24-003393 Dismiss BOP signed.pdf
John Hanley, Petitioner V Township Of Leelanau, Respondent · 24-003393-TT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS LANSING MARLON I. BROWN, DPA DIRECTOR MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 John Hanley, MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL Petitioner, SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION v MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Leelanau Township, Case Type: Valuation Respondent. PROPOSED ORDER OF DISMISSAL Personnel Presiding: Nancy Klukowski, Administrative Law Judge Location of Hearing: Telephone Hearing Held on: August 5, 2025 Appearances on Behalf of Petitioner: John Hanley Appearances on Behalf of Respondent: Barry Wauldron, Assessor PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner was required to protest the subject property’s assessment to the Board of Review (BOR) and did so to the 2024 March BOR. The BOR did not change the assessment. Petitioner filed a petition with the Tribunal on May 30, 2024, and Respondent filed an answer on October 10, 2024. On April 23, 2025, the Tribunal issued an order placing Respondent in default for failing to appear at an April 22, 2025 hearing. Respondent subsequently cured its default. On May 19, 2025, the Tribunal issued an order setting aside Respondent’s default. The amount of the state equalized value (SEV) or taxable value (TV) in dispute, as set forth in the pleadings, for all tax years at issue is within the jurisdictional limits of the Small Claims Division.1 Further, the property’s assessment for subsequent tax years is included in this proceeding.2 ISSUES AND APPLICABLE LAW The issues in this matter are: 1 See MCL 205.762(1). 2 See MCL 205.737(5)(b).
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 2 of 8 a) Whether the subject property is assessed in excess of 50% of its true cash value (TCV). “The petitioner has the burden of proof in establishing the true cash value of the property.”3 The assessment of real property in Michigan shall not exceed 50% of its TCV.4 “True cash value” means “the usual selling price . . . .”5 “True cash value” means “fair market value.”6 The Tribunal is required to make an independent determination of TCV.7 “[T]he tribunal is not bound to accept either of the parties’ theories of valuation. It may accept one theory and reject the other, it may reject both theories, or it may utilize a combination of both in arriving at its determination.”8 The Tribunal is required to select the valuation methodology that is accurate and bears a reasonable relationship to the property’s TCV.9 b) Whether the TV exceeds the amount provided by MCL 211.27a. MCL 211.27a provides that a property’s TV is the lesser of the property’s SEV or capped TV, and a property’s capped TV is, absent a transfer of ownership, determined mathematically by taking into consideration the prior tax year’s TV, statutory losses, the lesser of the rate of inflation or 5%, and statutory additions, including omitted property (i.e., property not previously assessed).10 SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE A. Petitioner’s Evidence Petitioner’s contentions of TCV, SEV and TV: Parcel Number: 042-150-001-01 Year TCV SEV TV 2024 $975,000 $487,500 $487,500 2025 Unknown Unknown Unknown 3 MCL 205.737(3); see also Kern v Pontiac Twp, 93 Mich App 612, 620; 287 NW2d 603 (1979). 4 Michigan Const 1963, art IX, sec 3. 5 MCL 211.27(1). 6 CAF Investment Co v State Tax Comm, 392 Mich 442, 450; 221 NW2d 588 (1974). 7 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp v City of Warren, 193 Mich App 348; 483 NW2d 416 (1992). 8 Id. at 356. 9 See Safran Printing Co v Detroit, 88 Mich App 376; 276 NW2d 602 (1979). 10 See MCL 211.34d.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 3 of 8 The exhibits offered by Petitioner may be viewed on lines 1 and 10 of the docket maintained in this case.11 No exhibits were excluded from evidence. Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Petitioner contends that the assessment of the subject property is too high. Petitioner testified that his tax rate penalizes him for building a new home. It is his understanding that property assessments should have uniformity under Michigan law, but he does not see uniformity here. Petitioner contends that new construction is being taxed at a significantly higher rate than other homes. He stated that his assessed value since building the home is up over 80% and his taxes have gone up by almost 10%. Petitioner indicated that his home has a taxable value $111,000 higher than the house adjacent, but that home is much larger than his. Petitioner also cited a home that sold for $970,000 last year but Respondent says Petitioner’s home is worth $1.3 million; thus, there is nothing to substantiate that value. He indicated that the taxable value of the home that sold for $970,000 has not changed from $270,000. Petitioner said that Respondent’s board chair told him that his home is valued higher due to the finishes and other homes are worth less due to depreciation. Petitioner questions why his neighbors are not paying higher taxes while receiving the same services. He feels that the taxable values should be fair, but they are not. On rebuttal, Petitioner asserted that the garage on his property has been there since construction was finished in 2023, so the assessor “screwed up” by not including it back then. B. Respondent’s Evidence The property’s TCV, SEV and TV, as confirmed by the BOR, for the tax years at issue: Parcel Number: 042-150-001-01 Year TCV SEV TV 2024 $1,356,800 $678,400 $535,920 2025 $1,847,200 $923,600 $552,533 The exhibits offered by Respondent may be viewed on line 5 of the docket maintained in this case.12 No exhibits were excluded from evidence. Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Respondent contends that the subject property is correctly assessed. Mr. Wauldron testified that he took over as Respondent’s assessor in April and he has taken a close look at the records for this property. He also met with Petitioner and explained the increases in the assessment. Mr. Wauldron testified that the land value was unchanged from 2024 to 2025. Building 11 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case. 12 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 4 of 8 was the reason for the higher value. The new construction was done incrementally from 2023 through 2025, so the values increased accordingly. Mr. Wauldron explained that new construction is not taxed higher; rather, it is valued higher because construction costs are higher than they have been in the past. Construction costs are updated annually in the assessment software. Homes are valued at the cost to build new, less depreciation, which is why Petitioner’s value is high. Mr. Wauldron noted that construction costs are higher than they’ve ever been. The property will depreciate as time goes by. However, values will continue to increase because the market is going up faster than the inflation rate. Mr. Wauldron also noted that Petitioner’s taxable values for 2024 and 2025 increased only at the rate of the inflation rate multiplier. Mr. Wauldron also indicated that there was an issue with the land values in the township, and that is being corrected in the software. This did not affect Petitioner’s taxable value. Mr. Wauldron said that the issue should be corrected by the time the 2026 assessments are done, and Petitioner should see a significant adjustment in his 2026 assessment. However, there will also be an adjustment due to a garage being added to the roll. Mr. Wauldron noted that in addition to the $970,000 sale cited by Petitioner, there were two other sales in the area: $1.3 million in May 2023 and $1.12 million in November 2023. Mr. Wauldron could not explain why the assessed value of the home that sold for $970,000 had not changed, as alleged by Petitioner. FINDINGS OF FACT The following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. The subject property is located at 226 E. Fifth Street in Leelanau Township, in Leelanau County. 2. The subject property is classified as residential real property. 3. Petitioner submitted an analysis of the 2024 and 2025 taxable values, assessed values, and state-equalized values for the subject and 17 properties nearby. Petitioner did not submit a valuation disclosure that applied the cost, income, or sales comparison approaches. 4. Respondent submitted valuation evidence in the form of a mass appraisal cost approach. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The following authority and reasoned opinion support the Tribunal’s determination:
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 5 of 8 Petitioner “has the burden of proof in establishing the [TCV] of the property.”13 “This burden encompasses two separate concepts: (1) the burden of persuasion, which does not shift during the course of the hearing, and (2) the burden of going forward with the evidence, which may shift to the opposing party.”14 Although the Tribunal has a duty to make an independent determination of value,15 the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that this duty “arises only when the petitioner has met its burden of going forward with evidence.”16 Therefore, “if a petitioner fails to come forward with competent evidence to challenge the assessed values of the property, then the tribunal's duty to make an independent determination of true cash value is not triggered.”17 Indeed, the Tribunal’s factual findings must be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.18 Thus, while the Tribunal may not “automatically accept a respondent’s assessment,”19 it may, upon motion or its own initiative, enter an involuntary dismissal if the petitioner fails to meet the burden of going forward.20 “The ‘substantial evidence test’ has been defined as evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. While it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence it may be substantially less than a preponderance of the evidence.”21 “Competent evidence” has been defined as “that which the very nature of the thing to be proven requires . . . . ”22 The “thing to be proven” in this case is the TCV of the property at issue. TCV is defined as “the usual selling price at the place where the property to which the term is applied is at the time of assessment, being the price that could be obtained for the property at private sale, and not at auction sale except as otherwise provided in this section, or at forced sale.”23 TCV is traditionally determined 13 MCL 205.737(3). 14 Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354–55; 483 NW2d 416, 420 (1992). 15 See Alhi Dev Co v Orion Twp, 110 Mich App 764, 767; 314 NW2d 479, 481 (1981). 16 Dicastal N Am, Inc v City of Greenville, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 22, 2024 (Docket No. 365333) citing Great Lakes Div of Nat'l Steel Corp, 227 Mich App 379, 408- 410; 576 NW2d 667, 680-681 (1998). 17 Id. The Court further stated that it “will not assess the credibility of witnesses, and the determination of the weight to be given the evidence is within the Tax Tribunal’s discretion.” Id. (citations omitted). See also Country Meadows, GP v Macomb Twp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 1, 1997 (Docket No. 182305), wherein the Court held: “Plaintiffs cite Jones & Laughlin . . . . for the proposition that even when the plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof, the tribunal must still make an independent determination of the true cash value of the property in question. However, unlike the plaintiff in Jones & Laughlin, in the present case plaintiffs did not meet their burden of going forward with evidence. Under the circumstances, the tribunal could not make an independent determination of the true cash value of the property because it had no evidence on which to base such a determination except that provided by defendant. A contrary holding would be tantamount to requiring the tribunal to hire its own appraiser.” Id. (citations omitted). 18 See Antisdale v City of Galesburg, 420 Mich 265, 277; 362 NW2d 632 (1984). 19 Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 355-356. 20 See MCR 2.504(B)(2). See also Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354-355 and Great Lakes v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App at 408-410. 21 Russo v Dep’t of Licensing & Regul, 119 Mich App 624, 631; 326 NW2d 583, 587 (1982). See also Dow Chem Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 185 Mich App 458; 462 NW2d 765 (1990). 22 Goff v Bil–Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507, 514 n 5; 563 NW2d 214 (1997), overruled on other grounds in Mudel v Great Atl & Pac Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2000), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). See also Moore v Prestige Painting, 277 Mich App 437; 745 NW2d 816 (2007). 23 MCL 211.27(1).
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 6 of 8 using one of three widely accepted appraisal methods: cost, income, and market.24 “Variations of these approaches and entirely new methods may be useful if found to be accurate and reasonably related to the fair-market value of the subject property.”25 Although Petitioner provided some evidence in this case, it is not sufficient to meet the burden of going forward. Petitioner submitted an analysis of the 2024 and 2025 taxable values, assessed values and state equalized values for the subject and 17 properties nearby, to demonstrate Petitioner’s belief that property is not uniformly assessed and that new construction is unfairly assessed at higher taxable values. Petitioner’s comparison of tax assessments of his property to other properties is misplaced and cannot be used as credible evidence of the TCV of the subject property. Comparing the AVs and TVs of various properties is not a valid comparison and provides no meaningful data to determine the TCV or TV for the subject for the years at issue. As noted above, TCV is customarily determined using one of three widely accepted appraisal methods: cost, income, or market. Assessment comparisons are not the equivalent of a comparative market analysis. Assessed values (AV) are not market indicators, but rather are the result of a mass appraisal, cost less depreciation approach to value, which includes market adjustments using an Economic Condition Factor (ECF). Various steps go into constructing each assessment, and mere comparison of AVs discounts the numerous factors considered for each individual assessment. Moreover, no matter how similar two or more parcels of property appear to be, such comparisons can create highly misleading results since vital distinctions can be overlooked, as can the various applicable adjustments and manipulations of market-based values. Additionally, while a property’s AV is directly related to its true cash or fair market value, taxable value (TV) is determined pursuant to Proposal A and is calculated by multiplying the prior year’s TV by the inflation rate multiplier for the current year. Except for additions and losses to a property, annual increases in the property’s TV are limited to 5% or the rate of inflation, whichever is less. As such, TV can vary greatly depending upon a number of factors that are not necessarily related to a property’s value, including, but not limited to the last date of sale, and the TV of one property is therefore not probative of the TV of another. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s assessment analysis and comparisons are given no weight or credibility in the independent determination of market value for the subject property. Consequently, the burden of going forward did not shift to Respondent, and the Tribunal’s duty to make an independent determination of value was not triggered. As such, involuntary dismissal of the case is warranted. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. 24 Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v City of Holland, 437 Mich 473, 485; 473 NW2d 636 (1991). 25 Id.
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 7 of 8 JUDGMENT This is a proposed decision and not a final decision. As such, no action should be taken based on this decision. After the expiration of the time period for the opposing party to file a response to the exceptions, the Tribunal will review the case file, including the Proposed Opinion and Judgment (POJ) and all exceptions and responses, if any, and: a. Issue a Final Opinion and Judgment (FOJ) adopting the POJ as a Final Decision; b. Issue an FOJ modifying the POJ and adopting the Modified POJ as a Final Decision; or c. Issue an Order vacating the POJ and ordering a rehearing or such other action as is necessary and appropriate. EXCEPTIONS The parties have 20 days from the “Entered” date below to notify the Tribunal in writing, by mail or by electronic filing, if they do not agree with the POJ and to state in writing why they do not agree with the POJ (i.e., file exceptions to the POJ). Exceptions must be signed and are limited to the evidence submitted prior to or at the hearing and any matter addressed in the POJ. There is no fee for filing exceptions. Parties must provide the opposing party with a copy of their exceptions and file proof of service with the Tribunal (i.e., submit a written statement indicating that the opposing party has been provided or “served” with a copy of the exceptions). Service on the opposing party can be made by mail, or if agreed to by the parties, by electronic service (i.e., email). The proof of service must be signed. The opposing party has 14 days from the date the exceptions are served on that party to file a written response with the Tribunal. Responses to exceptions must be signed. Parties must provide the opposing party with a copy of their response to the exceptions and file a signed proof of service with the Tribunal. If the parties fail to sign their exceptions or responses, or if they fail to submit a signed proof of service for the exceptions and/or responses, the Tribunal may not consider the exceptions or responses in issuing the FOJ. By Entered: September 11, 2025
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MTT Docket No. 24-003393 Page 8 of 8 PROOF OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized representatives. By: Tribunal Clerk