25-002826_Recon deny.pdf
Marion A Mills, Petitioner V City Of Port Huron, Respondent · 25-002826-TT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS LANSING MARLON I. BROWN, DPA DIRECTOR MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 Marion A Mills, MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL Petitioner, SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION v MTT Docket No. 25-002826 City of Port Huron, Presiding Judge Respondent. Marcus L. Abood ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION On October 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the Tribunal reconsider the Order of Dismissal entered in this case on October 10, 2025. In the motion, Petitioner states that Tribunal committed a palpable error by finding, without a hearing, that the Refuse Billing Rate was not a tax rather than a fee. Petitioner argues that, unlike Respondent’s water and sewer bills, the charge at issue in this case appears on Petitoiner’s property tax bill. On the property tax bill for the subject property, the charge is listed as "Refuse Billing Rate," and is not described as a fee. The charge replaced a 3-mill refuse tax that Petitioner did not have to pay previously because this millage is exempted based on the Disabled Veteran's Exemption applied to the subject property. In further support, Petitioner cites Bolt v City of Lansing1 as establishing the test for whether it is a charge or a tax. According to Petitioner, the Refuse Billing Rate at issue in this case meets all three of the criteria set forth in Bolt. Because the Refuse Billing Rate functions as a tax, it should have been considered a property tax under Michigan law and exempted by the Disabled Veteran’s Exemption applied to the subject property. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in dismissing the above-referenced appeal. The Tribunal has considered the motion and the case file and finds that Petitioner is merely restating the arguments and evidence previously presented. Procedurally, the Order of Dismissal stated that “Petitioner was held in default on September 9, 2025, because Petitioner filed the wrong petition for the issue under appeal and failed to file a copy of the notice giving rise to the appeal, i.e. Disabled Veterans Exemption denial notice.” The Order of Dismissal also noted that, while Petitioner attempted to cure the default on September 12, 2025, the attempt was incomplete in as much as Petitioner filed an outdated petition and did not include a copy of the formal denial notice. Despite Petitioner’s assertions to the contrary, Petitioner did not file an updated petition form. Instead, the form that was submitted indicated it was revised in February 2010, and contained references to the Department of Energy, Labor & Economic Growth, a department within the executive branch that has not existed since 2011.2 The amended petition form also included a non-working telephone number rather than the Tribunal’s 1 Bolt v City of Lansing, 459 Mich 152 (1998). 2 2011, E.R.O. No. 2011-4, Eff. Apr. 25, 2011
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MTT Docket No. 25-002826 Page 2 of 3 correct telephone number. Although Petitioner indicated that the form utilized is available on the Tribunal’s website, Petitioner is incorrect in such an assertion. Furthermore, MCL 205.731(a) states that the Tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over “[a] proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under the property tax laws of this state.” TTR 279(3) provides that, “[f]or property tax contested cases, a copy of the notice giving rise to the appeal, including, but not limited to, notice of board of review action, notice of taxable value uncapping, or notice denying a principal residence exemption, must be submitted with the petition.” Although Petitioner acknowledged providing an email from the assessor, the email itself only provided certain background information about the requests submitted to the July Board of Review and confirmed that Petitioner received an exemption under MCL 211.7b going back to 2019. The email itself did not indicate it was a denial, reference Petitioner’s appeal rights, or otherwise indicate that the email constituted a final determination as to Petitioner’s claims. Thus, Petitioner failed to cure the default as directed. Even if, as asserted by Petitioner, the charge at issue should be considered a tax under Bolt v City of Lansing, the Order of Dismissal recognized that Petitioner did not appear before a Board of Review to protest the charge….” Here, a protest to the Board of Review is a prerequisite to invoking the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under MCL 205.735a. A final decision of the BOR is a prerequisite for invoking the Tribunal’s jurisdiction,3 and Petitioner’s failure to complete the prerequisite step is a failure to invoke the Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction over this proceeding.4 In Sixarp, the Michigan Supreme Court reiterated previous appellate decisions in its reasoning that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is statutory by nature. The Court stated: MCL 205.735a(3) “is not a notice statute, but is a jurisdictional statute that governs when and how a petitioner invokes the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” We therefore overrule Parkview5 to the extent that it incorrectly held that the protest requirement of . . . the precursor to MCL 205.735a . . . is a mere “procedural requirement for perfecting an appeal in the Tax Tribunal” and not an express limitation on the MTT’s jurisdiction. Instead, the protest requirement of MCL 205.735a(3) may only be waived by the court if necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right to protest.6 The Tribunal finds that the same reasoning relied upon by the Sixarp court is applicable in this case. The Tribunal has no equitable power to disregard a statutory filing 3 See MCL 205.731. 4 See Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, __Mich __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No 166190) at 8 (Sixarp). 5 Parkview Memorial Ass’n v City of Livonia¸ 183 Mich App 116; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 6 See Sixarp at 8. (Citations omitted).
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MTT Docket No. 25-002826 Page 3 of 3 deadline.7 “[S]imply because the plaintiffs' underlying claim has a constitutional dimension, and may even be meritorious, does not excuse the plaintiffs' failure to assert their claim within the applicable statutory period of limitation.8 Given the above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a palpable error relative to the Order of Dismissal that misled the Tribunal and the parties and that would have resulted in a different disposition if the error was corrected.9 Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This order resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes this case. APPEAL RIGHTS If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the record on appeal. There is no certification fee. By Entered: December 17, 2025 smm PROOF OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized representatives. By: Tribunal Clerk 7 The Tribunal’s powers are limited to those authorized by statute and do not include powers of equity. See Federal-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346 (1987), Elec Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 253 Mich App 538 (2002), and VanderWerp v Plainfield Twp, 278 Mich App 624 (2008). 8 See Szymanski v City of Westland, 420 Mich 301, 303; 362 NW2d 224, 225 (1984). 9 See MCR 2.119(F)(3). A palpable error is one that is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, or manifest.” Luckow v Luckow, 291 Mich App 417, 426 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).