26-002451 stip_SD.pdf

Sandy Bottom Island LLC Petitioner V Township Of Green Oak Respondent · 26-002451-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING 

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Eli Saulson, 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

Petitioner, 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

v 

 

MTT Docket No. 26-002451 

 

Green Oak Township, 

 

Presiding Judge 

Respondent. 

 

Patricia L. Halm 

 

ORDER CORRECTING DOCKET 

 

ORDER DENYING JOINT STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF CONSENT JUDGMENT 

 

ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT 

 

FINAL OPINION AND JUDGMENT 

 

The Tribunal has considered the file in this case and the submitted Stipulation for Entry 

of Consent Judgment (Stipulation) filed on July 16, 2026, and finds that the stipulation 

cannot be entered at this time. Petitioner is appealing the “uncapping” of the subject 

property’s taxable value (TV) for the 2026 tax year following a conveyance of the 

property from the Eli Saulson Revocable Trust to Sandy Bottom Island LLC on July 22, 

2025. The issue of whether TV is properly uncapped is a question of law,1 and the 

Supreme Court has held in that regard as follows: 

 

It is well established that a court is not bound by the parties' stipulations of 

law. It is within the inherent power of a court, as the judicial body, to 

determine the applicable law in each case. To hold otherwise could lead to 

absurd results; for example, parties could force a court to apply laws that 

were in direct contravention to the laws of this state. It would also allow the 

parties to stipulate to laws that were obsolete, overruled, or 

unconstitutional. On the appellate level, this would result in a tremendous 

waste of judicial resources, since such case law would have no precedential 

value.2 

 

Petitioner contends that the 2025 conveyance does not constitute a “transfer of 

ownership” pursuant to MCL 211.27a(7)(m) because the LLC is 100% owned by the 

 

1 The Supreme Court has held that “the provisions establishing taxable values in MCL 211.27a(2) and 

MCL 211.27a(3) are both mandatory and automatic. Both subsections unambiguously provide that the 

[TV] for a property falling under each respective subsection ‘is’ the value that results from the parameters 

contained in the applicable subsection.” Michigan Properties, LLC v Meridian Twp, 491 Mich 518, 531; 

817 NW2d 548, 554 (2012) (emphasis added). 

2 Matter of Estate of Finlay, 430 Mich 590, 595–96; 424 NW2d 272 (1988) (citations and footnotes 

omitted).

MTT Docket No. 26-002451 

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trust, and Eli Saulson is the “owner” of both entities.”3 Even accepting that a trust is a 

legal entity within the meaning of MCL 211.27a(7)(m),4 that Eli Saulson is a beneficiary 

of the trust so as to properly be considered an “owner” of trust property,5 and that the 

trust is the sole member of the LLC, the Court of Appeals has noted that MCL 211.27a 

“applies when there is a change in the ownership of the property.”6 

 

By law, a membership interest in an LLC is personal property, and an LLC member “has 

no interest in specific limited liability company property.”7 Consequently, Eli Saulson, by 

virtue of the Trust’s LLC membership, would own a personal property interest in the 

LLC, while the LLC holds title to and interest in the real property at issue, including 

beneficial use. Thus, there was a change in ownership from Eli Saulson, as beneficiary 

of the trust, to the LLC. Eli Saulson no longer has any ownership interest in the 

property and uncapping is proper. The stipulation must therefore be denied and 

Respondent is entitled to judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(1).8 

 

Procedurally, the Tribunal notes that this appeal was filed in the name of Eli Saulson. 

As discussed, however, the record owner of the property is Sandy Bottom Island LLC. 

Sandy Bottom Island LLC is the proper party-in-interest and named petitioner in this 

matter and the docket should be corrected to reflect the same, with Eli Saulson as the 

 

3 MCL 211.27a(7)(m) states that a “transfer of ownership” does not include “a transfer of real property or 

other ownership interests among corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, limited liability 

partnerships, or other legal entities if the entities involved are commonly controlled.” Id. 

4 A “trust” is defined as “A fiduciary relationship regarding property and charging the person with title to 

the property with equitable duties to deal with it for another's benefit; the confidence placed in a trustee, 

together with the trustee's obligations toward the property and the beneficiary.” TRUST, Black's Law 

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). A “legal entity” is defined as “a body, other than a natural 

person, that can function legally, sue or be sued, and make decisions through agents.” LEGAL ENTITY, 

Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A trust cannot sue or be sued directly, as it is the duty of the 

trustee to administer the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries, MCL 700.7801, to control and protect the 

property of the trust, MCL 700.7810, to enforce any claims of the trust, MCL 700.7812, and to marshal 

and collect outstanding trust property, MCL 700.7813(1).” In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 

Mich App 339, 356; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (emphasis added). 

5 The petition states that Eli Saulson is the only trustee of the trust and appears to rely on this in support 

of the “ownership” argument, but as noted by the Court of Appeals, “a trustee manages trust property 

held in trust for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. Although the trustee has extensive control over the 

trust, he or she is ultimately liable to the beneficiaries. Further, MCL 211.27a(6)(e) specifically provides 

that a transfer of ownership occurs if the beneficiaries of a trust are changed. There is no similar 

provision for when the trustees of a trust are changed because, quite simply, the trustees do not own the 

property. Sebastian J Mancuso Family Trust v City of Charlevoix, 300 Mich App 1, 7–8; 831 NW2d 907 

(2013) (citations omitted, emphasis added). See also Apollinari v Johnson, 104 Mich App 673; 305 

NW2d 565 (1981), wherein the Court noted that “the separation of legal and equitable title is one of the 

distinctive features of the trust relationship. Legal title vests in the trustee to be held for the benefit of the 

beneficiary.” Id. at 675. 

6 TRJ & E Props, LLC v City of Lansing, 323 Mich App 664, 671; 919 NW2d 795 (2018). 

7 MCL 450.4504(1) and (2). See also VanderWerp v Plainfield Charter Twp, 278 Mich App 624; 752 

NW2d 479 (2008). 

8 MCR 2.116(I)(1) provides: “If the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 

or if the affidavits or other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court shall 

render judgment without delay.” Id.

MTT Docket No. 26-002451 

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authorized representative.9 The noted error is appropriately corrected under the 

misnomer doctrine.10 Therefore, 

 

IT IS ORDERED that the docket shall be CORRECTED to reflect Sandy Bottom Island 

LLC as Petitioner in this case. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Joint Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment is 

DENIED. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Respondent. 

 

This Final Opinion and Judgment resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes 

this case. 

 

APPEAL RIGHTS 

If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for 

reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of 

Appeals. 

 

A motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Tribunal with the required filing fee 

within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision 

closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing 

system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such 

motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless 

the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a 

principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the 

decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty or disabled veterans exemption and, 

if so, there is no filing fee. You are required to serve a copy of the motion on the 

opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to 

electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the 

motion. Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral 

arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal. 

 

Alternatively, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the 

claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If 

the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal 

by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the 

record on appeal. There is no certification fee. 

 

 

Entered: July 27, 2026 

 

 

 

 

By: /s/ Patricia L. Halm 

ejg/am 

 

9 Pursuant to MCL 205.735a, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction can only be invoked by a party in interest. The 

Michigan Court of Appeals has held that “a ‘party in interest’ includes persons or entities with a property 

interest in the property being assessed.” Spartan Stores, Inc v City of Grand Rapids, 307 Mich App 565, 

567 (2014). 

10 See Vanco 1 LLC v Grand Rapids, unpublished opinion per curiam of the court of appeal, issued 

November 18, 2014 (Docket no. 317305).

MTT Docket No. 26-002451 

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PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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