26-000073_Recon.pdf

Charles Duggan, Petitioner V Township Of Ann Arbor, Respondent · 26-000073-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING 

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Charles Duggan, 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

Petitioner, 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

v 

 

MTT Docket No. 26-000073 

 

Ann Arbor Township, 

 

Presiding Judge 

Respondent. 

 

Marcus L. Abood 

 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

 

On March 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the Tribunal reconsider the 

Order of Dismissal entered in this case on March 9, 2026. In the motion, Petitioner 

states that the Township’s written instructions provide a 35-day time limit for filing an 

appeal, and Petitioner filed an appeal with the Michigan Tax Tribunal during that time. 

 

The Tribunal has considered the motion and case file and finds that, as indicated in the 

Order of Dismissal, it has no authority over Petitioner’s appeal. The pleadings and 

accompanying documentation indicate that Petitioner is appealing the poverty 

exemption denial for Parcel No. I-09-13-300-028 for the 2025 tax year. The Tribunal 

has no authority over that parcel under MCL 211.53c, however, because Petitioner 

failed to appeal the December Board of Review (BOR) decision to the Tribunal within 30 

days of that decision.1 That decision is dated December 9, 2025.2 However, the 

petition in this case was filed on January 10, 2026. In other words, the appeal was filed 

beyond the statutory timeframe. 

 

Petitioner’s failure to file the appeal by the statutory deadline is a failure to invoke the 

Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction over this proceeding.3 In Sixarp, the Michigan Supreme 

Court reiterated previous appellate decisions in its reasoning that the Tribunal’s 

jurisdiction is statutory by nature. The Court stated: 

 

MCL 205.735a(3) “is not a notice statute, but is a jurisdictional statute that 

governs when and how a petitioner invokes the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” 

We therefore overrule Parkview4 to the extent that it incorrectly held that the 

protest requirement of . . . the precursor to MCL 205.735a . . . is a mere 

“procedural requirement for perfecting an appeal in the Tax Tribunal” and 

not an express limitation on the MTT’s jurisdiction. Instead, the protest 

requirement of MCL 205.735a(3) may only be waived by the court if 

 

1 MCL 211.53c states: “If the July or December board of review denies a claim for exemption under 

section 7u, the person claiming the exemption may appeal that decision to the Michigan tax tribunal within 

30 days of the denial.” See also MCL 211.7u and MCL 211.53b. 

2 See Petitioner’s response to January 21, 2026 Order of Default. 

3 See Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, __Mich __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No 166190) at 8 (SixArp). 

4 Parkview Memorial Ass’n v City of Livonia¸ 183 Mich App 116; 454 NW2d 169 (1990).

MTT Docket No. 26-000073 

Page 2 of 3 

 

necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process violation that deprived 

the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right to protest.5 

 

The Tribunal finds that the same reasoning relied upon by the Sixarp court is applicable 

to MCL 211.53c in this case. The Legislature created a statutory jurisdiction 

requirement that the BOR decision be appealed by filing a petition with the Tribunal 

within 30 days of the day of the December BOR notice. This statutory subsection, like 

MCL 205.735a(3), controls the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over an appeal. The Tribunal has 

no equitable power to disregard a statutory filing deadline.6 “[S]imply because the 

plaintiffs' underlying claim has a constitutional dimension, and may even be meritorious, 

does not excuse the plaintiffs' failure to assert their claim within the applicable statutory 

period of limitation.7 

 

The Tribunal recognizes that Petitioner accurately indicates that the BOR denial notice 

does not state the correct appeal rights for the denial of a poverty exemption claim. 

Specifically, the BOR denial states that the appeal deadline is 35 days from the date of 

the decision. However, any omission or misstatement of the required filing deadline, if 

actionable, would require a determination that the omission or misstatement resulted in 

a due-process violation. As explained above, the Tribunal lacks any equitable authority 

to consider a potential due-process violation. Jurisdiction because of a failure of a unit 

of government to comply with a statutory obligation, if there was any, may be vested 

upon the Tribunal by a judicial body only as a matter of equity.8 Lacking jurisdiction, the 

only appropriate action is dismissal. Therefore, 

 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 

 

This order resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes this case. 

 

APPEAL RIGHTS 

 

If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a claim of appeal with 

the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final 

decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry 

of the final decision, it is an “appeal by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be 

filed with the Tribunal to certify the record on appeal. There is no certification fee. 

 

 

 

 

5 See Sixarp at 8. (Citations omitted). 

6 The Tribunal’s powers are limited to those authorized by statute and do not include powers of equity. 

See Federal-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346 (1987), Elec Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 

253 Mich App 538 (2002), and VanderWerp v Plainfield Twp, 278 Mich App 624 (2008). 

7 See Szymanski v City of Westland, 420 Mich 301, 303; 362 NW2d 224, 225 (1984). 

8 See Sixarp at 4, 8. The court held respectively that “the Court of Appeals remedied the violation by 

vesting the MTT with jurisdiction to consider the exemption claim as a matter of equity” and that Petitioner 

was required to demonstrate that Respondent deprived it of its right to constitutional due process to 

invoke this court’s jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)

MTT Docket No. 26-000073 

Page 3 of 3 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By: /s/ Marcus L. Abood 

Entered: April 3, 2026 

smm 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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