J & S Farms LLC_Redacted.pdf
J & S Farms LLC, Petitioner V Township Of Holland, Respondent · 25-003108-TT
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Page 1
RECEIVED JUN 13 2025 ~~ FOSTERSWIFT FOSTER SWIFT COLLINS & SMITH PC || ATTORNEYS © Lansing | Southfield | Grand Rapids | Detroit | Holland MICHIGAN TAN-TRIBL NAL RAs a=ivih jam Lansing Southfield Grand Rapids 313 S. Washington Square 28411 Northwestern Highway — Suite 500 1700 E. Beltline NE — Suite 200 Lansing MI 48933 Southfield MI 48034 Grand Rapids MI 49525 Detroit Holland 333 W. Fort Street — Suite 1400 151 Central Avenue ~ Suite 260 Detroit MI 48226 Holland M1 49423 Walter S. Foster Thomas R. Meagher ‘Thomas R. TerMaat Leslie A. Abdoo Steven J. Tjapkes Benjamin M. Williams 1878-1961 Douglas A. Mielock Frederick D. Dilley Julie L. Hamlet Erica EL. Huddas Dina D. Kashat Richard B. Foster Scott A. Chernich David R. Russell Michael C. Zahrt Jennifer L. Montasir Danielle N. Romano 1908-1996 Paul J. Millenbach Joel C. Farrar Mark T. Koerner Mikhail Murshak Lindsey M. Mead Theodore W. Swift Dirk H. Beckwith Laura J. Genovich Warren H. Krueger, [11 Courtney G. Agrusa Destiny R. Hughes 1928-2000 Brian J. Renaud Karl W. Butterer, Jr. Taylor A. Gast Rachael Kuilema Klein Samantha L. Diamond John L. Collins Lynwood P. VandenBosch Mindi M. Johnson Thomas K. Dillon Michael R. Kluck McKenna S. Rivers 1926-2001 Lawrence Korolewicz Ray H. Littleton, II Robert A. Hamor Gabrielle C. Lawrence Melanie A. Assad Webb A. Smith James B. Doezema Jack L. Van Coevering Jacquelyn A. Dupler Kelly Reed Lucas Matthew C. Murray 1938-2025 Anne M. Seurynck Anna K. Gibson Dora A. Brantley Paula K. Manis Mackenzie M. Almassian Michael D. Homier Nicholas M. Oertel James F. Anderton, V Michael G. Oliva Patrick E. Quinn Charles A. Janssen Scott H. Hogan Alicia W. Birach Sara L. Cunningham Jeffrey S. Theuer James A. Ryan Charles E. Barbieri Benjamin J. Price Adam A. Fadly Michael A. Cassar Lino A. Taormina Charles R. Sarchet Scott L. Mandel Michael R. Blum Michael J. Liddane Alexander S. Rusck Jeffrey G. Schultz Michael D. Sanders Jonathan J. David Ryan E. Lamb Amanda J. Dernovshek Alaina M. Nelson Brent A. Titus Andrew C. Vredenburg Clifford L. Hammond Brandon M. H. Schumacher ~~ Anthony M. Dalimonte Brian G. Goodenough Julie 1. Fershtman Matthew S. Fedor Bryan Cermak Nicholas J. Stock, II Matt G. Hrebec Todd W. Hoppe Andrea Badaluceo Kevin J. Roragen Keith T. Brown Deanna Swisher Jennifer B. Van Regenmorter Stefania Gismondi Allison M. Collins Mallory E. Reader Writer's Direct Phone: 616.726.2244 Fax: 616.726.6844 Reply To: Grand Rapids Email: JFolkema@fosterswift.com June 10, 2025 Via First Class Mail Michigan Tax Tribunal P.O. Box 30232 Lansing, Michigan 48909 48-1 06/12/25 Re: J & S Farms LLC v. Holland Charter Township PPN: 70-16-04-200-004 Dear Clerk: Enclosed for filing with the Tribunal, please find a Property Tax Appeal Petition Form, Valuation/Exemption/Classification Appeal, along with a check in the amount of $200.00 to cover the filing fee. Thank you for your assistance with this matter. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. Respectfully yours, FOSTER SWIFT COLLINS & SMITH PC
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GRETCHEN WHITMER STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS ALA GOVERNOR MARLON |. BROWN, DPA LANSING PROPERTY TAX APPEAL PETITION FORM VALUATION / EXEMPTION / CLASSIFICATION APPEAL Do not use this form to appeal Principal Residence Exemption, Qualified Agricultural Exemption, Special Assessment, or Non-Property tax disputes. submit this document, you may be held in default. Pursuant to Michigan Tax Tribunal Rule (TTR) 279, you MUST submit a copy of the notice giving rise to the appeal (e.g. Board of Review Decision or Notice of Uncapping) with this Small Claims Petition, if applicable. If you do not Section 1: Petitioner’s Contact Information First Name ML Last Name/Company Name J & S Farms LLC Mailing Address (No., Street, P.O. Box or Rural Route) 12120 New Holland Street City or Town State ZIP Code Holland Mi 49424 Telephone Number E-mail Address (do not enter unless you want MTT to send all correspondence via e-mail) Representative’s Contact Information First Name Thomas Section 2: Petitioner’s Attorney/Authorized } [0 K Last Name Dillon Frm Name (fa) = ster, Swift, Collins & Smith, PC Mailing Address (No., Street, P.O. Box or Rural Route) 1700 E Beltline Ave. NE, Ste 200 City or Town State ZIP Code Grand Rapids MI 49525 Telephone Number 61 6-726-2258 tdillon@fosterswift.com Email Address (do not enter unless you want MTT to send all correspondence via email) Section 3: Subject Property Information How many parcelsareyou | [[] vest [] No** 1 If you are appealing more than one parcel, are they contiguous or adjoining? appealing? *If yes, use a multiple parcel form for information regarding any contiguous parcels. **|f no, you must file separate appeals for each non-contiguous or non-adjoining parcel or you will be defaulted. Property Address (No., Street, City, ST, ZIP) [If multiple, list first property’s address] 12120 New Holland St., Holland, MI 49424
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS MARLON I. BROWN, DPA GOVERNOR LANSING DIRECTOR Section 4: Issues Being Appealed (check all that apply) [0 True Cash and Taxable Value [OJ Poverty Exemption [J Taxable Value Only (calculation) [J Disabled Veterans Exemption [wi] Uncapping of Taxable Value [0 Eligible Manufacturing Personal Property (ESA) Od Exemption from Taxation (other than the denial of a [ Classification Principal Residence or Qualified Agricultural Exemption) Section 5: Explain the Reason for this Appeal See Attachment A to Petition for explanation. Section 6: Jurisdictional Issues Year(s) you are appealing: 2025 Did you protest the assessment at a Board of Review (BOR)? [Vl Yes [No If Yes, check which BOR you attended AND attach the BOR decision: [A March [] July O December If No, check the applicable reason(s): [J Not required to attend [CJ] Assessment Change Notice was not received by Petitioner O Appealing a purported Clerical Error or Mutual Mistake of Fact (if yes, include explanation in Section 5) Oa Appealing within 35 days of State Tax Commission Order
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS MARLON I. BROWN, DPA GOVERNOR LANSING DIRECTOR Section 7: Valuation Information *use the multiple parcel form for additional, contiguous parcels. Parcel Identification Number: 70-16-04-200-004 Classification of Property: Real Personal (check one) Agricultural Commercial Industrial Residential Timber-Cutover Developmental Utility (check one) Current Assessed Value (also known as State Equalized Value) as established by the BOR: $242,900 Current Taxable Value as established by the BOR: $242,900 What do you believe is the fair market value (also known as True Cash Value)? $485,800 Multiply the True Cash Value by .5 and enter here. This is your contention of Assessed Value. $242,900 If you believe the Taxable Value differs from your contention of Assessed Value, enter your contention of Taxable Value. $132,506 Section 8: Classification Information *oniy the Mi Dep't of Treasury may appeal this issue to the Tribunal* Parcel Identification Number: Current Classification of Property as established by Board of Review: Real Personal (check one) O Agricultural Commercial Industrial Residential Timber-Cutover Developmental Utility (check one) What do you believe is the property's classification? Real Personal (check one) a Agricultural Commercial Industrial Residential Timber-Cutover Developmental Utility (check one) If improved property, how is the property currently being used? If improved property, for what use was the property designed?
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STATE OF MICHIGAN GRETCHEN WHITMER DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS MARLON I. BROWN, DPA GOVERNOR LANSING DIRECTOR Fee Information Does the subject property have a Principal Residence Exemption of at least 50% as of the date of the filing of this petition? Oa Yes wi} No Are you appealing ONLY the denial of a Poverty Exemption or Disabled Veterans Exemption? [Yes [4 no If you answered yes to either or both of the above questions, you are not required to pay any filing fees. The filing fee is based on the greater of the State Equalized Value or Taxable Value in contention. If you are appealing more than one parcel, the parcel with the highest State Equalized Value or Taxable Value in contention will be used to determine your filing fee, plus $25.00 will be added for each additional parcel being appealed, not to exceed a total filing fee of $1,000. If your property is residential property (see MCL 205.762) and the State Equalized Value or Taxable Value in contention is: Filing Fee is: $100,000.00 and under $125.00 $100,000.01 to $500,000.00 $200.00 $Over $500,000.00 $300.00 If your property is NOT residential property (see MCL 205.762) and the State Equalized Value or Taxable Value in contention is: Filing Fee is: $100,000.00 and under $250.00 * Plus $25.00 for each additional parcel, as indicated above. If your property is NOT residential property and the State Equalized Value or Taxable Value in contention is $100,000.01 or greater the appeal does not qualify for Small Claims. Therefore, an Entire Tribunal petition must be filed. Signature *Required Petitioner or Attorney/Authorized Representative’s Signature: Thomas K. Dillon Isl
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ATTACHMENT A J & S FARMS LLC PETITION REGARDING UNCAPPING OF TAXABLE VALUE Section 5: Explanation for Appeal. The property at issue in this appeal, Parcel No. 70-16-04-200-004 (the “Subject Property” or “Property™), is a farm currently classified as Residential. Though classified as residential, the 2025 Notice of Assessment indicates that the Property is currently receiving the Qualified Agricultural Exemption (“QAE”). Exhibit 1, Notice of Assessment. Petitioner purchased the Property on August 28, 2024. The prior owner, Mary Nienhuis, used the Property primarily for agricultural purposes. Though the Property was used for agricultural purposes, it was classified as Residential and was receiving the Principal Residence Exemption during tax year 2024. Since Petitioner’s purchase, Petitioner has continued to devote the Property primarily to agricultural purposes. Immediately following its purchase, Petitioner filed an Affidavit Attesting that Qualified Agricultural Property Shall Remain Qualified Agricultural Property with Respondent. Exhibit 2, Qualified Agricultural Property Affidavit. Both before and after Petitioner’s purchase, the property was devoted primarily to agricultural use and therefore met and meets the definition of “qualified agricultural property” contained in MCL 211.7dd(d). For 2025, Respondent granted the QAE but nevertheless uncapped the Property’s taxable value. Exhibit 1, Notice of Assessment. Petitioner protested the uncapping to Respondent’s March Board of Review, but the March Board of Review denied Petitioner’s protest. Exhibit 3, March Board of Review Decision. Property not receiving the QAE may still meet the definition of “qualified agricultural property” and, when transferred, the taxable value of that property remains capped as such a transfer is not a “transfer of ownership” under MCL 211.27a(7)(0). Phelps v Courtland Township, MTT Docket No. 16-002057 (May 2, 2017) (attached hereto as Exhibit 4). Because the Property met the definition of “qualified agricultural property” both before and after Petitioner’s purchase, and because Petitioner properly filed the Qualified Agricultural Affidavit required by Michigan law, Respondents determination that Petitioner’s purchase constituted a “transfer of ownership” and subsequent uncapping of the Property’s taxable value is contrary to Michigan law. MCL 211.27a(7)(0). unal enter an Order reversing
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EXHIBIT 1
Page 9
FH
THIS
IS NOT A TAX BILL
L-4400
Notice of Assessment, Taxable Valuation, and Property Classification
LJ
This form is issued under the authority of P.A. 206 of 1993; Sec. 211.24 (c) and'Sec.211.34c, as amended. This is a model assessment nofico to bo used bythe local assessor.
FROM: HOLLAND CHARTER TOWNSHIP
{
:
PARCEL IDENTIFICATION
353 N 120TH AVE
PARCEL NUMBER:
70-16-04-200-004
HOLLAND, MI 49424 =
PROPERTY ADDRESS:
12120 NEW HOLLAND ST
HOLLAND, MI 49424
PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE EXEMPTION
OWNER'S NAME & ADDRESS/PERSON NAMED ON ASSESSMENT ROLL:
.
% Exempt As “Homeowners Principal Residence":
.00%
:
% Exempt As "Qualified Agricultural Property":
100.00%
J
&
S FARMS LLC
9
"
a
00%
12120 NEW HOLLAND ST
Y
% Exempt As
"MBT Industrial Personal™
7
HOLLAND MI 49424
% Exempt As "MBT Commercial Personal;
00%
Exempt As "Qualified Forest Property”:
[Yes
IX
No
2
Exempt
As "Development Property":
| i Yes
No
LEGAL DESCRIPTION:
| PART.OF
THE NE FRL 1/4
COM.AT THE N 1/4 COR, TH S 88D 37M 32S E 1508.84 FT. ALG N SEC LI. TO PT OF BEG, THCONTS_
.
88D 37M 32S E 370.25 FT, TH S 0D 29M 11S W.660.08 FT ALG W.LI OF E 45 RDS, OF NE 1/4 OF NE ERL 1/4, TH N 88D 37M 32S w
369.52 FT ALG S LI OF N 660 FT OF NE 1/4 OF NE FRL 1/4, TH.N 0D 25M 22S E 660.09 FT TO BEG. SEC 4 T5N R15W 5.6 AC
ACCORDING TO MCL 211.34c THIS:PROPERTY IS CLASSIFIED
AS:
401
Residential
PRIOR YEAR'S CLASSIFICATION:
401
Residential
The change in taxable value will increase/decrease your tax bill for the 2025
PRIOR AMOUNT
CURRENT
CHANGE FROM
TENTATIVE AMOUNT
PRIOR YEAR TO
year by approximately:
$3650
YEAR:
2024
YEAR:
2025"
|
CURRENT YEAR
1. TAXABLE VALUE:
128,522
242,900 | 89 945,
114.378
7
| 2. AssEssED VALUE;
|
242,900
e
3. TENTATIVE EQUALIZATION FACTOR:
1.000
hi
if
i
4. STATE EQUALIZED VALUE (SEV):
:
214,400
242,900
28,500
5. There WAS or WAS NOT a transfer of ownership on this property in2024°
WAS
X2= 48S goo vv
6. Assessor Change Reason:
Market Adjustment
The 2025 Inflation rafe Wuifiplier is is: 1.031
Questions regarding the Notice of Assessment, Taxable Valuation, and Property Classification may be directed to the Following:
Name;
Phone:
Email Address:
TYLER WOLFE
616-395-0236
TYLERW@HCT.HOLLAND.MLUSPage 10
EXHIBIT 2
Page 11
TT
ERECORDING
2024-0025573
FILED 8& SEALED FOR RECORD IN
OTTAWA COUNTY, MX
JUSTIN F. ROEBUCK
COUNTY CLERK/REGISTER OF DEEDS
09/12/2024 AT 12:10 PM
30.00
Michigan Department of Treasury
So tn
Emme:
Affidavit Attesting Qualified Agricultural Property Shall Remain Qualified Agricultural Property
1. Street Address of Property
2. Name of County
12120 New Holland
Ottawa
3. City/Township/Village Where Real Estate Is Located
.
Holland
O City
Township
O Village
4, Name of Property Owner(s) (Print or Type Legibly)
5, Property ID Number (from Tax Bill or Assessment Notice)
J &S Fams L.L.C.
PP 70-16-04-200-004
6. Legal Description (Lega! description Is required; attach additional shoots if
7. Percentage of this property that Is, and will remain Qualified Agricultural Property
necessary)
(Do Not Include Qualified Forest Program Property)
Attached
100%
8, Daytime Telephone Number
9, E-mail Address
Partial transfer under MCL 211.27a(6)}K)? See Pago 2
(616) 218-1455
greatlakesturkey@att.net
[C] Yes
No
CERTIFICATION & NOTARIZATION (Notarization necessary for recording with Register of Deeds)
1 certify that the information above Is true and complete to the best of my knowledge. | further certify that the property noted on this affidavit
currently is, and wlll remain, qualified agricultural property. Must be signed
by
awgsy, paitner, corporate officer, or a duly authorized agent.
Dated:
F/ag
2024
Signed
__
/
Name (Prired
or Type) Je
W. Janssen
Title Manager
Dated:
, 20
Signed
Name (Printed or Type)
.
Title
STATE OF MICHIGAN
)
) ss.
COUNTY OF
Ottawa
)
on this
_2 7" day of __ fusucd
,20_24 _, the above-named person(s) John W. Janssen, Manager
each personally appeared before me. Each acknowledged that the persons’ execution of this affidavit was that
person's free act and deed and affirmed that the contents of this affidavit are true to the best of that person's Information, knowledge
and belief.
-
PRINTITYPE NAME: _ Mawr
{J wi S$
NOTARY PUBLIC,
feud
County, Michigan
.
Acting In
Miia
County
(NOTARY SEAL)
My commission expires:
2-2-2fPage 12
Michigan Depariment of Treasury
This form is issuad under authority of P.A. 260 of
3676 (Rev. 12-18)
2000 and P.A. 378 of 2006. Filing Is mandatory.
Affidavit Attesting Qualified Agricultural Property Shall Remain Qualified Agricultural Property
1. Streel Address of Property
2. Name of Counly
12120 New Holland
Ottawa
3. Cily/Township/Village Where Real Eslale is Located
.
,
)
Holland
OJ City
X Township
OJ Village
4. Name of Property Owner(s) (Print or Type Legibly)
5. Property ID Number (from Tax BIll or Assessmant Notice)
J&S Farms L.L.C.
PP# 70-16.04-200.004
6. Legal Description (Legal description Is required; attach addilional sheets if
7. Percenlage of this property that Is, and will remain Qualified Agricultural Property
necessary)
(Do Not Include Qualified Forest Program Properly)
Attached
100 %
8. Daylime Telephone Number
9. E-mail Address
Partial transfer under MCL 211.27a(6)(K)? See Page 2
(616) 218-1455
greatlakesturkey@att.net
[] Yes
No
CERTIFICATION & NOTARIZATION (Notarization necessary for recording with Register of Deeds)
| certify that the information above is true and complete to the best of my knowledge.
| further certify that the property noted on this affidavit
currently is, and will remain, qualified agricultural property. Must by signed by bi
r, partner, corporate officer, or a duly authorized agent.
Dated:
S/25
2024
Signed
Fir) [id Jenga
/
Name (Priel or Type) Joh W. Janssen
Title Manager
Dated:
, 20
Signed
Name (Printed or Type)
Title
STATE OF MICHIGAN
)
) ss.
COUNTY OF
Ottawa
)
On this
_2 £4* day of
Ji! gsc
,20.24 __, the above-named person(s) John W. Janssen, Manager
\each personally appeared before me. Each acknowledged that the persons’ execution of this affidavit was that
person's free act and deed and affirmed that the contents of this affidavit are true to the best of that person's information, knowledge
and belief.
~~
PRINTITYPE NAME; _ Mowe
{0 wis
NOTARY PUBLIC,
[ent
County, Michigan
Acting in
oie
CountyPage 13
EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION For APN/Parcel ID(s): 70-16-04-200-004 Land Situated in the State of Michigan, County of Ottawa, Township of Holland. Part of the Northeast Fractional 1/4 of Section 4, Town 5 North, Range 15 West, Holland Township, Ottawa County, Michigan, described as: Commencing at the North 1/4 comer of said Section; thence S88°37'32"E 1508.84 feet along the North line of said section to the Point of Beginning; thence continuing along said North line S88°37'32"E 370.25 feet; thence S00°29'11"W 660.08 feet along the West line of the East 45 Rods of the NE 1/4 of the NE fractional 1/4 of said section; thence N88°37'32"W 369.52 feet along the South line of the North 660 feet of the NE 1/4 of the NE fractional 1/4 of said section; thence N00°25'22"E 660.09 feet parallel with the West line of the NE 1/4 of the NE fractional 1/4 of said section to the Point of Beginning.
Page 14
EXHIBIT 3
Page 15
. oo oe 10 ny ar £16 hi
Page 16
EXHIBIT 4
Page 17
Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) 2017 WL 2634774 (Mich. Tax Tribunal) Michigan Tax Tribunal Department of Energy, Labor and Economic Growth State of Michigan AARON M PHELPS, PETITIONER v. COURTLAND TOWNSHIP, RESPONDENT MTT Docket No. 16-002057 May 2, 2017 ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION FINAL OPINION AND JUDGMENT *1 The Tribunal issued a proposed order denying Respondent's motion for summary disposition and granting Petitioner's motion for summary disposition (“POJ”) on March 27, 2017. The POJ states, in pertinent part, “[t]he parties have 20 days from date of entry of this POJ to notify the Tribunal in writing, by mail or by electronic filing, if available, if they do not agree with the POJ and to state in writing why they do not agree with the POJ (i.e., exceptions).” Neither party has filed exceptions to the POJ. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) considered the testimony and evidence and made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ's determination is supported by the testimony and evidence and applicable statutory and case law. Given the above, the Tribunal adopts the POJ as the Tribunal's final decision in this case. ! The Tribunal also incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the POJ in this Final Opinion and Judgment. As a result: The property's TV, as established by the Board of Review for the tax year at issue, is: Parcel Number: 41-07-09-400-001 Year TV 2016 $60,326 The property's final TV for the tax year at issue, as determined by the Tribunal, is:
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is NOT entitled to a refund of the property's ad valorem taxes paid for the 2016 tax year. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with maintaining the assessment rolls for the tax year at issue shall correct or cause the assessment rolls to be corrected to reflect the property's qualified agricultural exemption as provided in this Final Opinion and Judgment within 20 days of entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment. This Final Opinion and Judgment resolves the last pending claim and closes this case. APPEAL RIGHTS If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. A Motion for reconsideration must be filed with the required filing fee within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal's web-based e-filing system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty exemption and, if so, there is no filing fee.’ A copy of the motion must be served on the opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the motion. * Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal. 3 #2 A claim of appeal must be filed with the appropriate filing fee. If the claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an ““appeal by right.” If the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal by leave.” 6A copy of the claim must be filed with the Tribunal with the filing fee required for certification of the record on appeal. 7 The fee for certification is $100.00 in both the Entire Tribunal and the Small Claims Division, unless no Small Claims fee is required. § Steven H. Lasher Tribunal Judge Presiding
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) On January 18, 2017, Respondent filed a Motion requesting that the Tribunal render summary disposition in its favor pursuant to MCL 2.116(C)(10), as “there is no disputed issue fact and the Township is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In the Motion, Respondent contends that: 1. “This case involves the ‘resetting’ [i.e., recapping] provisions of MCL 211.27a(8) for qualified agricultural property. The statute imposes the following requirement for ‘resetting’: ‘The qualified agricultural property was qualified agricultural property for taxes levied in 1999 and each year after 1999.” [Emphasis in the original.] The prior property owners had never claimed the qualified agricultural property exemption Rom 18 mill local school operating millage afforded by MCL 211.7eeprior to 2011. Nevertheless, Petitioner claims that the taxable value of the property should be ‘reset’ if the property had been used in a manner that would have satisfied the definition of ‘qualified agricultural property’ for 1999 and every year since 1999, regardless of whether the prior property owners had actually claimed the qualified agricultural exemption.” [Emphasis added.] 2. “The issue presented by this motion is a purely legal question: To qualify for ‘resetting’ under qualifying agricultural property, must all previous property owners have actually claimed the qualified agricultural exemption from local school operating taxes for 1999 and each year thereafter? If so, judgment must be entered in favor of the Township. If not, then this Tribunal must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the property was actually being used in such a manner that it would have qualified for each and every year between 1999 and 2010.” 3. “Since 1999, the property has had four owners, including Mr. and Mrs, Phelps.” 4. “The taxable value was ‘uncapped’ by virtue of the 2002 transfer to Kleinheksel. No uncapping occurred by virtue of the 2008 transfer from Kleinheksel to MBK Holding, LLC, because that entity claimed the exemption for transfers between entities under common control or members of an affiliated group .... Had the 2002 uncapping event not occurred, the 2016 taxable value would have been $35,824, which is what Mr. Phelps claims it should be ... [Emphasis added.] 5. “With respect to exemption from the local school operating millage, the property was subject to a principal residence exemption from 1999 through 2003. Neither a PRE nor a qualified agricultural exemption was claimed from 2003 through 2010. For the first time, MBK Holdings claimed a 100% qualified agricultural property exemption in 2011.” [Emphasis added.] 6. “Petitioner Aaron Phelps and his wife, Elizabeth Phelps, purchased the subject property on or about March 11, 2016 .... The Phelps executed and recorded an ‘Affidavit Attesting that Qualified Agricultural Property Shall Remain Qualified Agricultural Property,” Treasury Form 3676, on or about March 16, 2016 .... It is the Township's intention to accept that affidavit, such that the 2016 taxable value of $60,326 will not become uncapped by virtue of the sale from MBK Holdings, LLC to the Phelps, and the 2017 taxable value will increase only by the lesser of the increase in the general price level or 5% .... 7. “By letter dated March 29, 2016 ... Mr. Phelps asserted that the 2017 taxable value should be calculated as if there had been no transfer of ownership since 1999. Following consultation with the Township attorney and the State Tax Commission, it was determined that MCL 211.27a(8) requires that the property had actually been receiving a qualified agricultural exemption for 1999 and every year since 1999, Accordingly, the assessor informed Mr. Phelps on May 4, 2016, that although the 2017 taxable value would not be uncapped by virtue of the 2016 transfer, the 2017 taxable value would not be reset pursuant to MCL 211.27a(8). Mr. Phelps fried this appeal within 35 days of that notification.”
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) 9. “That the property at issue had never received the qualified agricultural exemption from the local school operating millage prior to 2011 is supported by the assessor's affidavit ... and we doubt that there will be any opposition to that. Therefore, the Township will have satisfied its burden of providing documentary evidence that there is no disputed issue of fact, and the Township is entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law.” [Emphasis added.] 10. “Act 260 was initiated by Senate Bill 709. Substitute Senate Bill 709, passed by the Senate on October 12, 1999, included an exemption from uncapping for transfers of qualified agricultural property, with language similar to that ultimately adopted, but did not include the provision for resetting taxable value. The resetting provisions of subsections (8) and (9) were added by a substitute House version of Senate Bill 709 reflecting the recommendation by the House Committee on Agriculture Resource Management, passed by the House on June 7, 2000, and concurred by the Senate on June 8, 2000. The Legislative Analysis of the House substitute reflects a deliberate inclusion of the language for taxes levied’ as one of the requirements for resetting .... [Emphasis added.] L 11. “Claiming the exemption for qualified agricultural property ‘for taxes levied’ requires either that the property be classified as agricultural for equalization purposes, or that the owner file an affidavit claiming the exemption.” 2 [Emphasis added,] 12. “Here it is undisputed that this property was classified as either residential vacant or residential improved every year from 1999 through 2016.” [[Emphasis added.] 13. “If the property is not classified as agricultural, the property owners must file an affidavit claiming the exemption (Treasury Form 2599) and the owners of this property never did so until the 2011 tax year.” [Emphasis added.] 14. “For purposes of the exemption, ‘qualified agricultural property’ is defined by MCL 211.7dd(d). The determination of whether property meets this definition depends on the nature of agricultural use, and the extent of property put to that use. For purposes of this motion, however, it is irrelevant whether the Phelps parcel met the definition of ‘qualified agricultural property’ because it was not receiving the exemption from local school operating taxes prior to 2011.” 15. “Applying this principle here: The phrase ‘for taxes levied’ has no meaning unless it means that the property was actually receiving the qualified agricultural exemption from local school operating taxes. 3 The construction urged by Mr. Phelps would rewrite this requirement to read: ‘The qualified agricultural property was qualified agricultural property in 1999 and each year after 1999,’ thus ignoring and rendering the phrase “for taxes levied’ meaningless and surplusage.” [Emphasis added.] 16. “The phraseology of MCL 211.27a(0) does not require that qualified agricultural property be receiving the qualified agricultural exemption ‘for taxes levied’ in the year of the transfer, or for any particular time, in order to take advantage of the exemption from uncapping for the year following transfer of such property. In contrast, the provisions for resetting do specifically require that the property was qualified agricultural property ‘for taxes levied’ in 1999 and each year thereafter. * [Emphasis in the original,] This difference reflects a deliberate decision by the legislature that it was not necessary that property be receiving the qualified agricultural exemption “for taxes levied” in order to claim the uncapping exemption, but that it was necessary that the property be receiving the exemption to qualify for resetting of the taxable value.”
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) 18. “If Mr. Phelps' position is correct, and satisfying the definition of “qualified agricultural property" is sufficient regardless of whether the exemption is granted, the local assessor and this Tribunal are faced with the daunting task of taking evidence to determine whether a property met the definition of qualified agricultural property 18 years ago, in 1999. If so, did it meet it again in 2000? If so, did it meet it in 2001? And so on for each and every year thereafter ....” 19. “To address this, the Legislature required that the property had actually received the qualified agricultural property exemption for property taxes for 1999 and each year thereafter. This can be easily verified from the historical assessment records. This requirement dovetails with provisions of the General Property Tax Act which allow for challenging the classification of property for equalization purposes (MCL 211.3 4¢( 16)), and for testing whether or not the property is truly qualified agricultural property (MCL 211.7ee(4)-(8)) on an annual basis when the facts are more easily determined, not 18 or more years later.” 20. “In contrast, the requirement that the property had been receiving the qualified property tax exemption in the year of transfer is not included in the uncapping exemption in MCL 211.27a(7)(0) because the assessor need only to evaluate the use of the property during, at most, the prior 12 months. Thus, a record of receiving the exemption is not nearly so important” 21. “The legislative design acknowledges the incentive for property owners to claim the qualified agricultural property tax exemption, if it is available to them. A property owner might deliberately choose not to take advantage of the uncapping provisions of MCL 211.27a(7)(0) if unsure of the future use of the property and desiring to avoid the agricultural property recapture tax. However, there is no ‘claw back’ of the local school operating millage if the status of a qualified agricultural property for exemption purposes changes from year to year, and so there is no disincentive to claiming the qualified agricultural property tax exemption.” 22. “The [Red Arrow Diary] decision does not indicate whether the properties had achieved ... [the qualified agricultural property] status by virtue of classification as agricultural property or the filing of an exemption affidavit. Rather, it was simply accepted as true that the property was qualified agricultural property ‘for taxes levied in 1999 and for each year after 1999.76 23. “Bulletins issued by the State Tax Commission also do not directly address the issue of whether a subject property must have been receiving the qualified agricultural exemption from local school operating taxes in order to be eligible for resetting, and only considered that question in the context of uncapping pursuant to MCL 211.27a(7)(0). See Bulletin No. 7 of 2006, Transfers of Qualified Agricultural Property (August 29, 2006). However, the position taken by Courtland Township here is consistent with staff advice from Timothy Schnelle of the State Tax Commission dated May 3, 2016, and attached to petitioner's own [petition] 7... Mr. Schnelle pointed out that the Red Arrow Dairy case involved a situation in which the property had admittedly been receiving a qualified agricultural exemption since 1999, unlike the Phelps situation. In addition, he set forth the department's position that ‘we interpret the statute as requiring actual qualified ag designation since 1999 ...." With respect to this, Mr. Schnelle further noted: ‘How can one determine the amount of tilled acreage and the relative values of the residential and agricultural uses going back 18 years?” 24. “Mr. Phelps cannot be heard now to complain that the property should have been included in one of the agricultural classifications in previous years. Each year, a property owner has the opportunity to dispute the classification of a parcel, with a right to appeal to the State Tax Commission, MCL 211.34¢(6). In addition, a property owner may claim the qualified agricultural
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL. 2634774 (2017) [it] absolutely clear that the Tribunal does not have powers of equity. See Electronic Data Systems Corp v Flint Township, 253 Mich App 538, 548[; 656 NW2d 215] (2002)....” On February 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a Response to Respondent's Motion and a Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). In the Response and the Cross- Motion, Petitioner contends that: 1. “This case concerns 60 contiguous acres of farmland .... [that] has continuously been ‘qualified agricultural property.” In 2002, the owner of the Farm (who had owned it for over twenty-three years) sold it. Although the 2002 purchaser continued to farm the property as it had been farmed before, he never filed the Form 3676 Affidavit, resulting in the uncapping of the taxable value.” 2. “In 2016, Petitioner purchased the Farm and promptly filed Form 3676, attesting that the Farm shall remain qualified agricultural property. Petitioner also requested that the Courtland Township Assessor revise the taxable value of the Farm to the value it would have had [had] no transfer occurred in [2003], pursuant to MCL 211.27a(8).” 3. “Petitioner has strictly complied with the recapping requirements established by MCL 211.27a(8): the Farm has and continues to meet the statutory definition of qualified agricultural property, and Petitioner has filed an affidavit attesting to continue using the Farm for qualified agricultural purposes. Therefore, Petitioner, not Respondent, is entitled to summary disposition and the Farm's taxable value should be re-capped.” 4. “The statute does not mention, much less require, exemption from local school operating taxes (a matter wholly unrelated to taxable value) in order to re-cap. Rather, the statute requires only that the property be ‘qualified agricultural property/ that is [sic] property ‘devoted primarily to agricultural use.” The Farm is, and has been, ‘qualified agricultural property.” 8 5. “The law ... provides that a transfer of qualified agricultural property does not constitute a “transfer of ownership’ if the transferee files an affidavit with the local tax assessor and the register of deeds, attesting that the qualified agricultural property will remain qualified agricultural property. MCL 211.27a(0) .... However, for a variety of reasons (including simple ignorance), property owners do not always file Form 3676, resulting in the uncapping of taxable values. The Legislature addressed this situation in MCL 211.27a(8) by requiring assessors to ‘revise’ the current year's taxable value to the value of the property ‘would have had if there had been no transfer of ownership ... since December 31, 1999 ....” MCL 211.27a(8). The only requirements for recapping a property's taxable value are that the property (1) has been ‘qualified agricultural property’ without interruption since 1999, and (2) that the owner files an affidavit with the local assessor pursuant to MCL 211.27a(0).” 6. “Allowing the current owner to adjust the property's taxable value through this process facilitates the statute's purpose of easing tax burdens on farmers, thereby promoting the continued use of land for agricultural purposes. 2000 Leg. Analysis. Without such a provision, farmers in Petitioner's position, who have acquired agricultural land and intend to continue to use the land for agricultural purposes, would be stuck paying taxes on an inflated taxable value relative to other farmland.” 7. “Petitioner has submitted his own affidavit, as well as affidavits from the Farm's prior owner (and deceased owner's daughter) attesting to ... [the] fact [[of the property's agricultural use]. See Exhibits A-C. The Township has no contrary evidence. Therefore, the fact that the Farm is (and has been) “qualified agricultural property" is undisputed.”
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) to be requested since 1999, but the Township would have to approve it. No such obstacle was interposed by the Legislation and none can now be demanded by the Township.” 10 10. ... the 2016 taxable value should have been $35,824, which in turn should have reduced the 2016 summer tax bill, which was unpaid when the recapping was requested. Consequently, Petitioner is now owed a partial refund for summer and winter 2016 taxes.” On February 17, 2017, Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner's Motion, In the Response, Respondent contends that: 1. “Petitioner did not contest that the property had not been receiving the qualified agricultural exemption from property taxes for 1999 and each year thereafter. Rather, Petitioner takes the position that such exemption is not a prerequisite to resetting.” 2. “Considering the difficulty, expense, and burden on staff, the Township does not intend to contest the Affidavits filed by Petitioner. Indeed, such burden on the taxing unit is the reason why the resetting statute requires confirmation of agricultural use by reference to the easily verifiable fact of whether the property had been receiving the qualified agricultural exemption for 1999 and each year thereafter.” 3. “The Township's position is that the actual use of the property is irrelevant, and that the Petitioner is not eligible for resetting unless the property had been receiving the qualified agricultural exemption from local school operating taxes for 1999 and every single year thereafter. Indisputably it was not.” On February 27, 2017, the Michigan Farm Bureau (“Farm Bureau”) filed a Motion requesting that the Tribunal permit it to file an Amicus Curiae brief in support of Petitioner. In the Motion, the Farm Bureau contends that “... [the] Farm Bureau has determined that resolution of the legal issue in this case will significantly impact the owners of farmland throughout the state” and *... [the] Amicus Brief ... offers additional analysis and different perspectives on the legal issue and that the Brief will aid the Tribunal in reviewing the pending motions.” The Tribunal has reviewed the Motions, the Responses, and the case file and finds the resolution of the legal issue may, in fact, “significantly impact the owners of farmland throughout the state” and that the amicus brief, although unnecessary, does provide some marginal assistance in resolving that issue. 11 As a result, the Farm Bureau has shown good cause to justify the granting of its Motion. With respect to the parties’ motions, there is no specific Tribunal rule governing motions for summary disposition. Nevertheless, the Tribunal is bound to follow the Michigan Rules of Court in rendering a decision on such motions. 12 1n that regard, a motion filed under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for Petitioner's claim based upon the Tribunal's consideration of all pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” 13 Further, the Tribunal may only grant such motions if the parties' submissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. i If it is, however, determined that an asserted claim can be supported by evidence at trial, the motion under (C)(10) must be
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) Here, Respondent contends that the property is not entitled to have its taxable value “reset” because the property had not “actually been receiving the qualified agricultural exemption from local school operating taxes for 1999 and for each year thereafter.” In support of its argument, Respondent indicates that the resetting of the taxable value would render the phrase “for taxes levied” meaningless contrary to principles of statutory construction. 19 More specifically, Respondent is asking the Tribunal to interpret that phrase so as to limit the “resetting” to properties that have annually received qualified agricultural exemptions only. 20 Although the applicable statutes are not strictly tax exemption statutes, they do provide for an exception to full taxation. As such, they are sufficiently similar to exemption statutes so as to require that they be “strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority.” 2! That does not, however, mean that the Tribunal “should give a strained construction which is adverse to the Legislature's intent.” Nevertheless, the term or, more appropriately, phrase ““for the taxes levied” is not, unfortunately, defined and, as a result, the Tribunal is required to interpret that phrase to “glean the Legislature's intent.” 2 Any such interpretation does, however, begin with a review of the plain language of the statutes at issue. 23 In that regard, MCL 211.27a(7) provides, in pertinent part: Transfer of ownership does not include the following: (0) ... a transfer of qualified agricultural property, if the person to whom the qualified agricultural property is transferred files an affidavit with the assessor of the local tax collecting unit in which the qualified agricultural property is located and with the register of deeds for the county in which the qualified agricultural property is located attesting that the qualified agricultural property will remain qualified agricultural property .... If property ceases to be qualified agricultural property at any time after a transfer subject to this subdivision, all of the following shall occur: (i) The taxable value of that property ... shall be adjusted under subsection (3) as of the December 31 in the year that the property ... ceases to be qualified agricultural property .... [Emphasis added.] The phrase “for taxes levied” is not contained in this portion of the statutory scheme relating to transfers of qualified agricultural property (i.e., uncapping) and said omission is considered “intentional.” 24 There is also no requirement that the property have a qualified agricultural exemption. Rather, the statute merely requires the property to be “qualified agricultural property” and indicates that said status can “cease” at any time, which is consistent with the requirements for the granting and rescission of a qualified agricultural exemption. 2 As for the recapping portion, MCL 211,27a(8) provides, in pertinent part: If all of the following conditions are satisfied, the local tax collecting unit shall revise the taxable value of qualified agricultural property taxable on the tax roll in the possession of that local tax collecting unit to the taxable value that qualified agricultural property would have had if there had been no transfer of ownership of that qualified agricultural property since December 31, 1999 and there had been no adjustment of that qualified agricultural property's taxable value under subsection (3) since December 31, 1999:
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) Although the phrase “for tax levied” is contained in this portion of the statutory scheme, the statute does not specifically require that the property had to have had a qualified agricultural exemption for the 1999 tax year and each year after 1999. Rather, the plain language of the statute requires the property to have been qualified agricultural property during that time period, which is consistent with Petitioner's offered interpretation of that phrase. More specifically, the disputed phrase is one that is, in fact, commonly used in the General Property Tax Act to denote the effective date of particular statutory provisions (i.e., “[f]or taxes levied after December 31, 2002,” etc.) 26 and the Tribunal has a responsibility to read the contested portion of the statute in relation to the Act so as to ensure that the statutory provisions “work in mutual agreement.” 27 Additionally, said phraseology seems to have acquired a particular meaning in the Act and should be construed accordingly. 28 As for Respondent's reliance on the bill analysis prepared by the House Legislative Analysis Section in support of the “deliberate inclusion” of the phrase, said reliance is misplaced, as the Michigan Court of Appeals has stated that “staff prepared legislative analysis does not ‘summarize the intentions of those who have been designated by the Constitution to be participants in this legislative process' and therefore ‘should be accorded very little significance by courts when construing a statute.” 2 Nevertheless, it is clear that the object of the statute and the harm it was designed to remedy related to the continuation of farmland with a remedy, albeit punitive in nature, providing for a recapture of taxes should the property no longer be primarily devoted to agricultural use. 30 1p that regard, the amendment adding the language at issue did not become effective until March 28,2001. As for the definition of “qualified agricultural property,” MCL 211.27a(11)(t) provides “[q]ualified agricultural property” means that term as defined in section 7dd” and MCL 211.7dd(d) provides, in pertinent part: “Qualified agricultural property” means unoccupied property and related buildings classified as agricultural, or other unoccupied property and related buildings located on that property devoted primarily to agricultural use as defined in section 36101 of the natural resources and environmental protection act, 1994 PA 451, MCL 324.36101. Related buildings include a residence occupied by a person employed in or actively involved in the agricultural use and who has not claimed a principal residence exemption on other property .... Property used for commercial storage, commercial processing, commercial distribution, commercial marketing, or commercial shipping operations or other commercial or industrial purposes is not qualified agricultural property. A parcel of property is devoted primarily to agricultural use only if more than 50% of the parcel's acreage is devoted to agricultural use. An owner shall not receive an exemption for that portion of the total state equalized valuation of the property that is used for a commercial or industrial purpose or that is a residence that is not a related building .... [Emphasis added.] al The phrase “for taxes levied” is not in the statutory definition of “qualified agricultural property” and the provision does not condition the status of property as qualified agricultural property based on the issuance of a qualified agricultural exemption. Rather, the definition requires the property to either be classified as agricultural property or that the property be primarily devoted to agricultural use. Given the above, Respondent's contention that the Legislature included the phrase “for tax levied” as an indication that the
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL. 2634774 (2017) Said determination is consistent with a prior decision rendered by the Tribunal. 3 More specifically, the Tribunal specifically found in that case that “[p]roof that the subject property is qualified agricultural property and a Form 3676 affidavit attesting to the property's continued use of qualified agricultural property is all that section 8 requires.” >> Although Respondent contends that the Tribunal did not in that case consider the question at issue in this case (i.e., whether the property was required to have been receiving a qualified agricultural exemption) given that it was undisputed that the property was qualified agricultural property, said contention is without merit, as the question was specifically addressed as the Tribunal did not find or otherwise hold that the property was also required to have received a qualified agricultural exemption to be entitled to recapping. Additionally, Respondent's reliance on statements made by a representative of the Michigan State Tax Commission (“STC”) is also misplaced because those statements are unsupported and “the tribunal is the final agency for the administration of property tax laws.” 36 “When the Legislature fails to address a concern in the statute with a specific provision, the courts cannot insert a provision simply because it would have been wise of the Legislature to do so to effect the statute's purpose.” Mich Basic Prop Ins Ass'n, [supra]... at [p] 560 .... Finally or, more importantly, the Tribunal finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the status of the property as qualified agricultural property for the 1999 tax year and each after 1999 and that Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. More specifically, the submitted documents establish that the property was qualified agricultural property during that time period and, as a result, was, based on the filing of Petitioner's March 16, 2016 affidavit, entitled to a recapping or recalculation (i.e., resetting) of the property's taxable value for the 2016 tax year as if there had been no transfer since 1999 in the amount indicated herein. 37 petitioner is not, however, entitled to a refund of the taxes paid for the 2016 tax year, as the property's taxable value is being proposed for “adjustment under subsection (8)” by this decision, which is occurring after the collection or payment of taxes for that tax year. 38 Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the Michigan Farm Bureau's Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the property's taxable value (TV) for the tax year at issue is as follows: Parcel Number: 41-07-09-400-001 Year TV 2016 $35,824 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is NOT ENTITLED to a refund of the property's ad valorem taxes paid for the 2016 tax year.
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) b. Issue an FOJ modifying the POJ and adopting the Modified POJ as the final decision. c. Issue an Order vacating the POJ and ordering a rehearing or such other action as is necessary and appropriate. EXCEPTIONS The parties have 20 days from date of entry of this POJ to notify the Tribunal in writing, by mail or by electronic filing, if available, that they do not agree with the POJ and to state in writing why they do not agree with the POJ (i.e., exceptions). Exceptions are limited to the evidence submitted with the Motion, the Response, and any matter addressed in the POJ. There is no fee for filing exceptions and the opposing party has 14 days from the date the exceptions were mailed to or electronically served on that party (i.e., email), if the parties agree to service by email, to file a written response to the exceptions. 40 Exceptions and responses filed by e-mail or facsimile will not be considered in the rendering of the Final Opinion and Judgment. A copy of a party's written exceptions or response must be sent to the opposing party by mail or email, if email service is agreed upon by the parties, and proof must be submitted to the Tribunal demonstrating that the exceptions or response were served on the opposing party. Peter M. Kopke Administrative Law Judge Presiding March 27, 2017 Footnotes 1 See MCL 205.726. 2 See TTR 261 and 257. 3 See TTR 217 and 267. 4 See TTR 261 and 225. 5 See TTR 261 and 257. 6 See MCL 205.753 and MCR 7.204. 7 See TTR 213.
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) 3 Respondent cites Aroma Wines & Equipment, Inc v Columbian Distribution Services, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 345-56; 871 NW2d 136 (2015) in support of the ““principle” relied upon. Respondent also cites People v Miller, 498 Mich 886; 869 NW2d 606 (2015), Kincaid v City of Flint, 311 Mich App 76; 874 NW2d 193 (2015), Harbor Watch Condominium Ass Av Emmet County Treasurer, 308 Mich App 380; 863 NW2d 745 (2014), and Robertson v DaimlerChryselr Corp, 465 Mich 732, 748: 641 NW2d 567 (2002). 4 Respondent cites Tyler v Livonia Public Schools, 220 Mich App 697, 701; 561 NW2d 390, 392 (1996), affd, 459 Mich 382; 590 NW2d 560 (1999) for the proposition that “phraseological distinctions in the subparagraphs of a statutory section presumably reflect a legislative intent to treat some things differently.” Respondent also cites People v Carruthers, 301 Mich App 590, 604; 837 NW2d 16 (2003) and United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 14; 795 NW2d 101 (2009). 5 See the Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition issued by the Tribunal in Red Arrow Daity LLC v Hartford Tivp on November 30,2007 (MTT Docket No. 320205). 6 The parties stipulated that the properties at issue were qualified agricultural property for taxes levied in 1999 and for each year after 1999. Respondent also indicates that the decision in Lyle Schmidt Farms, LLC v Mendon Tip, 315 Mich App 824; NW2d (2016) also has no applicability as “the opinion specifically noted there was no dispute that the properties were qualified agricultural properties.” 7 Although Respondent uses the word “complaint,” the only pleadings filed in the Tribunal are petitions and answers. See TTR 221(1). 8 Petitioner cites Keyzer v Christian Rest Home Ass'n 32 Mich App 286, 288; 188 NW2d 672 (1971) for the proposition that “[i]t is not for the court [[or, in the instant case, the Tribunal] to add language to a clear and explicit statute.” Petitioner also cited Kirkaldy v Rim MD, et al, 478 Mich 581, 587; 734 NW2d 201 (2007), ££ M. Sibley Lumber Co v Dep't of Revenue, 311 Mich 654, 660; 19 NW2d 132 (1945). 9 Petitioner cites Davidson v Bugbee, 227 Mich App 264, 267; 575 NW2d 574 (1977) (citing Johnson v. Marks, et al, 224 Mich App 356, 358; 568 NW2d 689 (1997)) for the proposition that “[i]n construing a statute ... omissions in the language are deemed to be intentional.” 10 Petitioner cites Eldenbrady v City of Albion, 294 Mich App 251,254; 816 NW2d 449 (2011) for the proposition that “[t]he words contained in the statute provide ... the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent” and Pohidski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 638; 641 NW2d 219 (2002) for the proposition “[w]here the language is unambiguous, ‘we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning, looking outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent only if the statutory language is ambiguous.” 11 See TTR 223(7). 12 See TTR 261 and 215. 13 See Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 187 (1999) and Quinto v Cross and Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 See McCormic v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 202 Mich App 233,237; 507 NW2d 741 (1993). See MCL 211.27a(8)(a). Although Respondent makes this argument, it does recognize that the property received a qualified agricultural exemption beginning in 2011. In that regard, there is some question as to why the property was receiving a principal residence exemption (“PRE”) from 1999 to 2003 that is not addressed by Petitioner's affidavits, as those affidavits merely indicate that the property was “primarily devoted” to agricultural uses during those years and from 2004 to 2010. The fact that Respondent did, however, grant the property a qualified agricultural exemption of 100% beginning in 2011 does, however, address concerns regarding related buildings. See MCL 211,7dd(d) See Ashley Capital, LLC v Dep't of Treasury, 314 Mich App 1, 7; 884 NW2d 848 (2015) (i.e., “‘tax statutes that grant tax credits or exemptions are to be narrowly construed in favor of the taxing authority because such statutes reduce the amount of tax imposed”D’ citing Alliance Obstetrics & Gynecology, PLC v Dep't of Treasury, 285 Mich App 284,286; 776 NW2d 160 (2009)). See Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Lansing Twp, 423 Mich 661, 664-65; 378 NW2d 737 (1985). See Spartan Stores, Inc v City of Grand Rapids, 307 Mich App 565, 569; 861 NW2d 347 (2014) (i.e., “[t]he primary goal of statutory interpretation “is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature”D’ citing Lafarge Midwest, Inc v Detroit, 290 Mich App 240,246; 801 NW2d 629 (2010)). See Bronson Methodist Hospital v Allstate Ins Co, 286 Mich App 219, 228; 779 NW2d 304 (2009) (i.e., the Legislature “is presumed to know the rules of statutory construction and therefore its use or omission of language is generally presumed to be intentional”). See MCL 211.7ee(4) (i.e., “the assessor shall determine if the property is qualified agricultural property and if so shall exempt the property from the collection of the tax as provided in subsection (1) until December 31 of the year in which the property is no longer qualified agricultural property as defined in section 7dd”) and 211.7ee(5) (i.e., “[n]ot more than 90 days after all or a portion of the exempted property is no longer qualified agricultural property, the owner shall rescind the exemption for the applicable portion of the property by filing with the local tax collecting unit a rescission form prescribed by the department of treasury”)- [Emphasis added.] See MCL 211.2, MCL 211.70, MCL 211.7cc, MCL 211.7dd, and MCL 211.79. See Spartan Stores, supra at p 569. See also G C Timmis & Cov Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416,420-21; 662 NW2d 710 (2003) (i.e., “the emphasized language does not stand alone, and thus it cannot be read in a vacuum .... [i]nstead, [i]t exists and must be read in context with the entire act, and the words and phrases used there must be assigned such meanings as are in harmony with the whole of the statute” citing Arrowhead Dev Co v Livingston Co Rd Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). See Bronson Methodist Hospital, supra at p 223 (i.e., “[w]here words “have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, they should be construed according to that meaning” citing Feyz v Mercy Memorial Hospital, 475 Mich 663, 673; 719 NW2d 1 (2006)).
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Phelps v. Courtland Twp., 2017 WL 2634774 (2017) 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 “Agricultural use” means the production of plants and animals useful to humans, including forages and sod crops; grains, feed crops, and field crops; dairy and dairy products; poultry and poultry products; livestock, including breeding and grazing of cattle, swine, captive cervidae, and similar animals; berries; herbs; flowers; seeds; grasses; nursery stock; fruits; vegetables; maple syrup production; Christmas trees; and other similar uses and activities. Agricultural use includes use in a federal acreage set-aside program or a federal conservation reserve program. Agricultural use does not include the management and harvesting of a woodlot. See Book-Gilbert v Greenleaf, 302 Mich App 538, 542; 840 NW2d 743, 745-46 (2013) citing In re Hurd-Marvin Drain, 331 Mich 504, 509; 50 NW2d 143 (1951) and Mich Basic Prop Ins Ass'n v Office of Fin & Ins Regulation, 288 Mich App 552, 560; 808 NW2d 456 (2010). The Court of Appeals also stated in Book-Gilbert, supra at p 542: See Red Arrow Dairy, supra. The properties at issue in both Red Arrow Dairy case and the Lyle Schmidt Farms case were considered qualified agricultural property and entitled to the recapping. Neither case indicated that the properties were required to also have a qualified agricultural exemption to be entitled to said recapping. Rather, the Court of Appeals in Lyle Schmidt Farms, supra at p stated: “Courts may not speculate regarding legislative intent beyond the words expressed in a statute. Hence, nothing may be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the act itself.” Mich Ed Ass'nv Secretary of State, 489 Mich 194, 217-218; 801 NW2d 35 (2011)... “The words used by the Legislature are given their common and ordinary meaning.” Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 491 Mich 200,206; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). [Emphasis added.] In that regard, the “common and ordinary meaning” of the phrase or phraseology when analyzed by its grammatical components (i.e., the phrase “was qualified agricultural property” is a past participle verb, while “for taxes levied in 1999 and each year after 1999” is a prepositional phrase modifying that verb) merely indicates when the property was required to be qualified agricultural property. See MCL 205.753(1). See MCL 211.27a(8) (i.e., “[i]f all of the following conditions are met, the local tax collecting unit shall revise the taxable value of qualified agricultural propertyand Michigan Properties, LLC v Meridian Twp, 491 Mich 518, 531-32; 817 NW2d 548, 554 (2012). [Emphasis added.] See MCL 211.27a(9) (i.e., “[i]f the taxable value of qualified agricultural property is adjusted under subsection (8), the owner of that qualified agricultural property is not entitled to a refund for any property taxes collected under this act on that qualified agricultural property before the adjustment under subsection (8)”). See MCL 205.726. See MCL 205.762(2) and TTR 289(1) and (2).
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FOSTERSWIFT FOSTER SWIFT COLLINS & SMITH PC [| ATTORNEYS 1700 E. Beltline Ave NE Suite 200 Grand Rapids MI 49525 Michigan Tax Tribunal P.O. Box 30232 Lansing, Michigan 48909