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24-003458 valuation.pdf

Alnamer Investment LLC, Petitioner V City Of Detroit, Respondent · 24-003458-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Alnamer Investment LLC, 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

Petitioner, 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

v 

 

MTT Docket No. 24-003458 

 

City of Detroit, 

 

Case Type: Valuation 

Respondent. 

 

 

 

PROPOSED ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

 

Personnel Presiding: 

 

 

Erissa J. Glekler, Administrative Law Judge 

Location of Hearing: 

 

 

Telephonic 

Hearing Held on: 

 

 

 

June 27, 2025 

Appearances on Behalf of Petitioner: 

Sam Miller 

Appearances on Behalf of Respondent: Stacy Smith 

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 

Petitioner filed a petition with the Tribunal on May 31, 2024; Respondent filed an answer 

to the petition on October 1, 2024. 

 

The amount of the SEV or TV in dispute, as set forth in the pleadings, for all tax years at 

issue is within the jurisdictional limits of the Small Claims Division.1 Further, the 

property’s assessment for subsequent tax years is included in this proceeding.2 

 

ISSUES AND APPLICABLE LAW 

 

The issues in this matter are: 

 

1. Whether the subject property is assessed in excess of 50% of its TCV. 

 

“The petitioner has the burden of proof in establishing the [TCV] of the property.”3 

 

The assessment of real property in Michigan may not exceed 50% of its TCV.4 TCV 

means “the usual selling price . . . being the price that could be obtained for the property 

at private sale, and not at auction . . . or at forced sale.”5 The concepts of TCV and “fair 

market value” are synonymous.6 

 

1 See MCL 205.762(1). 

2 See MCL 205.737(5)(b). 

3 MCL 205.737(3); see also Kern v Pontiac Twp, 93 Mich App 612, 620; 287 NW2d 603 (1979). 

4 Michigan Const 1963, art IX, sec 3. 

5 MCL 211.27(1). 

6 CAF Investment Co v State Tax Comm, 392 Mich 442, 450; 221 NW2d 588 (1974).

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MTT Docket No. 24-003458 

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The Tribunal is required to make an independent determination of TCV.7 “[T]he tribunal 

is not bound to accept either of the parties’ theories of valuation. It may accept one 

theory and reject the other, it may reject both theories, or it may utilize a combination of 

both in arriving at its determination.”8 

 

The Tribunal is required to select the valuation methodology that is accurate and bears 

a reasonable relationship to the property’s TCV.9 

 

2. Whether the TV exceeds the amount provided by MCL 211.27a. 

 

Pursuant to MCL 211.27a, a property’s TV is the lesser of the property’s SEV or capped 

TV, and a property’s capped TV is, absent a transfer of ownership, determined 

mathematically by taking into consideration the prior tax year’s TV, statutory losses, the 

lesser of the rate of inflation or 5%, and statutory additions, including new construction 

and omitted property (i.e., property not previously assessed).10 

 

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 

 

A. Petitioner’s Evidence 

 

Petitioner’s contentions of TCV, SEV and TV: 

 

Parcel Number: 21002977-84 

Year

TCV

SEV

TV

2024

$30,000

$15,000

$15,000

2025

N/A

N/A

N/A

*Petitioner did not provide value contentions for the 2025 tax year. 

 

Petitioner offered no exhibits. 

 

Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Petitioner contends 

that the subject property is assessed in excess of 50% of its TCV. Petitioner purchased 

the property for $30,000 in 2022; Petitioner is in the process of making improvements, 

but the assessments are not reflective of the property’s actual condition. Petitioner’s 

representative did not have an opportunity to submit any evidence in this case because 

they believed that a settlement had been reached. The parties’ representatives spoke 

on the phone a few times and Petitioner’s representative forwarded Respondent the 

numbers that they had agreed to, but was subsequently informed that its representative 

would no longer agree to those numbers. Petitioner’s representative was blindsided by 

the last-minute reversal and seeks a rehearing. Upon inquiry from the Tribunal, 

Petitioner’s representative testified that they believed the parties had come to an 

agreement on settlement on or around June 10, 2025; Petitioner’s representative was 

 

7 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp v City of Warren, 193 Mich App 348; 483 NW2d 416 (1992). 

8 Id. at 356. 

9 See Safran Printing Co v Detroit, 88 Mich App 376; 276 NW2d 602 (1979). 

10 See MCL 211.34d.

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not able to provide any testimony on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2022 

sale of the property. 

 

B. Respondent’s Evidence 

 

The property’s TCV, SEV and TV, as confirmed by the BOR: 

 

Parcel Number: 21002977-84 

Year

TCV

SEV

TV

2024

$183,200

$91,600

$91,600

2025

$189,000

$94,500

$94,439

 

The exhibits offered by Respondent may be viewed on lines 5, 9, and 10 of the docket 

maintained in this case.11 

 

No exhibits were excluded from evidence. 

 

Based on the pleadings, admitted exhibits, and sworn testimony, Respondent contends 

that the subject property is not assessed in excess of 50% of its TCV. The parties did 

have a tentative agreement regarding settlement in this matter based on the condition 

asserted by Petitioner’s representative, but upon inspection of the property a few weeks 

prior to hearing, it was found to be in much better condition than indicated. Respondent 

provided sales information for various commercial properties in the area. Sales prices 

range between $80,000 and #350,000. 

 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

 

The following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence: 

 

1. The subject property is located at 17505 E. Warren in Wayne County. 

2. The subject property is classified as commercial. 

 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

 

Petitioner “has the burden of proof in establishing the [TCV] of the property.”12 “This 

burden encompasses two separate concepts: (1) the burden of persuasion, which does 

not shift during the course of the hearing, and (2) the burden of going forward with the 

evidence, which may shift to the opposing party.”13 Although the Tribunal has a duty to 

make an independent determination of value,14 the Michigan Court of Appeals has held 

that this duty “arises only when the petitioner has met its burden of going forward with 

 

11 The docket is located on the Tribunal’s website at Tax Docket Lookup Search Page and may be 

accessed by entering the docket number assigned to this case. 

12 MCL 205.737(3). 

13 Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354–55; 483 NW2d 416, 420 (1992). 

14 See Alhi Dev Co v Orion Twp, 110 Mich App 764, 767; 314 NW2d 479, 481 (1981).

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evidence.”15 Therefore, “if a petitioner fails to come forward with competent evidence to 

challenge the assessed values of the property, then the tribunal's duty to make an 

independent determination of true cash value is not triggered.”16 Indeed, the Tribunal’s 

factual findings must be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.17 

Thus, while the Tribunal may not “automatically accept a respondent’s assessment,”18 it 

may, upon motion or its own initiative, enter an involuntary dismissal if the petitioner 

fails to meet the burden of going forward.19 

 

“The ‘substantial evidence test’ has been defined as evidence which a reasoning mind 

would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. While it consists of more than a 

mere scintilla of evidence it may be substantially less than a preponderance of the 

evidence.”20 “Competent evidence” has been defined as “that which the very nature of 

the thing to be proven requires . . . . ”21 The “thing to be proven” in this case is the TCV 

of the property at issue. TCV is defined as “the usual selling price at the place where 

the property to which the term is applied is at the time of assessment, being the price 

that could be obtained for the property at private sale, and not at auction sale except as 

otherwise provided in this section, or at forced sale.”22 TCV is traditionally determined 

using one of three widely accepted appraisal methods: cost, income, and market.23 

“Variations of these approaches and entirely new methods may be useful if found to be 

accurate and reasonably related to the fair-market value of the subject property.”24 

 

The condition of the subject property is the primary basis of Petitioner’s appeal in this 

case, but there is no documentary evidence on file establishing its condition as of the 

relevant valuation dates for the tax years at issue, and the testimony provided at the 

 

15 Dicastal N Am, Inc v City of Greenville, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 

August 22, 2024 (Docket No. 365333) citing Great Lakes Div of Nat'l Steel Corp, 227 Mich App 379, 408-

410; 576 NW2d 667, 680-681 (1998). 

16 Id. The Court further stated that it “will not assess the credibility of witnesses, and the determination of 

the weight to be given the evidence is within the Tax Tribunal’s discretion.” Id. (citations omitted). See 

also Country Meadows, GP v Macomb Twp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 

issued April 1, 1997 (Docket No. 182305), wherein the Court held: “Plaintiffs cite Jones & Laughlin . . . . 

for the proposition that even when the plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proof, the tribunal must still 

make an independent determination of the true cash value of the property in question. However, unlike 

the plaintiff in Jones & Laughlin, in the present case plaintiffs did not meet their burden of going forward 

with evidence. Under the circumstances, the tribunal could not make an independent determination of 

the true cash value of the property because it had no evidence on which to base such a determination 

except that provided by defendant. A contrary holding would be tantamount to requiring the tribunal to 

hire its own appraiser.” Id. (citations omitted). 

17 See Antisdale v City of Galesburg, 420 Mich 265, 277; 362 NW2d 632 (1984); 

18 Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 355-356. 

19 See MCR 2.504(B)(2). See also Jones & Laughlin, 193 Mich App at 354-355 and Great Lakes v City of 

Ecorse, 227 Mich App at 408-410. 

20 Russo v Dep't of Licensing & Regul, 119 Mich App 624, 631; 326 NW2d 583, 587 (1982). See also 

Dow Chem Co v Dep't of Treasury, 185 Mich App 458; 462 NW2d 765 (1990). 

21 Goff v Bil–Mar Foods, Inc (After Remand), 454 Mich 507, 514 n 5; 563 NW2d 214 (1997), overruled on 

other grounds in Mudel v Great Atl & Pac Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607 (2000), quoting Black's 

Law Dictionary (6th ed). See also Moore v Prestige Painting, 277 Mich App 437; 745 NW2d 816 (2007). 

22 MCL 211.27(1). 

23 Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n v City of Holland, 437 Mich 473, 485; 473 NW2d 636 (1991). 

24 Id.

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hearing is not sufficient to meet Petitioner’s burden of going forward with the evidence 

on that point. Petitioner also failed to provide any documentary evidence of sales or 

other market-based evidence establishing the quantitative impact, if any, the asserted 

condition would have on the property’s TCV, and its representative could not testify to 

the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2022 sale of the property, which 

Respondent’s office deemed to be a non-arms-length transaction. As such, the Tribunal 

finds that the burden of going forward with the evidence did not shift to Respondent, and 

the Tribunal’s duty to make an independent determination of value was not triggered. 

Involuntary dismissal of the case is warranted. 

 

Moreover, the Tribunal finds that Petitioner had sufficient notice and opportunity to 

timely file evidence and prepare its case for hearing. Petitioner filed this appeal on May 

31, 2024, and the Tribunal issued a Notice of Filing on October 4, 2024, which indicated 

that the case was ready to be scheduled for hearing and that the parties were required 

to submit evidence to both the Tribunal and the opposing party at least 21 days in 

advance of the hearing. The hearing notice issued on April 15, 2025 reiterated the 

requirements for submission of evidence 21 days prior to hearing. Petitioner was thus 

given notice on two separate occasions as to the impending hearing and evidentiary 

filing requirements, and it had more than a year to prepare its case for hearing and to 

file documentation. While the parties may have been engaged in settlement 

discussions, this does not negate the requirement of preparing their respective cases 

for hearing. Indeed, upon inquiry from the Tribunal, Petitioner’s representative testified 

that the tentative settlement agreement was reached on or around June 10, 2025, which 

was several days beyond the evidentiary filing deadline. Therefore, 

 

IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. 

 

JUDGMENT 

 

This is a proposed decision and not a final decision. As such, no action should be taken 

based on this decision. 

 

After the expiration of the time period for the opposing party to file a response to the 

exceptions, the Tribunal will review the case file, including the Proposed Opinion and 

Judgment (POJ) and all exceptions and responses, if any, and: 

 

a. Issue a Final Opinion and Judgment (FOJ) adopting the POJ as a Final 

Decision; 

b. Issue an FOJ modifying the POJ and adopting the Modified POJ as a Final 

Decision; or 

c. Issue an Order vacating the POJ and ordering a rehearing or such other 

action as is necessary and appropriate. 

 

EXCEPTIONS 

 

The parties have 20 days from the “Entered” date below to notify the Tribunal in writing, 

by mail or by electronic filing, if they do not agree with the POJ and to state in writing

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why they do not agree with the POJ (i.e., file exceptions to the POJ). Exceptions must 

be signed and are limited to the evidence submitted prior to or at the hearing and any 

matter addressed in the POJ. There is no fee for filing exceptions. 

 

Parties must provide the opposing party with a copy of their exceptions and file proof of 

service with the Tribunal (i.e., submit a written statement indicating that the opposing 

party has been provided or “served” with a copy of the exceptions). Service on the 

opposing party can be made by mail, or if agreed to by the parties, by electronic service 

(i.e., email). The proof of service must be signed. 

 

The opposing party has 14 days from the date the exceptions are served on that party 

to file a written response with the Tribunal. Responses to exceptions must be signed. 

Parties must provide the opposing party with a copy of their response to the exceptions 

and file a signed proof of service with the Tribunal. 

 

If the parties fail to sign their exceptions or responses, or if they fail to submit a signed 

proof of service for the exceptions and/or responses, the Tribunal may not consider the 

exceptions or responses in issuing the FOJ. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By _________________________________ 

Entered: August 21, 2025 

 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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