25-003770 Vacate Order Ext Dismiss.pdf

Kesha Danielle McKinney, Petitioner V City Of Detroit, Respondent · 25-003770-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Kesha Danielle McKinney, 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

Petitioner, 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

v 

 

MTT Docket No. 25-003770 

 

City of Detroit, 

 

Presiding Judge 

Respondent. 

 

Paricia L. Halm 

 

ORDER VACATING DECEMBER 8, 2025 ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR 

PETITIONER TO CURE DEFAULT 

 

ORDER SETTING ASIDE PETITIONER’S DEFAULT 

 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

 

The Tribunal has considered the file in this case and finds that it entered an order on 

December 8, 2025, extending the time for Petitioner to cure their default. However, the 

Tribunal erred in the entry of this order as Petitioner timely filed the notice giving rise to 

the appeal and paid the petition filing fee on November 19, 2025, in response to the 

November 7, 2025 Order of Default. It appears that the response had been sent to the 

Michigan Department of Treasury, rather than the Tribunal, and therefore was simply 

not yet processed as of the entry of the December 8, 2025 order. As such, and 

inasmuch as Petitioner has complied with the default order, as required by TTR 237, the 

Tribunal finds good cause to vacate the order extending the time to cure and set the 

default aside. 

Additionally, the Tribunal finds that it has no authority over Petitioner’s appeal. The 

pleadings and accompanying documentation indicate that Petitioner is appealing 

Respondent’s principal residence exemption (PRE) denial for Parcel No. 02004228 for 

the 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 tax years. However, the Tribunal has no authority over 

that parcel under MCL 211.7cc(13) because Petitioner failed to appeal the denial to the 

Tribunal within 35 days of that decision.1 

 

Petitioner’s failure to file the appeal by the statutory deadline is a failure to invoke the 

Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction over this proceeding.2 In Sixarp, the Michigan Supreme 

Court reiterated previous appellate decisions in its reasoning that the Tribunal’s 

jurisdiction is statutory by nature. 

 

 

1 MCL 211.7cc(13) states in pertinent part: “An owner may appeal a denial by the assessor of the local 

tax collecting unit under subsection (6) . . . to the residential and small claims division of the Michigan tax 

tribunal within 35 days of that decision.” 

2 See Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, __Mich __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No 166190) at 8.

MTT Docket No. 25-003770 

Page 2 of 3 

 

MCL 205.735a(3) “is not a notice statute, but is a jurisdictional statute that 

governs when and how a petitioner invokes the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” 

We therefore overrule Parkview3 to the extent that it incorrectly held that the 

protest requirement of . . . the precursor to MCL 205.735a . . . is a mere 

“procedural requirement for perfecting an appeal in the Tax Tribunal” and 

not an express limitation on the MTT’s jurisdiction. Instead, the protest 

requirement of MCL 205.735a(3) may only be waived by the court if 

necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process violation that deprived 

the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right to protest.4 

 

The Tribunal finds that the same reasoning relied upon by in Sixarp is applicable to 

MCL 211.7cc(13) in this case. The Legislature created a statutory jurisdiction 

requirement that an assessor denial be appealed by filing a petition with the Tribunal 

within 35 days of the day of the PRE denial. This statutory subsection, like MCL 

205.735a(3), controls the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over an appeal. The Tribunal has no 

equitable power to disregard a statutory filing deadline.5 “[S]imply because the plaintiffs' 

underlying claim has a constitutional dimension, and may even be meritorious, does not 

excuse the plaintiffs' failure to assert their claim within the applicable statutory period of 

limitation.”6 

 

The Tribunal notes that the petition contends that sufficient notice was not sent to 

Petitioner. This contention of improper notice, if actionable, would require a 

determination by an applicable authority that the purported error resulted in a due 

process violation. As explained above, the Tribunal lacks any equitable authority to 

consider a potential due-process violation. Jurisdiction as a result of a failure of a unit 

of government to comply with a statutory obligation, if there was any, may be vested 

upon the Tribunal by a judicial body only as a matter of equity.7 Lacking jurisdiction, the 

only appropriate action is dismissal. Therefore, 

 

IT IS ORDERED that the December 8, 2025 Order Extending Time for Petitioner to 

Cure Default is VACATED. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Default is SET ASIDE. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is DISMISSED. 

 

This order resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes this case. 

 

3 Parkview Memorial Ass’n v City of Livonia¸ 183 Mich App 116; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 

4 See Sixarp at 8 (citations omitted). 

5 The Tribunal’s powers are limited to those authorized by statute and do not include powers of equity. 

See Federal-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346 (1987), Elec Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 

253 Mich App 538 (2002), and VanderWerp v Plainfield Twp, 278 Mich App 624 (2008). 

6 See Szymanski v City of Westland, 420 Mich 301, 303; 362 NW2d 224, 225 (1984). 

7 See Sixarp at 4, 8. The court held respectively that “the Court of Appeals remedied the violation by 

vesting the MTT with jurisdiction to consider the exemption claim as a matter of equity” and that Petitioner 

was required to demonstrate that Respondent deprived it of its right to constitutional due process to 

invoke this court’s jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)

MTT Docket No. 25-003770 

Page 3 of 3 

 

APPEAL RIGHTS 

If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for 

reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of 

Appeals. 

 

A motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Tribunal with the required filing fee 

within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision 

closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing 

system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such 

motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless 

the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a 

principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the 

decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty or disabled veterans exemption and, 

if so, there is no filing fee. You are required to serve a copy of the motion on the 

opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to 

electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the 

motion. Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral 

arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal. 

 

Alternatively, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the 

claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If 

the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal 

by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the 

record on appeal. There is no certification fee. 

 

 

Entered: December 15, 2025 

 

 

By _____________________________ 

kac/jc 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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