25-003130 Reconsideration Deny.pdf
Crockery Creek Turkey Farms, Petitioner Vs. Township Of Sheridan, Respondent · 25-003130-TT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS LANSING MARLON I. BROWN, DPA DIRECTOR MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 Crockery Creek Turkey Farms, MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL Petitioner, v MTT Docket No. 25-003130 Sheridan Township, Presiding Judge Respondent. Jason C. Grinnell ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION On August 29, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the Tribunal reconsider the Order of Dismissal entered in this case on August 11, 2025. In the motion, Petitioner states that their method of filing was compliant with MCL 205.735a as postage was paid and the filings were deposited with the United States Postal Service (USPS) timely on July 31, 2025. Petitioner asserts that utilizing the delivery date rather than the mailing date to determine the date of filing violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions as filings without postmarks are treated differently than those with a black postmark stamp. Further, this matter is distinguishable from Arbor Crossings Apt LLC v Muskegon Twp1, as the petition in Arbor Crossings was postmarked after the filing date while the subject petition did not receive a postmark. The timing requirements of MCL 205.735a(6) are jurisdictional.2 In other words, the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction may only be invoked by a petition that complies with the timing requirements of MCL 205.735a(6).3 The powers of the Tax Tribunal are derived from statute, and the Tax Tribunal lacks powers in equity, including the ability to consider an untimely petition. 4 The Tribunal has considered the motion and the case file and finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a palpable error relative to the Order of Dismissal that misled the Tribunal and the parties and that would have resulted in a different disposition if the error was corrected.5 Pursuant to MCL 205.735a(7)(a), “a petition is considered filed on or before the expiration of the time period provided in this section or by law if . . . . [it] is 1 Arbor Crossings Apt LLC v Muskegon Twp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 26, 2017 (Docket No. 334318) (Arbor Crossings). 2 Electronic Data Sys Corp v Twp of Flint, 253 Mich App 538, 543-544; 656 NW2d 215 (2002). 3 Id. 4 Id. See also VanderWerp v Plainfield Charter Twp, 278 Mich App 624, 634; 752 NW2d 479 (2008). 5 See MCR 2.119(F)(3). A palpable error is one that is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, or manifest.” Luckow v Luckow, 291 Mich App 417, 426 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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MTT Docket No. 25-003130 Page 2 of 3 postmarked by the [USPS] on or before the expiration of that time period.”6 The envelope containing the petition in this case, however, bears a metered postmark, and it therefore was not “postmarked” by the USPS as provided by MCL 205.735a(7)(a). This determination was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Arbor Crossings Apt LLC v Muskegon Twp,7: The operative language of the statute is ‘postmarked by the United States postal service.’ Thus, the statute unambiguously treats ‘postmarked’ as a verb, or in other words, an action undertaken by the USPS. Petitioners rely on treating the word as a noun, which would impermissibly rewrite the statute to read something in effect, ‘bearing a postmark from the United States postal service.’ Although perhaps a subtle distinction, we are not permitted to deviate from what the Legislature actually wrote. ‘Postmark,’ when used as a verb, means ‘to put a postmark on.’ Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). Consequently, the statute unambiguously requires the postmark to have been applied ‘by the United States postal service.’ We conclude that it was not, and petitioners do not appear to seriously contend that it was so applied. A postage meter is ‘a device or system of components a customer uses to print evidence that postage required for mailing has been paid.’ . . . . Postage meters imprint postage under license of the USPS . . . and are regulated by the USPS to ensure they are properly used . . . . Thus, the petition in this case could not have literally been ‘postmarked’ by the USPS because it was postmarked by petitioners. At best, the petition was postmarked under license of the USPS. The statute unambiguously mandates that only petitions that are ‘postmarked by the United States postal service’ fall within the provisions of MCL 205.735a(7)(a).8 Petitioner’s attempt to distinguish this matter from Arbor Crossings is without merit. While Petitioner asserts that the lack of a postmark from USPS on the subject filing distinguishes the present matter from Arbor Crossings, this does not negate the fact that the subject filing and the Arbor Crossings filing both bore meter postmarks the day of the filing deadline and were not considered filed as of that date.9 Moreover, Petitioner’s claims regarding violations of the Equal Protection Clauses are similarly without merit. MCL 205.735a(7) is clear that mail is considered filed as of the date it is postmarked by the USPS. All filings postmarked by the USPS are treated the same. As established in Arbor Crossings, metered postmarks are differentiated from postmarks made by USPS and warrant different treatment, as required by MCL 6 Id. See also TTR 225(5), which states, in relevant part, that “[a] submission by mail is considered filed on the date indicated by the United States Postal Service postmark on the envelope containing the submission.” Id. 7 Supra, Note 1. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 1.
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MTT Docket No. 25-003130 Page 3 of 3 205.735a(7). Further, even if Petitioner’s Equal Protection Clauses claim had merit, the Tribunal would not be able to grant the requested relief as Petitioner failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which the Tribunal has no equitable power to disregard.10 TTR 225(5) states that “[a] submission without a postmark or with an illegible postmark is considered filed on the date the submission is received by the tribunal.”11 The petition in this case was date-stamped by the Tribunal on August 6, 2025, but bears a money stamp date of August 4, 2025, which is considered the date received by the Tribunal for purposes of TTR 225(5). As such, and inasmuch as the petition was not filed until August 4, 2025, the appeal is untimely and was properly dismissed. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This order resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes this case. APPEAL RIGHTS If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the record on appeal. There is no certification fee. Entered: September 11, 2025 By _______________________________ cs/jcg PROOF OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized representatives. By: Tribunal Clerk 10 See SixArp, LLC v Byron Twp, __ NW3d __ (Michigan Supreme Court Docket No 166190) (2025) at 8 (SixArp). See also, Federal-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346 (1987). 11 See TTR 225.