Full record / 25-002924 Dismiss Res No MBOR.pdf

25-002924 Dismiss Res No MBOR.pdf

Brandon Por, Petitioner V Township Of Cato, Respondent · 25-002924-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

 

GRETCHEN WHITMER 

GOVERNOR 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

LANSING

MARLON I. BROWN, DPA 

DIRECTOR 

 

 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL · 611 W. OTTAWA ST., LANSING, MI 48933 · 517-335-9760 

PO BOX 30232, LANSING, MI 48909 · Other Carriers: 2407 N. GRAND RIVER AVE., LANSING, MI 48906 

Brandon Por, 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

Petitioner, 

SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

 

v 

 

MTT Docket No. 25-002924 

 

Cato Township, 

 

Presiding Judge 

Respondent. 

 

Patricia L. Halm 

 

ORDER VACATING SEPTEMBER 16, 2025 ORDER HOLDING 

PETITIONER IN DEFAULT 

 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

 

On September 16, 2025, the Tribunal issued an order placing Petitioner in default. In 

response, on September 19, 2025, Petitioner filed a copy of their petition to the March 

Board of Review (BOR) and a signed affidavit from Petitioner’s authorized 

representative stating they never received a copy of the BOR results. 

 

The Tribunal has considered the file in this case and finds that it entered an order 

holding Petitioner in default because Petitioner failed to file a copy of the notice giving 

rise to the appeal, i.e. BOR decision.1 The pleadings and accompanying documentation 

indicate that Petitioner is appealing the true cash, state equalized, and taxable values 

for Parcel No. 59-004-550-047-00 for the 2025 tax year. While Petitioner asserts to 

having protested to the BOR, Respondent’s answer, filed on October 16, 2025, 

indicates Respondent never received Petitioner’s protest to the BOR, and thus no BOR 

decision was made. Therefore, the Tribunal finds good cause to vacate the default 

order. 

 

Moreover, the Tribunal finds it has no authority over this parcel under MCL 205.735a(3), 

nor any authority over Petitioner’s appeal as a final decision of the BOR is a prerequisite 

for invoking the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.2 Because Respondent never received 

Petitioner’s protest to the March BOR, Petitioner failed to complete the prerequisite step 

of appealing to the BOR and thus failed to invoke the Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction 

over this proceeding. In Sixarp LLC v Byron Twp,3 the Michigan Supreme Court 

reiterated previous appellate decisions in its reasoning that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is 

statutory by nature. The Court stated: 

 

 

1 The order further stated: “Failure to comply with this order will result in the defaulted party being 

required to file a motion to set aside the default (with appropriate filing fee).” 

2 See MCL 205.731. 

3 Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, __Mich __; __ NW3d __ (2025) (Docket No 166190) at 8.

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MTT Docket No. 25-002924 

Page 2 of 3 

 

MCL 205.735a(3) “is not a notice statute, but is a jurisdictional statute that 

governs when and how a petitioner invokes the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” 

We therefore overrule Parkview4 to the extent that it incorrectly held that the 

protest requirement of . . . the precursor to MCL 205.735a . . . is a mere 

“procedural requirement for perfecting an appeal in the Tax Tribunal” and 

not an express limitation on the MTT’s jurisdiction. Instead, the protest 

requirement of MCL 205.735a(3) may only be waived by the court if 

necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process violation that deprived 

the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right to protest.5 

 

The Tribunal finds that the same reasoning relied upon in Sixarp is applicable in this 

case. The Legislature created a statutory jurisdiction prerequisite that a residential 

valuation be appealed to the March BOR prior to a petition being filed with the Tribunal. 

MCL 205.735a(3) controls the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over an appeal. The Tribunal has 

no equitable power to disregard a statutory filing deadline.6 “[S]imply because the 

plaintiffs' underlying claim has a constitutional dimension, and may even be meritorious, 

does not excuse the plaintiffs' failure to assert their claim within the applicable statutory 

period of limitation.”7 

 

The Tribunal notes that the answer in this case contends that Respondent did not 

receive Petitioner’s protest to the March BOR. This contention of improper notice, if 

actionable, would require a determination by an applicable authority that the purported 

error resulted in a due-process violation. As explained above, the Tribunal lacks any 

equitable authority to consider a potential due-process violation. Jurisdiction as a result 

of a failure of a unit of government to comply with a statutory obligation, if there was 

any, may be vested upon the Tribunal by a judicial body only as a matter of equity.8 

Lacking jurisdiction, the only appropriate action is dismissal. Therefore, 

 

IT IS ORDERED that the September 16, 2025 Order Holding Petitioner in Default is 

VACATED. 

 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is DISMISSED. 

 

This order resolves all pending claims in this matter and closes this case. 

 

 

 

4 Parkview Memorial Ass’n v City of Livonia, 183 Mich App 116; 454 NW2d 169 (1990). 

5 See Sixarp at 8. (Citations omitted). 

6 The Tribunal’s powers are limited to those authorized by statute and do not include powers of equity. 

See Federal-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 161 Mich App 346 (1987), Elec Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 

253 Mich App 538 (2002), and VanderWerp v Plainfield Twp, 278 Mich App 624 (2008). 

7 See Szymanski v City of Westland, 420 Mich 301, 303; 362 NW2d 224, 225 (1984). 

8 See Sixarp at 4, 8. The court held respectively that “the Court of Appeals remedied the violation by 

vesting the MTT with jurisdiction to consider the exemption claim as a matter of equity” and that Petitioner 

was required to demonstrate that Respondent deprived it of its right to constitutional due process to 

invoke this court’s jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.)

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MTT Docket No. 25-002924 

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APPEAL RIGHTS 

If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for 

reconsideration with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of 

Appeals. 

 

A motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Tribunal with the required filing fee 

within 21 days from the date of entry of the final decision. Because the final decision 

closes the case, the motion cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing 

system; it must be filed by mail or personal service. The fee for the filing of such 

motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and $25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless 

the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of property and the property had a 

principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the petition was filed or the 

decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty or disabled veterans exemption and, 

if so, there is no filing fee. You are required to serve a copy of the motion on the 

opposing party by mail or personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to 

electronic service, and proof demonstrating that service must be submitted with the 

motion. Responses to motions for reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral 

arguments unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal. 

 

Alternatively, you may file a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. If the 

claim is filed within 21 days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal of right.” If 

the claim is filed more than 21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal 

by leave.” A copy of the claim of appeal must be filed with the Tribunal to certify the 

record on appeal. There is no certification fee. 

 

 

Entered: November 19, 2025 

 

 

By _____________________________ 

kac/jc 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

 

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent on the entry date indicated above to the 

parties or their attorneys or authorized representatives, if any, utilizing either the mailing 

or email addresses on file, as provided by those parties, attorneys, or authorized 

representatives. 

 

By: Tribunal Clerk

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