Motion for Reconsideration_Distro 10_FINAL.pdf

Distro 10 Inc, Petitioner Vs. City Of Warren, Respondent · 25-001898-TT

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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL 

 

DISTRO 10, INC., 

 

 

 

Petitioner, 

 

v 

 

CITY OF WARREN, 

 

 

 

Respondent. 

 

 

 

Docket No. 25-001898 

Parcel No. 12-99-02-217-200 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________________/ 

 

ALAN SHAMOUN (P76992) 

JAMILA J. GARMO (P85952) 

Attorneys for Petitioners 

21445 Hoover Road, Suite 101 

Warren, MI 48089 

(248)808-5222 

LAURA M. HALLAHAN (P42101) 

SETH A. O’LOUGHLIN (P80257) 

KELSEA M. MELCHER (P85821) 

HALLAHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 

Attorneys for Respondent 

1750 S. Telegraph Road, Suite 202 

Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302 

(248) 731-3089 

_____________________________________________________________________________/ 

 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE 

TRIBUNAL’S JULY 30, 2025 ORDER HOLDING PETITIONER IN DEFAULT 

 

Respondent, City of Warren, by and through its counsel, Hallahan & Associates, P.C., 

states the following in support of the above captioned Motion: 

1. 

Notice was issued to Petitioner on March 30, 2025 (hereinafter Board of Review’s 

Notice) that the March Board of Review had denied Petitioner’s appeal request for the Eligible 

Manufacturing Personal Property (hereinafter EMPP) exemption due to insufficient evidence.1 

2. 

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition with the Tribunal on May 30, 2025 

appealing the aforementioned denial of its requested EMPP exemption under MCL 211.9m and/or 

MCL 211.9n.2 

 

1 Docket entry no. 2 at Exhibit B. 

2 Id.

2

3. 

On July 30, 2025, the Tribunal issued an Order Holding Petitioner in Default 

based on Petitioner’s failure to “pay the full required petition filing fee under Tribunal rules.”3 

4. 

The Order went on to further state: 

[T]he Tribunal finds that dismissal is not appropriate at this time. 

Specifically, the petition was not filed within 35 days of the March 

Board of Review (BOR) decision as required by MCL 211.9m(2)(c). 

However, the BOR decision incorrectly states or implies that the 

appeal of commercial property was required to be filed with the 

Tribunal by May 31 and does not reference the more specific EMPP 

appeal deadline under statute. The notice of denial is not 

constitutionally sufficient if it does not include information about 

the appeal of that denial notice. See Six[a]rp LLC v Byron Twp, __ 

NW3d __ (2025 WL 921773) (2025). Here, while information was 

included, that information was not correct. Petitioner did submit the 

petition within the time period provided by the incorrect notice.4 

5. 

Respondent seeks reconsideration of the Tribunal’s conclusion Petitioner did not 

receive constitutionally sufficient notice as well as that dismissal of the above captioned appeal is 

not appropriate at this time. 

Grounds for Reconsideration 

6. 

TTR 261(1) provides that the Tribunal “may order a rehearing or reconsideration 

of any decision or order upon its own initiative or motion filed within 21 days after the entry of 

the decision or order sought to be reheard or reconsidered.” 

7. 

However, TTR 261(1) does not set forth an applicable standard of review nor does 

any other Tribunal rule. As such, pursuant to TTR 201(5), MCR 2.119(F)(3) provides the 

applicable standard. 

8. 

MCR 2.119(F)(3) states, in pertinent part, “a motion for rehearing or 

reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by the court, either expressly or 

 

3 Docket entry no. 8. 

4 Id.

3

by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The moving party must demonstrate a palpable 

error by which the court and the parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of 

the motion must result from correction of the error.” 

9. 

A palpable error has been defined as an error which is “easily perceptible, plain, 

obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest.”5 

The Presence of a Palpable Error 

10. 

A palpable error is present with respect to the Tribunal’s conclusion that the notice 

provided to Petitioner re its opportunity to have its claims heard before the Tribunal was 

constitutionally insufficient as well as the Tribunal’s assumption of jurisdiction due to this alleged 

due process violation. 

The Board of Review’s Notice 

11. 

While the Board of Review’s Notice was issued on a standard denial form that 

allows Respondent to timely issue notice re all determinations rendered by the Board of Review, 

the Notice did not provide Petitioner with any inaccurate appeal information. Said notice 

accurately informed Petitioner that it “MUST file [its] Petition no later than May 31.”6 It did not 

advise Petitioner that it had until May 31 or that it, otherwise, had more than 35 days to file an 

appeal with the Tribunal.7 

12. 

Any belief that said Notice implied Petitioner had until May 31, 2025 to appeal 

overlooks the information and documentation Petitioner was previously provided and/or had 

knowledge of. For example, in claiming the EMPP exemption Petitioner was required to certify 

that the exemption requirements of the MCL 211.9m and/or MCL 211.9n were met.8 As the 

 

5 Luckow v Luckow, 291 Mich App 417, 426; 805 NW2d 453 (2011) (citation and alteration omitted). 

6 Docket entry no. 2 at Exhibit B (emphasis added). 

7 See id. 

8 Id. at Exhibit A.

4

Tribunal notes, the plain language of MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n require that “[a]n appeal of 

a denial by the March board of review may be made by filing a petition with the Michigan tax 

tribunal within 35 days of the denial notice.”9 

13. 

“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 

situation demands.”10 The State is, however, “afforded great flexibility in satisfying the 

requirements of due process in the field of taxation.”11 This is “because of the significant interest 

states have in their own financial stability” and the “substantial governmental interest in the prompt 

and efficient collection of taxes.” 

14. 

Petitioner’s obvious knowledge of MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n—and the 

statutory requirements set forth therein—via its request for exemption under said statutes, put 

Petitioner on notice of its need to appeal to the Tribunal within 35 days of the Board of Review’s 

determination.12 Moreover, the Board of Review’s Notice did not advise nor imply that Petitioner 

was otherwise not required to adhere to the requirements of MCL 211.9m and/or MCL 211.9n in 

securing its opportunity to be heard before the Tribunal. 

15. 

To hold that Respondent was required to provide Petitioner more explicit direction 

regarding the appeal process it not only contrary to the flexible process of due process but also 

unfeasible given the number of property tax assessment and appeal related notices Respondent, 

and municipalities across the state, are tasked with drafting and delivering each year in a very 

limited period of time. 

 

9 MCL 211.9m(2)(c); MCL 211.9n(3)(c). 

10 Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 481 (1972). 

11 By Lo Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267 Mich App 19, 29; 703 NW2d 822 (2005). 

12 See, e.g., Docket entry no. 2 at Exhibit B.

5

16. 

Petitioner was informed of its opportunity to be heard before the Tribunal in 

accordance with the constitutional standards of due process. It was a palpable error for the Tribunal 

to conclude the inverse. 

The Tribunal’s Assumption of Jurisdiction 

17. 

Notwithstanding the fact the Board of Review’s Notice was constitutionally 

sufficient, whether there has been a violation of constitutional due process is a matter outside of 

this Tribunal’s review. 

18. 

The Tribunal appears to rely on Sixarp LLC v Byron Twp for the proposition that 

due to an alleged violation of constitutional due process, the Tribunal may waive the jurisdictional 

requirements of MCL 211.9m/n and allow this appeal to proceed. However, the Supreme Court 

held in Sixarp LLC that the “the Tribunal has no equitable power to waive or otherwise disregard 

a statutory requirement or filing deadline.”13 

19. 

The fact the Tribunal had no authority to waive the jurisdictional filing deadlines 

set forth in MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9m was emphasized by the Supreme Court throughout its 

opinion: (1) the taxpayer “did not satisfy the statutory requirements for the MTT to exercise 

jurisdiction;”14 (2) “MTT correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the claim;”15 

(3) “MTT correctly explained that ‘because the Tribunal has no equitable power to waive or 

otherwise disregard a statutory requirement or filing deadline, it has no authority to grant’ [the 

taxpayer’s] exemption request.”16 

 

13 Sixarp, LLC v Twp of Byron, ___ Mich ___; ___NW3d___ (2025) and attached as Exhibit 1. 

14 Exhibit 1 at p 15. 

15 Id. at p 10. 

16 Id. at p 11.

6

20. 

The Supreme Court only examined the issue of due process to see if the taxpayer 

could “invoke th[e Supreme] Court’s judicial power to waive the jurisdictional requirements.”17 

If Petitioner believes its due process has been violated then relief relative to remedying such an 

alleged violation would need to be sought from a judicial body with powers of equity and the 

authority to consider such constitutional questions. 

21. 

 As the Supreme Court has made clear, the Tribunal is not a venue that can offer 

Petitioner such relief. The Tribunal has no authority to waive the jurisdictional requirements of 

MCL 211.9m and/or MLC 211.9n—regardless of any alleged due process violation that has 

occurred. 

22. 

In Sixarp LLC, the Tribunal was required to “dismiss[] the petition” when the 

taxpayer failed adhere to the jurisdictional requirements of MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n.18 The 

Tribunal is required to do the same here due to Petitioner’s failure to file a petition with the 

Tribunal within 35 days of the Board of Review’s Notice as required by MCL 211.9m(2)(c) and 

MCL 211.9n(2)(c). 

23. 

It was a palpable error for the Tribunal to conclude “dismissal [wa]s not 

appropriate” and to allow the above captioned appeal to proceed despite the Tribunal’s finding 

Petitioner had failed to adhere to the jurisdictional requirements of MCL 211.9m and/or MCL 

211.9n. 

24. 

For the reasons set forth above, reconsideration should be granted to the Tribunal’s 

July 30, 2025 holding and the above captioned appeal be dismissed. 

 

17 Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 

18 Id. at 6.

7

WHEREFORE, Respondent, City of Warren, requests the Tribunal enter an Order: 

(A) Granting Respondent’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration; and 

(B) Ordering the above captioned appeal be dismissed based on the Tribunal’s lack of 

jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s exemption claims under MCL 211.9m and MCL 

211.9n. 

 

HALLAHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 

 

 

/s/Kelsea M. Melcher ____________ 

LAURA M. HALLAHAN (P42101) 

SETH A. O’LOUGHLIN (P80257) 

KELSEA M. MELCHER (P85821) 

Attorneys for Respondent 

1750 S. Telegraph Road, Suite 202 

Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302 

Dated: August 20, 2025 

(248) 731-3089 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PROOF OF MAILING 

 

On the date below I sent by electronic mail a copy of the foregoing Respondent’s Motion for Partial 

Reconsideration to: 

Alan Shamoun 

alan@mgmt10.com 

 

I declare that the statement above is true to the best of my information, knowledge and belief. 

 

 

/s/Kelsea M. Melcher_______________ 

Dated: August 20, 2025 

Kelsea M. Melcher

Exhibit 1

SIXARP, LLC v TOWNSHIP OF BYRON 

 

Docket No. 166190. Argued on application for leave to appeal December 4, 2024. Decided 

March 26, 2025. 

 

Sixarp, LLC, doing business as Praxis Packaging Solutions, filed a petition in the Michigan 

Tax Tribunal against the Township of Byron, alleging that its constitutional right to due process 

was violated by the failure of the township’s assessor, Timothy Baker, to notify Praxis of its right 

to appeal the township’s decision denying its request for a tax exemption and to explain the reason 

for the denial. Praxis operated a manufacturing facility in the township. In February 2021, Praxis 

applied to the township for the eligible manufacturing personal property (EMPP) exemption under 

MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n for the 2021 tax year related to some of its manufacturing 

equipment. Baker denied the application on the grounds that the “qualified new personal property” 

or “qualified existing personal property” claimed by Praxis did not meet the definition of EMPP 

set forth in the statutes. The denial notice included a section titled “Notification of Taxpayers 

Right of Appeal,” which stated that a taxpayer could appeal a denial of the EMPP exemption before 

the March Board of Review and that filing a protest was “necessary” to protect the right to further 

appeal a dispute over an EMPP exemption in the tribunal. In February 2021, the township mailed 

a notice of assessment to Praxis that included an increased tentative state-equalized taxable value 

for the current tax year and taxable value for the previous year for its personal property. The notice 

of assessment also specified that taxpayers who disputed the values in the notice had to appeal 

before the March Board of Review, and it included the Board’s meeting times and a phone number 

to call to make an appointment to meet with the Board. Praxis’s agents contacted Baker regarding 

the details of submitting an appeal. In his communications with Praxis’s agents, Baker did not 

provide any deadlines for submitting an appeal or advise them of the Board’s hearing date or of 

the filing requirements for an appeal. Baker did advise Praxis to email him a letter appeal. Praxis’s 

agent sent Baker a letter appeal on March 10, 2021, but the Board had adjourned the evening of 

March 9, 2021, and Baker replied via email that the appeal was too late. Praxis did not appear 

before the March Board and the Board did not consider Praxis’s appeal. Praxis then petitioned the 

Tax Tribunal, and the township moved for summary disposition, arguing in part that the tribunal 

lacked jurisdiction because Praxis had failed to first appeal before the Board. The tribunal granted 

the township’s motion and dismissed Praxis’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Praxis appealed in 

the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded to the tribunal. 348 Mich App 1 (2023). The 

Court of Appeals held that the township’s efforts to provide notice to Praxis did not comport with its 

statutory obligations under MCL 211.9m(3) or MCL 211.9n(3) and therefore deprived Praxis of due 

 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Syllabus 

 

Chief Justice: 

Elizabeth T. Clement 

 

Justices: 

Brian K. Zahra 

Richard H. Bernstein 

Megan K. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth M. Welch 

Kyra H. Bolden 

Kimberly A. Thomas 

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

process. The Court of Appeals vested the tribunal with jurisdiction as a matter of equity to consider 

Praxis’s exemption claim. The township applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and in 

lieu of granting leave, the Court ordered oral argument on the application. 513 Mich 1052 (2024). 

 

In a unanimous opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court held: 

 

Praxis failed to timely protest the township’s exemption denial before the March Board of 

Review despite receiving timely notice from the township; therefore, the Tax Tribunal did not have 

jurisdiction to hear Praxis’s claim. 

 

1. Under MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 211.9n(3), when an EMPP exemption request is 

denied before the first substantive meeting of the Board of Review, the denial must be appealed 

before the Board. If the petitioner does not prevail before the Board, the Board’s decision may be 

appealed by filing a petition with the tribunal. Similarly, an assessment dispute as to the valuation 

or exemption of property must be protested to the Board before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction. 

The tribunal has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the final decision of an agency related to 

an assessment or valuation under MCL 205.731. Under the doctrine of in pari materia, MCL 

205.731 must be read together with MCL 205.735a (requiring that an assessment be protested 

before the Board) and MCL 211.9m(2)(c) and MCL 211.9n(2)(c) (which require that a petition be 

filed with the tax tribunal to appeal a denial by the Board). Thus, the tribunal could not exercise 

jurisdiction in this case because the township denied the exemption before the Board met, and 

Praxis failed to appeal the decision before the Board. Further, as the tribunal correctly noted, it 

had no equitable power to waive or otherwise disregard a statutory requirement or filing deadline, 

so it had no authority to grant Praxis’s exemption request. The Court of Appeals concluded that 

under Parkview Mem Ass’n v Livonia, 183 Mich App 116 (1990), the requirement to protest before 

the Board could be waived or excused because Praxis had received inadequate notice. However, 

in Parkview, although the petitioners did not protest before the Board, the Court remanded the 

petitioners’ claims to the tribunal because the petitioners had received the tax assessments mailed 

by the respondent two days after the Board had adjourned. Accordingly, the Parkview Court 

concluded that the late notices violated due process because they were not provided in a manner 

reasonably calculated to afford the petitioners notice and an opportunity to be heard. Parkview 

was overruled to the extent that it held that the jurisdictional requirements of MCL 205.735, 

including the protest requirement, are merely “procedural requirements for perfecting an appeal” 

in the tribunal that are not express limitations on the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Legislature clearly 

mandated that the requirements for appeal in the tribunal under MCL 205.735 are jurisdictional, 

and the requirements of the statute may only be waived by the court if necessary to remedy a 

constitutional due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right 

to protest. Because Praxis did not satisfy the statutory requirements for the tribunal to exercise 

jurisdiction by first protesting the township’s decision before the Board, it had to demonstrate that 

the township deprived it of its right to constitutional due process in order to invoke the Court’s 

judicial power to waive the jurisdictional requirements. 

 

2. MCL 211.9m addresses new manufacturing personal property, and MCL 211.9n 

addresses previously existing manufacturing personal property. Under both statutes, an assessor’s 

denial of an EMPP exemption must (1) be sent in writing to the person who filed the form, (2) 

contain a statement of the reason for the denial, and (3) advise the person that they have the right 

to appeal the denial before the Board under MCL 211.30 by filing a “combined document” as

described by MCL 211.9m(2) and MCL 211.9n(2). There was no dispute that the written notice 

sent by the township to Praxis satisfied the first requirement. Regarding the second requirement, 

the notice stated the reason for the denial: the claimed personal property did not meet the statutory 

definition of EMPP under the statutes. Although Praxis argued that this reason was insufficient, 

the statutory language does not require more detail than Baker provided. Further, although the 

stated reason for the denial was succinct, it did not deprive Praxis of its procedural-due-process 

rights. Praxis was not erroneously deprived of the claimed exemptions, given that the denial notice 

informed Praxis that it could avail itself of the Board’s appeal process. Regarding the third 

requirement, the notice advised Praxis that it had to appeal before the Board, but it omitted specific 

meeting dates and times and the statutory requirement to refile the combined document that was 

submitted with its exemption request. At minimum, procedural due process requires notice and 

an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner. Thus, although the denial notice was 

flawed, due process is a flexible concept, and mechanically applying the denial notice requirements 

would be insufficient to review whether due process has been provided. The notice clearly 

explained that appealing the denial before the Board was required to preserve the taxpayer’s 

appellate rights. Additionally, Praxis had timely notice of the Board’s meeting dates and times, 

the deadlines for filing a letter protest or scheduling an appearance, and the valuation of the 

property at issue without the requested exemption. The notice of assessment of the property’s 

increased taxable value also included information about the Board’s meeting dates, times, 

deadlines, and other details. Although a posting in a local newspaper inaccurately stated that 

appointments could be made with the Board from March 1 through March 10, 2021, the body of 

the posting also specified that the Board would meet on March 8, 2021, and March 9, 2021. 

Therefore, it was discernable from the posting that its statement that appointments could be made 

on March 10 was erroneous. Further, there was no evidence that Praxis relied on the inaccuracy 

in the posting when it emailed its request for an appointment to Baker on March 10. 

 

3. In concluding that Praxis was denied due process, the Court of Appeals relied in part on 

the fact that Baker failed to provide Praxis’s agents with the deadline for filing a letter appeal 

despite encouraging them to use this method of appeal. Baker provided statutorily accurate 

information, however, and he was not required by statute to provide any additional information, 

such as the dates of the hearing or that the combined document had to be refiled to perfect the 

appeal. Additionally, although Praxis accurately noted that the denial notice did not advise it of 

the requirement to refile the combined document with its appeal, Praxis was not denied an 

opportunity to challenge the denial on this basis. Rather, Praxis did not appear before the Board 

because it failed to timely file a written appeal. The township’s efforts to provide notice, including 

the denial notice, the notice of assessment, and the information provided by Baker, when taken 

together were reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise Praxis of the appeal 

process and to afford Praxis an opportunity to present its objections to the township’s actions. 

Moreover, although there were some shortcomings in the denial notice, Praxis received actual 

notice of the deadline and schedule for perfecting a written appeal to the Board in the notice of 

assessment. Because there was no constitutional violation, there was no basis to waive the 

jurisdictional requirements. 

 

Court of Appeals judgment reversed and Tax Tribunal order reinstated. 

 

Justice THOMAS did not participate because the Court considered this case before she 

assumed office.

FILED March 26, 2025 

 

 

 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

 

SUPREME COURT 

 

 

SIXARP, LLC, doing business as PRAXIS 

PACKAGING SOLUTIONS, 

 

 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

 

 

v 

No. 166190 

 

TOWNSHIP OF BYRON, 

 

 

 

Respondent-Appellant. 

 

 

 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except THOMAS, J.) 

 

CAVANAGH, J. 

In this case, we consider whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT) can exercise 

jurisdiction over a taxpayer’s challenge to tax-exemption denials when the taxpayer did 

not initially protest those denials before the March Board of Review (the Board) as required 

by MCL 205.735a(3). Taxpayer, Sixarp, LLC, doing business as Praxis Packaging 

Solutions (Praxis), contends that its failure to protest before the Board may be excused or 

waived because respondent, the Township of Byron (the Township), failed to provide 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

OPINION 

 

Chief Justice: 

Elizabeth T. Clement 

 

 

Justices: 

Brian K. Zahra 

Richard H. Bernstein 

Megan K. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth M. Welch 

Kyra H. Bolden 

Kimberly A. Thomas

2 

 

Praxis with constitutionally sufficient notice. We hold that the Township’s notice to Praxis 

did not violate Praxis’s due-process rights and that the Township’s actions did not deprive 

Praxis of its ability to invoke the right to protest. Because Praxis failed to file a timely 

protest before the Board as required by MCL 205.735a(3), the MTT did not have 

jurisdiction to hear Praxis’s claims. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment 

and reinstate the MTT’s dismissal of the petition. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Praxis is a packaging company that operates a manufacturing facility in Byron 

Township. In February 2021, Praxis applied to respondent Township for the eligible 

manufacturing personal property (EMPP) exemption under MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n 

for the 2021 tax year related to some of its manufacturing equipment. On February 9, 2021, 

the Township’s assessor, Timothy Baker, denied Praxis’s request for the EMPP tax 

exemption and mailed the denial notice to Praxis. He provided the following reason for 

the denial: 

I certify that based on my review, the qualified new personal property 

and/or qualified existing personal property claimed on Form 5278 does not 

meet the definition of Eligible Manufacturing Personal Property as defined 

by MCL 211.9m and/or MCL 211.9n, therefore the Eligible Manufacturing 

Personal Property exemption is denied. [Emphasis omitted.] 

The denial notice also contained a section at the bottom labeled “Notification of Taxpayers 

[sic] Right of Appeal” in bold font, which stated, in part, that a taxpayer may appeal an 

assessor’s denial of the EMPP exemption to the March Board of Review under MCL

3 

 

211.301 and that “[f]iling a protest with the Board of Review is necessary to protect your 

right to further appeal an EMPP exemption dispute to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. 

Michigan Tax Tribunal forms are available at www.michigan.gov/taxtrib.” 

On February 17, 2021, the Township mailed a separate notice of assessment to 

Praxis that included the increased tentative state-equalized taxable value for the current 

year and taxable value from the previous year for the property. See MCL 211.24c and 

MCL 211.34c. The notice provided detailed information about appealing the assessed 

values to the Board under the heading “March Board of Appeal Review Information” with 

specific meeting times and instructions: 

Your assessment changed for the following reason(s): 

Personal property was updated on 2/17/2021, any new updates will be 

posted on the website. 

If you believe these values are incorrect you may appeal to the board 

of review which will meet March 8 from 9:00 a.m.to noon, and from 1 p.m. 

to 5 p.m. [and] March 9 from 1:00 p.m.to 5:00 p.m. and from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. 

To appeal these values, call 616-878-6033 before March 5 for an 

appointment with the board of review. Meetings can be attended either in 

person, virtual, or by letter appeal. Petition forms must be completed and are 

available as in the paragraph above. Letter appeals must be received by 

March 5, 2021. The board of review meets in the township hall.[2] 

 

1 The Board of Review is generally required to meet on the second Monday in March, 

although the governing body of the city or township may authorize by ordinance or 

resolution alternative starting dates on either the Tuesday or Wednesday following the 

second Monday in March. MCL 211.30. The Board’s review of assessments must be 

completed on or before the first Monday in April. MCL 211.30a. The Board also meets 

in July and December for the purpose of reviewing qualified errors, but that error type is 

not implicated here. See MCL 211.53b. 

2 Quotations from the notice of assessment have been changed from upper case for 

improved readability.

4 

 

The notice also stated that “[f]iling a protest with the Board of Review is necessary to 

protect your right to further appeal valuation and exemption disputes to the Michigan Tax 

Tribunal and classification appeals to the State Tax Commission.” The Board’s meeting 

schedule was posted publicly on respondent’s website, as well as at the Byron Township 

offices from February 1, 2021 to March 9, 2021.3 

Praxis’s finance controller, Timothy Karsten, received the notice of the EMPP 

exemption denial no later than February 23, 2021. On February 26, 2021, Karsten 

contacted Baker to provide a verbal notice of Praxis’s intent to appeal, request a hearing 

date, and learn the requirements for an appeal. Karsten averred that Baker told him to 

email a letter appeal. Karsten then advised Lisa Pohl, who was retained by Praxis to appeal 

the EMPP exemption denial, of his communications with Baker, including Baker’s 

suggestion to email a letter appeal. In early March 2021, Pohl left Baker a voicemail 

inquiring about the appeal procedure and deadlines and requesting an in-person hearing 

with the Board. Baker returned her call on March 2, 2021, and left a voicemail. According 

to Pohl’s uncertified transcription of the voicemail, Baker told Pohl that she should email 

him the letter appeal so that he could then send her the petition to sign and return. In his 

communications with Karsten and Pohl, Baker did not provide any deadlines, give a 

 

3 Notice was also posted in the Grand Rapids Press on February 21, 23, and 25. The Grand 

Rapids Press posting explained that the Board “shall convene on the 8th day of March, 

2021 and shall sit not less than three calendar days . . . .” It specified meeting times on 

March 8 from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and March 9 from 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. However, 

the posting erroneously indicated in its last sentence that “Board of Review appointments 

may be made by contacting the Assessor’s Office from March 1th [sic] through March 

10th,” despite the fact that the Board would adjourn on March 9. There is no evidence 

that Praxis acted in reliance on the Grand Rapids Press posting, nor has Praxis argued 

that it did so.

5 

 

hearing date, or advise them that the combined document had to be refiled to perfect the 

appeal. 

The Board met on March 8, 2021, and March 9, 2021, to hear taxpayer petitions, 

valuation disputes, and exemption appeals, and adjourned on the evening of the 9th. Pohl 

sent a letter appeal to Baker by email on March 10, 2021, at 6:39 p.m., but it was too late 

because, as Baker explained via email to Pohl the following day, the Board had already 

adjourned at 9:00 p.m. on March 9. Pohl responded and demanded recourse, claiming that 

the assessor was on notice that Praxis intended to appeal. The assessor did not respond. 

Ultimately, Praxis did not appear before the March 2021 Board, and the Board did not 

consider Praxis’s appeal. 

On April 12, 2021, Praxis filed a five-count petition with the MTT. Praxis alleged 

that Baker’s alleged failure to notify Praxis about its appeal rights, as well as his failure to 

provide an adequate explanation as to why Praxis’s EMPP application was denied, violated 

Praxis’s right to due process of law under the United States Constitution, US Const Am 

XIV, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 17.4 Additionally, Praxis asserted 

that it qualified for the EMPP exemption. The Township moved for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and (C)(10) (no questions of 

material fact and judgment required as a matter of law). The Township argued that it had 

provided sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard after denying the exemption as 

required by MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n, but Praxis had failed to appeal to the Board 

 

4 Praxis’s petition did not specifically cite these constitutional provisions but rather cited 

caselaw that relies upon them. See, e.g., Spranger v City of Warren, 308 Mich App 477, 

482-484; 865 NW2d 52 (2014).

6 

 

first, therefore depriving the MTT of jurisdiction. In response, Praxis moved for partial 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was entitled to the 

exemption, that the notice was inadequate as to the reason for the denial and available 

appellate rights, and that the assessor failed to comply with MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 

211.9n(3) when he failed to inform Praxis that it had to refile its combined document to 

perfect its appeal before the Board. Praxis also argued that the MTT had jurisdiction 

because the Township’s inadequate notice deprived Praxis of its due-process right to 

participate in the Board review process. 

On April 12, 2022, the MTT granted the Township’s motion under MCR 

2.116(C)(4), denied Praxis’s motion, and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

The MTT concluded that (1) Praxis failed to demonstrate that MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 

211.9n(3) required a more specific explanation for the denial than one that mirrored the 

statutory language; (2) the Township’s failure to inform Praxis of the requirement to refile 

the combined document with the Board did not violate Praxis’s due-process rights because 

the lack of a combined document was not the reason that the appeal was denied; (3) notice 

of the Board’s meeting schedule was sufficient because it was explicitly provided in the 

notice of assessment as well as generally stated in the statutes; and (4) the notice of 

assessment informed Praxis that it could appeal in person, virtually, or by letter and 

provided all necessary deadlines. In sum, the MTT determined that the Township’s actions 

did not deprive Praxis of a meaningful opportunity to appeal before the Board and, 

therefore, did not deprive Praxis of its right to constitutional due process. 

The MTT also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of Praxis’s 

argument that its equipment qualified for the EMPP exemption, finding that the Township

7 

 

provided sufficient notice of the times and dates that the Board would meet and that the 

contents of the notice of assessment, issued under MCL 211.24c(1), satisfied its obligation 

under MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 211.9n(3). The MTT determined that it was immaterial 

that the Township did not advise Praxis of the requirement to file a combined document 

because the lack of jurisdiction stemmed solely from Praxis’s failure to timely appeal in 

writing. Further, the assessor’s advice to Praxis’s agent, Karsten, that the appeal had to be 

in writing instead of a verbal communication with the assessor comported with the statutory 

requirements. Finally, the MTT concluded it was immaterial that the assessor failed to 

advise Praxis’s agents of the appeal deadline because the notice of assessment provided 

that information. 

Ultimately, the MTT concluded that Praxis’s failure to protest the EMPP denial to 

the Board deprived the MTT of jurisdiction, reasoning that “because the Tribunal has no 

equitable power to waive or otherwise disregard a statutory requirement or filing deadline, 

it has no authority to grant [Praxis] the relief requested.” The MTT subsequently denied 

Praxis’s motion for reconsideration. 

Praxis appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded in 

a published opinion. Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, 348 Mich App 1, ___; ___ NW3d ___ 

(2023). The Court of Appeals held that the Township’s efforts to provide notice to Praxis 

failed to comport with its statutory obligations under MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 211.9n(3) 

and therefore deprived Praxis of due process. Id. at ___; slip op at 13. The Court of 

Appeals remedied the violation by vesting the MTT with jurisdiction to consider the 

exemption claim as a matter of equity. The Township applied for leave to appeal in this

8 

 

Court. We scheduled oral argument on the application and directed the parties to file 

supplemental briefing to address: 

(1) whether the assessor’s denial of the petitioner-appellee’s request for 

exemption as eligible manufacturing personal property satisfied the 

requirements of MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 211.9n(3) and/or due process; (2) 

if not, whether the denial notice’s failure to satisfy those requirements 

relieved the petitioner-appellee of the requirement to protest the denial at the 

2021 March Board of Review; and (3) whether the Michigan Tax Tribunal 

can exercise jurisdiction over this case. [Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp, 513 Mich 

1052, 1052 (2024).] 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Judicial review of MTT decisions “is limited.” Campbell v Dep’t of Treasury, 509 

Mich 230, 237; 984 NW2d 13 (2022). “In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption 

of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided 

for the administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or 

allocation.” Const 1963, art 6, § 28. Given that no fraud is alleged, appellate review in 

this case is limited to whether the MTT committed an error of law or adopted a wrong legal 

principle. Liberty Hill Housing Corp v Livonia, 480 Mich 44, 49; 746 NW2d 282 (2008). 

All the factual findings made by the MTT are final if supported by competent and 

substantial evidence. Mt Pleasant v State Tax Comm, 477 Mich 50, 53; 729 NW2d 833 

(2007). Questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. 

Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 695; 853 NW2d 75 (2014). Jurisdictional questions 

under MCR 2.116(C)(4) are questions of law that are also reviewed de novo. Travelers 

Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 205; 631 NW2d 733 (2001).

9 

 

III. ANALYSIS 

This case concerns the subject-matter jurisdiction of the MTT. “The Tax Tribunal 

Act, MCL 205.701 et seq., defines the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Michigan 

Tax Tribunal as review of a final decision ‘of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, 

rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization under property tax laws.’ ” 

Highland-Howell Dev Co, LLC v Marion Twp, 469 Mich 673, 674; 677 NW2d 810 (2004), 

quoting MCL 205.731(a). Under MCL 205.735a(3), “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in 

this section or by law, for an assessment dispute as to the valuation or exemption of 

property, the assessment must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal 

acquires jurisdiction of the dispute . . . .” 

Here, Praxis did not protest before the Board before filing a petition with the MTT, 

and the MTT consequently dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of 

Appeals determined that the Township inadequately informed Praxis of the time and 

manner for appealing the denial and that the assessor’s failure to comply with the 

provisions of MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 211.9n(3) deprived Praxis of procedural due 

process. Sixarp, 348 Mich App at ___; slip op at 10, 13. As a matter of equity, the Court 

of Appeals determined that remand to the MTT was appropriate, relying on Parkview Mem 

Ass’n v Livonia, 183 Mich App 116, 117-118; 454 NW2d 169 (1990), and its progeny.5 

Sixarp, 348 Mich App at ___; slip op at 11-12. 

 

5 See, e.g., Morehouse v Mackinaw Twp, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of 

Appeals, issued March 17, 2009 (Docket No. 281483); Mich State Univ v Lansing, 

unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 15, 2005 (Docket 

No. 250813).

10 

 

We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the Township’s notice to Praxis failed 

to comply with due process. We, therefore, hold that because Praxis did not appeal the 

denial notice to the Board, the MTT correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction 

over the claim and that dismissal was appropriate. 

A. JURISDICTION OF THE MTT 

We begin by examining the jurisdiction of the MTT to hear Praxis’s petition. The 

relevant statutes provide that when a denial of an EMPP exemption is issued before the 

first substantive meeting of the Board, the denial must be appealed to the Board of Review. 

MCL 211.9m(3); MCL 211.9n(3). Should a petitioner not prevail on their challenge before 

the Board, “[a]n appeal of a denial by the March board of review may be made by filing a 

petition with the Michigan tax tribunal within 35 days of the denial notice.” MCL 

211.9m(2)(c); MCL 211.9n(2)(c). 

Pursuant to MCL 205.735a(3), “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section or by 

law, for an assessment dispute as to the valuation or exemption of property, the assessment 

must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of the 

dispute under subsection (6).” Subsection (6), in turn, states that the jurisdiction of the 

MTT in various types of assessment disputes, including those regarding commercial 

personal property, “is invoked by a party in interest, as petitioner, filing a written petition” 

by a specific deadline. MCL 205.735a(6). Finally, the MTT has exclusive and original 

jurisdiction over review of a final decision of an agency, such as the Board, relating to 

assessment or valuation. MCL 205.731(a).

11 

 

“ ‘Under the doctrine [of in pari materia], statutes that relate to the same subject or 

that share a common purpose should, if possible, be read together to create a harmonious 

body of law.’ ” Pueblo v Haas, 511 Mich 345, 357; 999 NW2d 433 (2023), quoting People 

v Mazur, 497 Mich 302, 313; 872 NW2d 201 (2015). Here, MCL 205.731, which affords 

the MTT exclusive and original jurisdiction over agency assessment and valuation 

decisions, must be read together with both MCL 205.735a, which requires an assessment 

to first be protested before the Board, and MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n, which require 

appealing an EMPP exemption denial before the Board (if the denial was issued before the 

first Board meeting) and, if the Board denies the appeal, filing a petition with the MTT. 

We agree with the MTT that it could not exercise jurisdiction because the Township’s 

assessor denied the exemption before the Board met, and Praxis failed to file an appeal 

with the Board. See MCL 211.9m(2)(c) and (3); MCL 211.9n(2)(c) and (3); MCL 

205.735a(3). 

The MTT correctly explained that “because the Tribunal has no equitable power to 

waive or otherwise disregard a statutory requirement or filing deadline, it has no authority 

to grant” Praxis’s exemption request. See Electronic Data Sys Corp v Flint Twp, 253 Mich 

App 538, 547-548; 656 NW2d 215 (2002), citing Fed-Mogul Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 

161 Mich App 346, 359; 411 NW2d 169 (1987) (explaining that the MTT “does not have 

powers of equity”); see also Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617, 646-649; 322 NW2d 

103 (1982). However, the Court of Appeals held that because Praxis received inadequate 

notice, the requirement to protest before the Board could be excused or waived, and it 

remanded the case for plenary consideration by the MTT. Sixarp, 348 Mich App at ___;

12 

 

slip op at 12. The Court of Appeals premised its authority to waive the protest requirement 

primarily on Parkview, 183 Mich App at 120.6 

In Parkview, the city of Livonia mailed tax assessments to the petitioners two days 

after the Board of Review convened for its last day. Id. at 117-118. Although the Parkview 

Court recognized that the MTT’s exercise of jurisdiction is conditioned on an initial protest 

to the Board and the petitioners did not protest before the Board, the Court determined that 

the petitioners’ claims should be remanded to the MTT. Id. at 118-120. The panel 

premised this remedy on its conclusion that the respondents’ late notices violated due 

process, because although the assessments were valid, they were untimely mailed in 

violation of MCL 211.24c(5).7 Id. at 120. Accordingly, the late notices were not provided 

in a manner reasonably calculated to afford notice and an opportunity to be heard and 

therefore violated the taxpayer’s right to procedural due process. Id. The Parkview Court 

also relied on this Court’s remedial approach in W & E Burnside, Inc v Bangor Twp, 402 

 

6 The panel also relied upon Wells Fargo Rail Corp v Michigan, 344 Mich App 351, 374-

375; 1 NW3d 373 (2022), which recognized that courts’ equitable power “has traditionally 

been reserved for unusual circumstances” and applied equitable tolling to toll the period of 

limitations, remanding to the MTT for consideration of the petitioner’s claim as a timely 

filed petition. (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In that case, there was confusion 

about where the petitioner could file its claim because it was faced with “two ostensibly 

valid statutes: one placing jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and one in the MTT” and the 

petitioner could not predict that the courts would later hold that the statute providing 

jurisdiction in the Court of Claims was implicitly repealed. Id. at 374. No such confusion 

exists in this case. 

7 This section of the statute has been amended several times since Parkview was decided 

and now appears at MCL 211.24c(4), which provides: “The assessment notice shall be 

addressed to the owner according to the records of the assessor and mailed not less than 14 

days before the meeting of the board of review. The failure to send or receive an 

assessment notice does not invalidate an assessment roll or an assessment on that property.”

13 

 

Mich 950l (1978), which remanded a petition to the MTT for plenary consideration despite 

the petitioner failing to satisfy the Board protest requirement. Parkview, 183 Mich App at 

120; see W & E Burnside, Inc v Bangor Twp, 77 Mich App 618, 621; 259 NW2d 160 

(1977). The Court also held that portions of MCL 205.735(1) and (2) imposed “procedural 

requirements for perfecting an appeal in the Tax Tribunal” that codified exhaustion-of-

remedies principles that did not expressly limit the MTT’s jurisdiction. Parkview, 183 

Mich App at 121. 

W & E Burnside involved taxpayers whose assessments nearly doubled from 1974 

to 1975. W & E Burnside, 77 Mich App at 619-620. The taxpayers were required to first 

protest the increase before the Board in order for the MTT to have jurisdiction but were 

unable to do so “as neither had notice of the increase until well after the meetings.” Id. at 

621. Under the relevant statute, MCL 211.24c, a taxpayer was only required to be provided 

notice if more than 30% of the parcels had an assessment increase. Id. at 621, 625. The 

MTT dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 620. The 

Court of Appeals held that if the 30% threshold was met, no notice was necessary and the 

assessment was valid, but if not, the assessment was invalid, and thus, it remanded the case 

to the circuit court to determine whether the threshold was met. Id. at 624-625.8 

 

8 Both Parkview and W & E Burnside interpreted versions of MCL 205.735, which applies 

“to a proceeding before the tribunal that is commenced before January 1, 2007.” MCL 

205.735(1). MCL 205.735 is the precursor to MCL 205.735a, which applies to this case 

and governs “a proceeding before the tribunal that is commenced after December 31, 

2006.” MCL 205.735a(1). The version of MCL 205.735 that was applicable in Burnside 

provided that “[i]n the case of an assessment appeal, the valuation of the same property 

must be protested before the board of review.” MCL 205.735(1), as enacted by 1973 PA 

186. The version of MCL 205.735 that was applicable in Parkview provided that “[f]or an 

assessment dispute as to the valuation of the property or where an exemption is claimed,

14 

 

This Court issued a peremptory order reversing the Court of Appeals, which stated 

in full: 

Leave to appeal is considered May 31, 1978 and, pursuant to GCR 

1963, 853.2(4), in lieu of leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals is reversed 

and the case is remanded to the Tax Tribunal. If the tribunal determines a 

notice should have been sent, the assessment increase is invalid and plaintiff 

is entitled to a refund. If the tribunal determines no notice was required, the 

tribunal must still determine whether or not the assessment increase was 

excessive, and that there is no other bar to granting relief. [W & E Burnside, 

402 Mich at 950l]. 

In sum, this Court ordered the MTT to review the merits despite the taxpayer’s failure to 

first protest before the Board in a case where the respondent provided no notice of the 

assessment increase to petitioners in advance of the Board’s meeting times—effectively 

depriving them of the right to be heard.9 

 

the assessment must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal may 

acquire jurisdiction of the dispute . . . .” MCL 205.735(1), as amended by 1987 PA 23. 

MCL 205.735(2) currently provides that “[f]or an assessment dispute as to the valuation of 

property or if an exemption is claimed, the assessment must be protested before the board 

of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of the dispute . . . .” See 2006 PA 174. 

We analyze pre-MCL 205.735a cases because the statute and its precursor contain 

materially similar language concerning the protest requirements. Compare MCL 

205.735(1), as enacted by 1973 PA 186; MCL 205.735(1), as amended by 1987 PA 23; 

and MCL 205.735(2) with MCL 205.735a(3). 

9 We observe that the Legislature knows how to enact specific exceptions to the general 

jurisdictional protest requirement when it wishes to do so. For instance, when an 

assessment dispute relates to the “valuation of property that is subject to taxation” under 

the Commercial Redevelopment Act, MCL 207.651 et seq., or other enumerated statutes, 

“the assessment may be protested before the board of review or appealed directly to the 

tribunal without protest before the board of review . . . .” MCL 205.735a(4)(c) (emphasis 

added). But the Legislature did not craft such an exception for EMPP cases. We thus find 

that the “Legislature’s statement that the assessment may be protested to the board or 

appealed directly to the Tax Tribunal without protest to the board [in MCL 205.735a(4)] 

demonstrates that the direct appeal is an exception to, not a replacement of, the requirement

15 

 

The Legislature has clearly mandated that the requirement for appeal in the MTT 

under MCL 205.735a(3) is jurisdictional. The statute plainly states that “the assessment 

must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of 

the dispute.” MCL 205.735a(3) (emphasis added). As a result, MCL 205.735a(3) “is not 

a notice statute, but is a jurisdictional statute that governs when and how a petitioner 

invokes the Tax Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” See Electronic Data Sys, 253 Mich App at 542. 

We therefore overrule Parkview to the extent that it incorrectly held that the protest 

requirement of MCL 205.735, the precursor to MCL 205.735a, is a mere “procedural 

requirement[] for perfecting an appeal in the Tax Tribunal” and not an express limitation 

on the MTT’s jurisdiction. Parkview, 183 Mich App at 121.10 Instead, the protest 

requirement of MCL 205.735a(3) may only be waived by the court if necessary to remedy 

a constitutional due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of their ability to invoke 

the right to protest. See Highland-Howell Dev Co, LLC v Marion Twp, 478 Mich 932, 933 

(2007) (citing W & E Burnside for the proposition that “the statutes at issue here cannot be 

construed in a manner that would deny petitioner due process of law”); Wikman, 413 Mich 

at 648 (considering that “there may be an extraordinary case which justifies the exercise of 

equity jurisdiction in contravention of a statute”). 

In this case, Praxis did not satisfy the statutory requirements for the MTT to exercise 

jurisdiction because it did not protest before the Board. Therefore, Praxis must demonstrate 

 

stated under MCL 205.735a(3).” New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Covert Twp, 334 

Mich App 24, 54; 964 NW2d 378 (2020). 

10 See also Morehouse, unpub op at 4 (adopting “the approach set forth in Parkview, except 

for that portion of Parkview[’s] analysis that concludes the requirements of MCL 205.735 

are procedural, not jurisdictional”).

16 

 

that respondent deprived it of its right to constitutional due process to invoke this Court’s 

judicial power to waive the jurisdictional requirements. 

B. DUE PROCESS 

We now turn to whether the Township’s notice to Praxis satisfied statutory 

requirements and, relatedly, due process. Praxis claimed personal property exemptions 

under the former versions of MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n.11 The text of these two 

provisions is nearly identical, differing only in the type of personal property exempted. 

MCL 211.9m concerns new manufacturing personal property, while MCL 211.9n concerns 

previously existing manufacturing personal property. Regarding denials of the 

exemptions, the statutes (using materially identical language) explained: 

If the assessor of the township or city believes that personal property 

for which the form claiming an exemption is timely filed each year under 

subsection (2)(c) is not qualified new personal property or the form filed was 

incomplete, the assessor may deny that claim for exemption by notifying the 

person that filed the form in writing of the reason for the denial and advising 

the person that the denial shall[12] be appealed to the board of review under 

section 30[13] by filing a combined document as prescribed under subsection 

(2).[14] [MCL 211.9m(3); see also MCL 211.9n(3)]. 

 

11 MCL 211.9m and MCL 211.9n, as enacted by 2017 PA 261, effective December 31, 

2017. The Legislature has since amended MCL 211.9m(3) and MCL 211.9n(3), changing 

only the word “shall” to “must.” See 2021 PA 153, effective December 27, 2021. Because 

the statutes were not amended until after Praxis applied for the exemption, the former 

versions of the statutes apply in this case and are cited in this opinion unless otherwise 

noted. 

12 See note 11 of this opinion. 

13 Section 30 (MCL 211.30) sets forth when the Board of Review must meet and how it 

performs its review, including its review of personal property exemptions. 

14 The combined document is the same form that Praxis used to claim the exemption. MCL 

211.9m(2) (“A person shall claim the exemption under this section and section 9n by filing

17 

 

Stated differently, these statutes require that an assessor’s denial of an EMPP exemption 

(1) be in a writing sent to the person who filed the form, (2) contain a statement of “the 

reason for the denial,” and (3) advise the person that they have the right to appeal the denial 

to the Board under MCL 211.30 by “filing a combined document” in the manner required 

by MCL 211.9m(2) and MCL 211.9n(2). 

Against this statutory backdrop, the deprivation of “a significant property interest 

cannot occur except by due process of law.” Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 

235; 848 NW2d 380 (2014). See also US Const, Am XIV (declaring that the government 

shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); 

Const 1963, art 1, § 17 (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, 

without due process of law.”).15 The principle of fundamental fairness is the essence of 

procedural due process. Lassiter v Dep’t of Social Servs of Durham Co, 452 US 18, 24; 

101 S Ct 2153; 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981). At a minimum, procedural due process requires 

notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner. Bonner, 495 Mich 

at 235. Procedural due process is a flexible concept, however, and determining what 

process is due in a particular case depends on the nature of the proceeding, the risks and 

 

each year a combined document that includes: the form to claim the exemption under this 

section and section 9n, a report of the fair market value and year of acquisition by the first 

owner of qualified new personal property, and for any year before 2023, a statement under 

section 19.”). See also MCL 211.9n(2). 

15 We have recognized the “textual similarities between the state and federal Due Process 

Clauses . . . .” Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 503 Mich 169, 186 n 12; 931 

NW2d 539 (2019). Consequently, when interpreting the Due Process Clause of the 

Michigan Constitution, we may “find persuasive” federal precedent interpreting the Due 

Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Id.

18 

 

costs involved, and the private and governmental interests that might be affected. By Lo 

Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267 Mich App 19, 29; 703 NW2d 822 (2005).16 

As to constitutionally sufficient notice, this Court has explained further: 

A fundamental requirement of due process in . . . proceedings [that seek to 

take property from its owner] is “notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 

afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v Central 

Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314; 70 S Ct 652; 94 L Ed 865 

(1950). Interested parties are “entitled to have the [government] employ such 

means ‘as one desirous of actually informing [them] might reasonably adopt’ 

to notify [them] of the pendency of the proceedings.” Dow v Michigan, 396 

Mich 192; 240 NW2d 450 (1976), quoting Mullane, [339 US] at 315. That 

is, the means employed to notify interested parties must be more than a mere 

gesture; they must be means that one who actually desires to inform the 

interested parties might reasonably employ to accomplish actual notice. 

Mullane, [339 US] at 315. However, “[d]ue process does not require that a 

property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his 

property.” Jones[ v Flowers, 547 US 220, 226; 126 S Ct 1708; 164 L Ed 2d 

415 (2006)]. [Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer, 481 Mich 503, 509; 751 NW2d 

453 (2008).] 

As discussed earlier, the statutes require a taxing authority’s assessor to notify a 

taxpayer (1) in writing (2) of the reason for the denial and (3) advise the petitioner that the 

denial must be appealed to the Board by filing a combined document. MCL 211.9m(3); 

 

16 Michigan courts follow the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v 

Eldridge, 424 US 319; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), which set forth three factors 

that must be considered to determine whether a litigant has been afforded due process: 

“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 

safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 

substitute procedural requirement would entail.” [Bonner, 495 Mich at 235, 

quoting Mathews, 424 US at 334-335.]

19 

 

MCL 211.9n(3). In this case, there is no dispute that the written notice satisfied the first 

requirement. As for the second requirement, the notice stated the reason for the denial—

that the personal property claimed did not meet the statutory definition of EMPP under 

MCL 211.9m or MCL 211.9n. Praxis argues that the reason for denial was insufficient. 

However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the statutory language does not require 

more detail than that provided by the assessor as to why he denied the exemption. Sixarp, 

348 Mich App at ___; slip op at 10. Instead, the statutes simply state that the written denial 

must contain “the reason for the denial.” MCL 211.9m(3); MCL 211.9n(3). No specific 

quantum of detail is required. See McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich 276, 286; 917 

NW2d 584 (2018) (“[W]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute 

must be applied as written. [The] court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that 

is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute 

itself.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). And, as the MTT explained, the language 

used in the denial notice mirrors the statutory language that permits the assessor to deny an 

exemption request if the property is not qualified new or previously existing property or if 

the filed form was incomplete. MCL 211.9m(3); MCL 211.9n(3). 

In addition to satisfying these statutory requirements, we do not believe that the 

stated reason for denial, albeit succinct, violates Praxis’s procedural due-process rights. 

Praxis was neither erroneously deprived nor at risk of being erroneously deprived of the 

claimed exemptions, given that the denial notice informed Praxis that it could avail itself 

of the Board’s appeal process and make the case for why its equipment met the statutory 

definition of EMPP. See Bonner, 495 Mich at 235.

20 

 

The third requirement is that the assessor’s denial must advise the petitioner that the 

denial must be appealed to the Board and that this must be accomplished by filing a 

combined document. MCL 211.9m(3); MCL 211.9n(3). The notice in this case advised 

Praxis that it must appeal to the Board but omitted specific meeting dates and times. The 

notice also omitted the statutory requirement to refile the combined document that was 

submitted with the exemption request. We recognize that the denial notice was flawed 

insofar as it failed to state that refiling the combined document was a requirement for 

protesting the denial and that it could have included more detailed information about when 

the Board would meet. But, as stated, due process is a flexible concept, and mechanically 

applying the denial notice requirements is insufficient to review whether due process has 

been provided. See By Lo Oil Co, 267 Mich App at 29. Rather, we must inquire into all 

the particular facts of the notice provided to Praxis because due process “negates any 

concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” See 

In re Adams Estate, 257 Mich App 230, 234; 667 NW2d 904 (2003), quoting Bd of 

Curators of Univ of Missouri v Horowitz, 435 US 78, 86; 98 S Ct 948; 55 L Ed 2d 124 

(1978) (quotation marks omitted). 

The “Notification of Taxpayers [sic] Right of Appeal” section of the denial notice 

stated that a taxpayer may appeal an assessor’s denial to the Board under MCL 211.30, and 

that filing such a protest was necessary to protect the right to further appeal an EMPP 

exemption dispute in the MTT. Despite the absence of information as to the Board’s 

meeting times and dates, the notice clearly explained that appealing the denial before the 

Board was required to preserve appellate rights.

21 

 

In addition, as the MTT found, Praxis had timely actual notice of the Board’s 

meeting dates and times, the deadlines for filing a letter protest or scheduling an 

appearance, and the valuation of the property without the requested exemption. The 

Township sent Praxis a separate notice of assessment because the taxable value of the 

property had increased. See MCL 211.24c and MCL 211.34c. This notice explained that 

the assessment for the personal property (for which Praxis had been denied an exemption) 

was updated on February 17, 2021 (about a week after the EMPP exemption denial notice 

was mailed), and that “[i]f you believe these values are incorrect you may appeal to the 

board of review . . . .” See MCL 211.34c(6) (“An owner of any assessable property who 

disputes the classification of that parcel shall notify the assessor and may protest the 

assigned classification to the March board of review.”). The notice of assessment included 

particularized information about the Board’s meeting dates, times, deadlines, and other 

details. And after setting forth this information, the notice stated that “[f]iling a protest 

with the Board of Review is necessary to protect your right to further appeal valuation and 

exemption disputes to the Michigan Tax Tribunal . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Township 

mailed this notice more than 14 days before the Board’s meeting. See MCL 211.24c(4). 

The MTT’s determination that Praxis received the notice of assessment is supported by the 

record, and Praxis does not dispute receiving it. 

The Court of Appeals and Praxis relied in part on the Grand Rapids Press posting 

that included incorrect dates to conclude that the Township deprived Praxis of due process 

by creating confusion about when the Board would meet. Although the posting 

inaccurately stated in the bottom portion that appointments could be made “from March 

1th [sic] through March 10th,” the boldface body of the posting specified Board meeting

22 

 

times on March 8, 2021, and March 9, 2021, only. It is therefore discernable from the face 

of the posting itself that its closing sentence—that appointments could be scheduled by 

contacting the assessor’s office until March 10—was plainly erroneous. Moreover, 

although Praxis emailed its request for an appointment to respondent’s assessor on March 

10, there is no evidence that Praxis did so in reliance on the inaccurate portion of the 

posting.17 

Praxis also argues that Baker’s communications with Praxis’s agents compounded 

the confusion because Baker encouraged the agents to file a letter appeal without providing 

a deadline for doing so. The Court of Appeals also relied on this fact. This argument is 

misplaced, however, because Baker provided statutorily accurate information to Karsten 

and Pohl when advising them to file a written letter appeal. See MCL 211.9m(3); MCL 

211.9n(3). Baker was not required by statute to provide more information, nor did he 

provide inaccurate information. Viewing the circumstances as a whole—and, notably, the 

fact that Praxis received actual notice via the notice of assessment—Baker’s failure to 

provide deadlines, give a hearing date, or advise Praxis’s agents that the combined 

document had to be refiled to perfect the appeal did not deprive Praxis of due process. 

Praxis’s final argument on this issue concerns the undisputed fact that it was not 

advised of the requirement to file a combined document with its appeal—either in the 

denial notice or by Baker. However, as the MTT correctly held, Praxis did not appear 

 

17 Praxis never argued that it relied on the erroneous posting in its filings with the MTT, 

and neither Karsten nor Pohl asserted in their affidavits that they were confused by or relied 

on the posting. We do not foreclose the possibility that erroneous publications by a local 

taxing authority could affect the due-process analysis when a taxpayer relies on the error 

to their detriment, but there is no evidence that this happened here.

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before the Board because it failed to file a timely written appeal, not because it failed to 

file a combined document. Thus, Praxis was not denied the opportunity to meaningfully 

challenge the denial on this basis and therefore was not denied due process.18 

Taken together, the Township’s denial notice, which stated that protest to the March 

Board of Review was required to protect appellate rights; the notice of assessment, which 

provided specific requirements for perfecting the protest; and the information provided by 

Baker to Praxis’s agents, which was accurate (if less than complete), sufficed to protect 

Praxis’s due-process rights. That is, the Township’s notice efforts were “reasonably 

calculated, under all the circumstances,” to apprise Praxis of the appeal process and to 

“afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Sidun, 481 Mich at 509 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). While actual notice is not required for due process, Jones, 

547 US at 226, “[f]undamental requirements of due process are satisfied if a party received 

actual notice,” Gillie v Genessee Co Treasurer, 277 Mich App 333, 356 n 12; 745 NW2d 

137 (2007), disavowed in part on other grounds by 2 Crooked Creek, LLC v Cass Co 

Treasurer, 507 Mich 1 (2021). Further, “if timely actual notice has been achieved, defects 

in how it was served are rendered harmless.” In re Application of Int’l Transmission Co, 

304 Mich App 561, 568; 847 NW2d 684 (2014). Despite some shortcomings in the denial 

notice, including its failure to advise Praxis of the requirement to submit a combined 

document, Praxis received actual notice of the deadline and schedule for perfecting a 

written appeal to the Board in the notice of assessment. We therefore hold that Praxis’s 

 

18 For this same reason, Praxis was not prevented from meaningfully challenging the denial 

by respondent’s omission of a more specific statement of the reason for denial in the denial 

notice.

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due-process rights were not violated. Finding no constitutional violation, we further hold 

that there is no basis to waive the statutory jurisdictional requirement of protesting to the 

Board before proceeding to the MTT. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Because Praxis failed to timely protest the exemption denial to the March Board of 

Review, and the notice provided by the Township to Praxis satisfied due process, we hold 

that the MTT did not have jurisdiction to hear Praxis’s claim. We therefore reverse the 

Court of Appeals judgment and reinstate the MTT’s order dismissing the petition for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

 

 

Megan K. Cavanagh 

 

Elizabeth T. Clement 

 

Brian K. Zahra 

 

Richard H. Bernstein 

 

Elizabeth M. Welch 

 

Kyra H. Bolden 

 

 

 

THOMAS, J., did not participate because the Court considered this case before she 

assumed office.

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