24-003862 Order Granting Relief.pdf

Holiday Village Tc & 1950 Investments Tic LLC, Petitioner V Township Of East Bay, Respondent · 24-003862-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Holiday Village TC & 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

1950 Investments TIC LLC, 

 

 

Petitioners, 

 

v 

 

MTT Docket No. 24-003862 

 

East Bay Township, 

 

Presiding Judge 

Respondent. 

 

Patricia L. Halm 

 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF 

DISMISSAL 

 

ORDER REINSTATING CASE 

 

On June 26, 2025, Petitioners filed a motion requesting the Tribunal set aside the 

December 12, 2024 Order of Dismissal, as there are grounds for relief under MCR 

2.612(C)(1)(a) and (f). Petitioners argue that relief is available under MCR 2.612 due to 

Petitioners’ former counsel’s failure to communicate and any neglect or non-compliance 

on the part of the Petitioners amounts to inadvertence and excusable neglect. 

Petitioners further assert that reinstatement is proper pursuant to Grimm v Dep’t of 

Treasury as they did not willfully refuse to comply with the Tribunal’s orders of default as 

their former representative failed to notify Petitioners of the default status and did not 

include Petitioners’ contact information on the petition. Petitioners state, upon 

information and belief, that the former representative has closed their law firm and is no 

longer practicing. 

 

The Tribunal has considered the motion and the case file and finds that granting relief 

pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) is improper; however, good cause exists to grant the 

motion pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). Relief pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) is 

proper when the judgment is a result of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect.”1 The Tribunal finds that the Order of Dismissal was appropriately reasoned for 

lack of response and compliance with Tribunal orders, and thus was not the result of a 

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Former counsel’s negligence in 

the form of lack of communication with Petitioners and apparent failure to manage this 

case does not amount to “excusable neglect.”2 

 

While Petitioners assert that Grimm v Dep’t of Treasury supports reinstatement because 

Petitioners did not willfully refuse to comply with the Tribunal orders of default, the 

 

1 MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). 

2 See First Bank of Cadillac v Benson, 81 Mich App 550; 265 NW2d 413 (1978), which held that an 

appellant could not rely on their attorney’s neglect to provide them with the reasonable excuse sought to 

set aside a default judgment.

MTT Docket No. 24-003862 

Page 2 of 3 

 

Tribunal finds that it properly considered the Grimm factors when the Order of Dismissal 

was issued.3 At the time of the dismissal there was a demonstrated history of non-

compliance which resulted in a deliberate delay, and no lesser sanction was 

appropriate. There was nothing in the record at the time of dismissal indicating that 

Petitioners lacked notice or that counsel was not communicating with the Petitioners 

about the status of the case. However, the facts and circumstances plead in the Motion 

for Relief from Order of Dismissal warrants reconsideration of the Grimm factors.4 

Based on the information presented and in consideration of the Grimm factors, the 

Tribunal finds that granting relief pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) is more appropriate 

than affirming the Order of Dismissal since Petitioners were unaware of the default 

status and did not knowingly or deliberately refuse to comply with the Tribunal’s orders. 

 

Courts may grant relief pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) when “any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” exists. The Michigan Court of 

Appeals has held that subsection (f) is modeled after the Federal Rules and provides 

courts with “a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case and 

vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such 

action is appropriate to accomplish justice.”5 The Michigan Court of Appeals further 

established the criteria for granting relief as follows: 

 

In order for relief to be granted under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), the following 

three requirements must be fulfilled: (1) the reason for setting aside the 

judgment must not fall under subsections (a) through (e), (2) the substantial 

rights of the opposing party must not be detrimentally affected if the 

judgment is set aside, and (3) extraordinary circumstances must exist that 

mandate setting aside the judgment in order to achieve justice. Generally, 

relief is granting under subsection (f) only when the judgment was obtained 

by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered.6 

 

As discussed above, relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a) is improper, and subsection (f) is 

the only other subsection in which relief is requested. While the misconduct in this 

matter is attributable to Petitioners’ previous counsel, the Tribunal finds that the facts 

and circumstances pleaded in the Motion for Relief constitute extraordinary 

circumstances that mandate setting aside the Order of Dismissal to achieve justice. 

The Michigan Supreme Court has held “generally, an attorney’s negligence is 

attributable to that attorney’s client, [however], abandonment by counsel has been held 

to constitute good cause for setting aside a default or default judgment.”7 As such, 

Petitioners have established good cause for granting relief and reinstating the case, 

consistent with subsection (f). 

 

 

3 Grimm v Dep’t of Treasury, 291 Mich App 140; 810 NW2d 65 (2010). 

4 Id. 

5 Heugel v Heugel, 237 Mich App 471, 481; 603 NW2d 121 (1999), quoting Compton v Alton SS Co, 608 

F2d 96, 106-107 (CA 4, 1979). See also FR Civ P 60(b)(6). 

6 Heugel at 478-479. 

7 Amco Builders & Developers, Inc v Team Ace Joint Venture, 469 Mich 90; 666 NW2d 623 (2003), citing 

White v Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 523-524; 87 NW2d 192 (1957).

MTT Docket No. 24-003862 

Page 3 of 3 

 

Further, the Tribunal finds that Respondent’s rights will not be detrimentally affected by 

reinstating the case as this matter has not moved beyond the pleadings stage, and 

Respondent will have an opportunity to address any new pleadings by filing an answer. 

Thus, granting Petitioners the relief requested pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) is 

warranted. 

 

Moreover, the Tribunal finds that the amended petition attached as Exhibit G to the 

motion cures Petitioners’ default as it was completed on the appropriate form and 

includes all the necessary information for each parcel at issue. As a result, Respondent 

shall file an answer to the amended petition. Therefore, 

 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Motion for Relief from Order of Dismissal is 

GRANTED. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is REINSTATED. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall file an answer addressing the 

amended petition within 28 days of this order. 

 

Failure to comply with this order will result in Respondent being held in default. 

 

 

Entered: September 22, 2025 

 

By _____________________________ 

cs/jc 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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