”6 

 

Pursuant to R 792.10133, after hearing, the Tribunal must issue a final decision in 

writing. Additionally, “[a] written final decision shall include separate sections entitled 

“findings of fact” and “conclusions of law.’” Findings of fact “shall include a concise 

statement of the underlying supporting facts” that are “based exclusively on the 

evidence.”7 Consequently, the Tribunal has not addressed every piece of evidence or 

every inference that might lead to a conflicting conclusion and has rejected evidence 

contrary to its findings. Furthermore, “[e]ach conclusion of law shall be supported by 

authority or reasoned opinion.”8 Accordingly, the Tribunal will outline the summary of 

evidence, findings of facts, and conclusions of law, before ultimately rendering 

judgment. 

 

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 

 

A. Petitioner’s Evidence 

 

The exhibits offered by Petitioner may be viewed on line 5 of the docket maintained in 

this case.9 

 

No exhibits were excluded from evidence. 

 

Based on the pleadings and admitted exhibits, Petitioner contends that he is a 100% 

disabled veteran who qualifies for a DVE. Further, Petitioner contends that he is not 

renting the subject property out for a commercial purpose, just to cover his expenses 

while away due to his wife’s military orders. 

 

B. Respondent’s Evidence 

 

The exhibits offered by Respondent may be viewed on line 8 of the docket maintained 

in this case.10 

 

5 Id. 

6 MCL 211.7b(4)(c). 

7 See also MCR 2.517(a). 

8 Id. 

9 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be 

accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case. 

10 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be 

accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case.

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

Page 4 of 7 

 

No exhibits were excluded from evidence. 

 

Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Respondent contends 

it properly denied the DVE because Petitioner does not presently occupy the subject 

property and is renting the property while Petitioner and his family are stationed abroad. 

 

At hearing, Respondent’s representative, Kelli Navarro, testified that Petitioner does not 

qualify for the DVE under MCL 211.7b because Petitioner does not presently use or 

occupy the subject property. Further, Ms. Navarro testified that the subject property is 

currently being rented out for a commercial purpose and therefore does not qualify for a 

DVE. 

 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

 

The following facts were found to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence: 

 

1. The subject property is located at 403 W. Leland Drive, in Muskegon County. 

2. The subject property is classified as residential. 

3. Petitioner owns the subject property. 

4. Petitioner used and occupied the subject property from January 1, 2024, through 

July 1, 2024. 

5. Petitioner and his family moved to Germany on or about July 2, 2024, as a result 

of his wife’s military orders. 

6. Petitioner rents the subject property out while he and his family are living in 

Germany as a result of his wife’s military orders. 

7. Petitioner did not use or occupy the subject property from July 2, 2024, through 

present, as required by MCL 211.7b. 

 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

 

The following authority and reasoned opinion supports the Tribunal’s determination: 

 

Michigan’s General Property Tax Act provides that all real property within Michigan that 

is “not expressly exempted” shall be subject to taxation.”11Further, tax exemptions are 

strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority, and the petitioner has the burden to 

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is entitled to the requested 

exemption.12 [Emphasis added.] 

 

In this case, Petitioner contends that because he qualifies for a military principal 

residence exemption (PRE) he should also qualify for a DVE. Further, Petitioner 

contends he is not renting the subject property out for a commercial purpose, just to 

cover his expenses while his family is stationed in Germany. 

 

 

11 MCL 211.1. 

12 Toaz v Dep’t of Treasury, 280 Mich App 457; 760 NW2d 325 (2008).

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

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In Michigan, the principal residence exemption (PRE) statute expressly exempts certain 

military property owners to qualify for a PRE for up to 3 years after all or any portion of 

their dwelling is rented or leased to another person as a residence so long as the owner 

files a timely PRE Active Duty Military Affidavit, the owner is absent on active military 

duty, and the dwelling would otherwise qualify as the owner’s principal residence.13 In 

short, Petitioner contends the same should apply for a DVE because he intends to 

return to the subject property after his wife completes her military assignment in 

Germany. 

 

Unfortunately, the DVE statute does not provide for a similar exemption and Petitioner 

has not provided any evidence to support his contention that he is eligible for a DVE 

while away for his wife’s active military duty. 

 

The DVE statute provides the following: 

 

(1) Real property used and owned as a homestead by either of the following 

individuals is exempt from the collection of taxes under this act: 

 

(a) A disabled veteran. 

 

Further, MCL 211.7a defines “homestead” as “…a dwelling or a unit in a 

multipurpose or multidwelling building which is subject to ad valorem taxes and 

which is owned and occupied as the principal domicile by the owner thereof.” 

[Emphasis added.] 

 

In this case, Petitioner admittedly does not presently use or occupy the subject 

property because he is living in Germany with his family as a result of his wife’s 

military orders. Although Michigan’s PRE statute expressly exempts property if 

certain requirements are met, there is no express exemption in the DVE statute. 

 

Further, Petitioner has not provided any legal basis to support a DVE. “An 

appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to 

discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give issues cursory 

treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.”14 

 

Accordingly, based on the evidence, Respondent’s testimony, and for the reasons 

outlined herein, the Tribunal finds that Petitioner has not met his burden by a 

preponderance of the evidence, and affirms Respondent’s DVE denial as outlined 

in the Summary of Judgment portion of this Opinion. 

 

JUDGMENT 

 

IT IS ORDERED that the officer charged with maintaining the assessment rolls for the 

tax year at issue shall correct or cause the assessment rolls to be corrected to reflect 

 

13 See MCL 211.7dd(c). 

14 Houghton ex rel Johnson v Keller, 256 Mich App 336, 339; 662 NW2d 854 (2003) (citations omitted). “

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

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the property’s exemption within 20 days of entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment, 

subject to the processes of equalization.15 To the extent that the final level of 

assessment for a given year has not yet been determined and published, the 

assessment rolls shall be corrected once the final level is published or becomes known. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with collecting or refunding the 

affected taxes shall collect taxes and any applicable interest or issue a refund within 28 

days of entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment. If a refund is warranted, it shall 

include a proportionate share of any property tax administration fees paid and penalty 

and interest paid on delinquent taxes. The refund shall also separately indicate the 

amount of the taxes, fees, penalties, and interest being refunded. A sum determined by 

the Tribunal to have been unlawfully paid shall bear interest from the date of payment to 

the date of judgment, and the judgment shall bear interest to the date of its payment. A 

sum determined by the Tribunal to have been underpaid shall not bear interest for any 

time period prior to 28 days after the issuance of this Final Opinion and 

Judgment. Pursuant to MCL 205.737, interest shall accrue (i) after December 31, 2013, 

through June 30, 2016, at the rate of 4.25%, (ii) after June 30, 2016, through December 

31, 2016, at the rate of 4.40%, (iii) after December 31, 2016, through June 30, 2017, at 

the rate of 4.50%, (iv) after June 30, 2017, through December 31, 2017, at the rate of 

4.70%, (v) after December 31, 2017, through June 30, 2018, at the rate of 5.15%, (vi) 

after June 30, 2018, through December 31, 2018, at the rate of 5.41%, (vii) after 

December 31, 2018, through June 30, 2019, at the rate of 5.9%, (viii) after June 30, 

2019, through December 31, 2019, at the rate of 6.39%, (ix) after December 31, 2019, 

through June 30, 2020, at the rate of 6.40%, (x) after June 30 2020, through December 

31, 2020, at the rate of 5.63%, (xi) after December 31, 2020, through June 30, 2022, at 

the rate of 4.25%, (xii) after June 30, 2022, through December 31, 2022, at the rate of 

4.27%, (xiii) after December 31, 2022, through June 30, 2023, at the rate of 5.65%, (xiv) 

after June 30, 2023, through December 31, 2023, at the rate of 8.25%, (xv) after 

December 31, 2023, through June 30, 2024, at the rate of 9.30%, (xvi) after June 30, 

2024, through December 31, 2024, at the rate of 9.50%, (xvii) after December 31, 2024, 

through June 30, 2025, at the rate of 9.47%, and (xviii) after June 30, 2025, through 

December 31, 2025, at the rate of 8.66%. 

 

This Final Opinion and Judgment resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes 

this case. 

 

APPEAL RIGHTS 

If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for 

reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of 

Appeals. 

 

A motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Tribunal with the required filing fee 

within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision 

closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing 

 

15 See MCL 205.755.

MTT Docket No. 24-003950 

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system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such 

motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless 

the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a 

principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the 

decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty or disabled veterans exemption and, 

if so, there is no filing fee. You are required to serve a copy of the motion on the 

opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to 

electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the 

motion. Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral 

arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal. 

 

Alternatively, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the 

claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If 

the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal 

by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the 

record on appeal. There is no certification fee. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By _______________________________________ 

 

Entered: October 3, 2025 

jcg 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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